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A B S T R A C T
Adversaries exploit software vulnerabilities in modern software to compromise
computer systems. While the amount and sophistication of such attacks is constantly
increasing, most of them are based on memory-corruption vulnerabilities—a problem
that has been persisting over the last four decades. The research community has taken
on the challenge of providing mitigations against memory-corruption-based attack
techniques such as code-injection, code-reuse, and data-only attacks. In a constant
arms race, researchers from academia and industry developed new attack techniques to
reveal weaknesses in existing defense techniques, and based on these findings propose
new mitigation techniques with the goal to provide efficient and effective defenses in
the presence of memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Along this line of research, this
dissertation contributes significantly to this goal by providing attacks on the recently
proposed mitigations and more enhanced defenses against memory-corruption-based
attacks.
Specifically, we present sophisticated attacks against the Control-flow Integrity
(CFI) implementation of two premier open-source compilers, and demonstrate
conceptual limitations of coarse- and fine-grained CFI. Our first attack exploits a
compiler-introduced race-condition vulnerability, which temporarily spills read-only
CFI-critical variables to writable memory, and hence, enables the attacker to
bypass the CFI check. Our second attack is a data-only attack that modifies the
intermediate representation of the Just-in-Time (JIT) compiler in browsers to generate
attacker-controlled code. We then turn our attention to attacking randomization-based
defenses. We demonstrate conceptual limitations of randomization with two advanced
memory-disclosure attack techniques. In particular, we demonstrate that the attacker
can bypass any code-randomization either by reading the code directly, or indirectly by
combining static code analysis with a sufficient number of disclosed code pointers.
Based on the insights we gain through our attack techniques, we design and
implement a leakage-resilient code randomization scheme to defeat code-reuse attacks
by using execute-only memory to mitigate memory-disclosure attacks. Since x86 does
not natively support execute-only memory, we leverage memory virtualization to
enable it for server and desktop systems. Moreover, since most embedded systems do
not offer memory virtualization, we demonstrate how to overcome this limitation by
implementing a compiler extension that enables software-based execute-only memory
for ARM-based systems. Lastly, we demonstrate how leakage-resilient randomization
can also be deployed to mitigate data-only attacks against the page table.
III
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Angreifer nutzen Programmierfehler in Software aus, um verwundbare
Computersysteme zu kompromittieren. Während sowohl die Anzahl, als auch die
Komplexität dieser Angriffe weiterhin zunimmt, hat sich an der zugrundeliegenden
Ursache nichts geändert: Seit mehr als vier Jahrzehnten nutzen Angreifer Speicherfehler
aus, um den Kontroll- oder Datenfluss des Programms zur Laufzeit zu manipulieren.
Aus diesem Grund haben es sich Forscher in Universitäten und Unternehmen zum Ziel
gesetzt, effektive und effiziente Verteidigungstechniken gegen speicherfehlerbasierte
Angriffe zu entwickeln. Mit dieser Dissertation tragen wir maßgeblich zu diesem
Ziel bei, indem wir neue Angriffstechniken entwickeln und, basierend darauf, neue
Verteidigungstechniken entwerfen.
Im Besonderen zeigen wir Schwächen bei der Umsetzung feingranularer
Kontrollflussintegrität in zwei weitverbreiteten Compilern sowie konzeptionelle
Schwächen von grob- und feingranularer Kontrollflussintegrität im Allgemeinen auf.
Unsere erste Angriffstechnik nutzt eine Wettlaufsituation aus, die ungewollt vom
Compiler durch die Optimierung des generierten Programmcodes und der darin
enthaltenden Kontrollflussintegritätsverifikationen eingefügt wird. Dabei werden Werte,
die zur Überprüfung der Kontrollflussintegrität aus nicht-schreibbaren Speicher in
Register geladen wurden, während eines Funktionsaufrufes temporär in schreibbaren
Speicher zwischengespeichert. Dort können diese Werte manipuliert und die schützende
Kontrollflussintegrität umgangen werden. Unsere zweite Angriffstechnik modifiziert die
verwendete Zwischendarstellung des Laufzeitcompilers eines Webbrowsers, wodurch
dieser Schadcode generiert. Neben den integritätsbasierten Verteidigungstechniken
überprüfen wir auch randomisierungsbasierte Verteidigungstechniken auf deren
Sicherheit. In diesem Zusammenhang entwickeln wir zwei fortgeschrittene, auf
Speicherlecks basierende Angriffstechniken, die die konzeptionellen Schwächen von
randomisierungsbasierten Verteidigungstechniken verdeutlichen.
Basierend auf den Erkenntnissen, die wir durch das Entwickeln genannter
Angriffstechniken gewonnen haben, entwerfen und implementieren wir eine Technik,
um randomisierungsbasierte Verteidigungstechniken vor Speicherlecks zu schützen.
Diese basiert auf nur-ausführbaren Speicher, welchen wir auf der x86 Architektur mittels
Speichervirtualisierung ermöglichen. Weiter zeigen wir, dass nur-ausführbarer Speicher
für eingebettete Systeme, welche oft keine Speichervirtualisierung unterstützen,
mit Hilfe einer Compilererweiterung auch ohne jegliche Hardwareunterstützung
umgesetzt werden kann. Zuletzt entwerfen wir eine gegen Speicherlecks resistente,
randomisierungsbasierte Verteidigung, die die Datenstruktur zur Verwaltung des
virtuellen Speichers vor datenbasierten Angriffen beschützt.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Our modern society is dominated by computer systems. Nearly every task in our daily
life depends on the availability and proper functioning of computer systems in different
form factors: desktop, smartphone, and tablets. These systems store, process and
transmit security, privacy, and safety critical data. However, the increasing complexity
of these systems comes at the cost of an increased attack surface. Attackers exploit
security vulnerabilities in software, which executes on these systems, with the ultimate
goal to take control of the underlying computing platforms. There are various types
of vulnerabilities that range from misconfiguration, e.g., weak passwords, design flaws,
or low-level memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Software written in unsafe languages,
like C and C++, is particularly vulnerable to the latter type of vulnerabilities because
they require manual memory management. Ensuring correct memory management is a
highly challenging task, particularly, for software such as operating systems, browsers
and document viewers which are comprised of millions of lines of code.
Any mistake while handling memory buffers can lead to a so-called memory-corruption
vulnerability which allows attackers to access the memory of a vulnerable application
in an unintended way. One common mistake during the access of a memory buffer
is a missing bounds check. The attacker can exploit the missing check and force
the application code to access memory that is beyond the bounds of an allocation
memory buffer. As a consequence, the application deviates from its intended behavior.
For example, the infamous Heartbleed bug [133], which affected a widely-used SSL
library, allows the attacker to read past the bounds of an allocated buffer. Attackers
exploited this vulnerability to obtain the private cryptographic keys of affected servers.
Another recent buffer over-read vulnerability [161], which affected one of the internal
components of the content delivery network provider Cloudfare, resulted in the
unintended appending of other users’ data to the response of web-requests.
In many cases, memory-corruption vulnerabilities do not limit the attacker to reading
memory but enable the attacker to overwrite memory of a vulnerable application during
run time as well. Attackers exploit this capability to overwrite code pointers that are
then used by the application to set the control flow. As a consequence, the attacker
controls which code is executed next. By injecting new code (code-injection attack), the
attacker can execute arbitrary malicious payloads within the context of a vulnerable
application. Code-injection attacks are conceptually easy to mitigate by enforcing a
Writable⊕Executable (W⊕X) memory policy which ensures that the attacker cannot
modify existing code, and cannot execute data [136, 159]. However, attackers adapted
their strategies after the widespread adoption of the W⊕X memory policy. Instead of
injecting new code, attackers started to reuse existing code by combining existing code
chunks (code-reuse attack) [117, 192]. This attack technique is much harder to mitigate
because defenders have to differentiate between a benign and a malicious execution path
1
2 introduction
within the application code. Code-reuse attacks are an effective attack technique that is
used in the real world to completely compromise computer systems that range from
mobile phones [63] and browsers on desktop systems [195, 224] to voting machines [34].
The obvious solution to this problem would to be the avoidance of unsafe languages
in the first place. However, this would require billions of lines of code to be rewritten,
a better programming language to be utilized, and adequate training of developers, all
of which is unlikely to occur in the near future. Even if the programming language is
changed to a more secure one, this is unlikely to completely solve the issue of software
vulnerabilities. For example, Java applications do not suffer from memory errors but
are prone to bugs of other vulnerability classes that are often easier to exploit [219].
Ironically, the runtime environment is still written in unsafe languages and contains
exploitable memory errors [64].
To address the problem of memory-corruption vulnerabilities, industry and academic
research groups developed different defense-techniques that aim to mitigate attacks in
the presence of memory errors. To this date, the most successful strategies are Stack
Cookies [48], Writable⊕Executable (W⊕X) memory [136, 159], Address Space Layout
Randomization (ASLR) [97, 150, 218] and Control-flow Integrity (CFI) [5, 107, 137, 215].
It is indisputable that research has raised the bar for exploiting memory-corruption
vulnerabilities, and for conducting code-reuse attacks. Yet, researchers continue to push
the limits of code-reuse attacks and defenses. This arms race has generated many
important insights on how and to what extent we can tackle the security threat posed
by memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, as we will show, there are still a
number of challenges left to mitigate sophisticated code-reuse attacks.
1.1 goals and scope of this dissertation
The main goals of this dissertation are
1. to develop novel attack techniques to bypass state-of-the-art code-reuse attack
mitigations, and
2. to introduce the design and implementation of practical leakage-resilient
code-randomization schemes to mitigate code-reuse attacks.
The research of run-time defenses against code-reuse attacks can be categorized into
randomization-based [119] and control-flow integrity-based [29] defenses. In order to
conduct a code-reuse attack the attacker modifies memory addresses of the targeted
application during run time by means of a memory-corruption attack. This requires
exact knowledge of the memory layout of the target application because any mistake can
crash the target, and hence, terminate the attack. Randomization-based defenses aim to
mitigate code-reuse attacks by increasing the diversity of the memory layout between
two executions of a targeted application. This increases the likelihood that the attacker
will make a mistake during the corruption of the memory. Control-flow integrity, on the
other hand, verifies the integrity of a subset of memory addresses. Specifically, it checks
the integrity of code pointers which are used by the application to determine the target
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of a branch. Both approaches have been subject to intense research—this dissertation
contributes to this research to understand their benefits and limitations—and are being
integrated into the real-world software [97, 137, 150, 215, 218].
In this dissertation, we focus on the execution of memory-corruption attacks. Thus,
we assume that the attacker already discovered a memory-corruption vulnerability in
the targeted application, and a way to take advantage of it. While process of discovering
vulnerabilities is related to the topic of this dissertation, it is another line of research [194,
235], and thus, out-of-scope for this dissertation.
1.2 summary of contribution
To summarize, the main contributions of this dissertation are as follows:
Memory-disclosure Attacks. We introduce the notion of direct and indirect
memory-disclosure attacks, and demonstrate how adversaries can utilize these
techniques to bypass all code-randomization schemes [119] that aim to prevent
code-reuse attacks [192]. Direct memory-disclosure attacks exploit the fact that code
sections in modern systems are readable, hence, attackers, with the capability to disclose
arbitrary memory during run time, can disassemble the randomized code, analyze it,
and adjust their code-reuse attack on-the-fly.
At first, it seems such attacks are mitigated by preventing read access to the code
section [16, 17]. However, we also show that indirect memory-disclosure attacks, which
do not require read access to code section, are as powerful as direct memory-disclosure
attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate how attackers can combine offline knowledge of
the target binary with run-time information, such as code pointers, to bypass code
randomization. Our work on memory-disclosure attacks spawned a new line of research
that investigates different techniques to harden code randomization against disclosure
attacks [16, 17, 21, 51, 52, 80, 124, 206, 229].
Attacks on Control-flow Integrity. We investigate different Control-flow Integrity (CFI)
schemes [4, 137, 215], and present code-reuse attacks that can fully bypass them.
Coarse-grained CFI, as it is currently deployed by Microsoft in Windows 10 [137], allows
indirect branches to target any valid branch target. We show how the attacker can exploit
counterfeit C++ objects to chain multiple C++ virtual function calls together to achieve
arbitrary code-execution without violating the integrity checks of coarse-grained CFI.
This attack can be mitigated through compiled-based fine-grained CFI. We take this
as a motivation to perform a security analysis of two fine-grained CFI implementations
by the most popular open-source compilers, Clang/LLVM and GCC. Our results
show that both compilers introduce security vulnerabilities in the conceptually secure
fine-grained CFI implementation [215]. Specifically, the applied code optimizations have
the unintended side effect that values in registers, which are supposed to be read-only,
are temporarily spilled to writable memory. This also affects read-only values, which are
used during the enforcement CFI, and hence, gives the attacker a small time window to
tamper with these values which results in a full bypass of the CFI enforcement.
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Memory-Disclosure Resilient Code Randomization. We present the design and
implementation of the first practical and effective mitigation against direct and
indirect memory-disclosure attacks [61, 196]. For this purpose, we leverage hardware
virtualization to implement a primitive that enforces execute-only memory. We then
utilize this primitive to prevent direct memory-disclosure attacks by mapping the code
section as execute only. Further, we introduce a novel technique, called code-pointer
hiding (CPH), which uses execute-only memory as a primitive to mitigate indirect
disclosure attacks. In particular, CPH creates an indirection for code pointers that cannot
be resolved by attackers who can read and write arbitrary data.
One disadvantage of our technique is that it relies on hardware virtualization support.
While almost all modern desktop Central Processing Units (CPUs) and selected mobile
CPUs support hardware-accelerated virtualization, this is not true for most embedded
CPUs. To tackle this shortcoming, we design and implement a Software Fault Isolation
(SFI)-inspired [132, 187] software-based execute-only memory technique for Reduced
Instruction Set Computer (RISC)-based CPUs. The impact on the overall run-time
performance is low, just as in our virtualization-based approach, however, it does not
require any hardware-enforced memory protection.
Data-only Attack on JIT compilers. We present a novel data-only attack against
Just-in-Time (JIT) compilers that enables arbitrary code execution. Contrary to
code-reuse attacks, data-only attacks do not alter the control flow but the data flow
of attacked systems. Generally, this limits the expressiveness of data-only attacks. For
example, previous data-only attacks disclosed secret information, like cryptographic
keys, or escalated privileges [38, 99]. Our data-only attack targets the intermediate
representation of the JIT compiler. As a consequence, the JIT compiler generates
attacker-controlled native code. Our attack cannot be mitigated through existing
defenses like code randomization [119], or control-flow integrity [5, 137, 215], and
highlights the power of data-only attacks.
Randomization in the Kernel. We present the design and implementation of a novel
mitigation of data-only attacks against page tables. Recently, researchers published
the first open-source fine-grained control-flow integrity implementation for the Linux
kernel [166]. We perform a security analysis of CFI for the kernel, and our results show
that existing CFI implementations for the kernel can be bypassed by manipulating the
page tables which are used to define memory access permissions that are enforced by
the hardware. Previous work to mitigate attacks against the page tables focused on
implementing policy-based access control to the page tables that either introduces high
run-time overhead, or depend on certain hardware features [14, 15, 53, 77, 176, 200].
Our work, on the other hand, follows a randomization-based approach resilient to
memory-disclosure attacks. In particular, our mitigation ensures that the page tables
are placed at a random location, and all references to this location are protected through
an indirection that can only be resolved by benign code. Our mitigation comes with the
advantage of having no dependencies on special hardware features, and a negligible
performance overhead.
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1.3 outline
This dissertation is structured as follows: in Chapter 2 we provide a comprehensive
overview on memory-corruption attacks and defenses. Therefore, we first introduce
the basics of a memory corruption vulnerability, and then provide a detailed
explanation of how attackers exploit these vulnerabilities to compromise a vulnerable
system. We follow with a description of countermeasures against code-injection and
code-reuse attacks. Specifically, we cover the principals of data execution prevention,
address space layout randomization, and control-flow integrity. In Chapter 3 we
present three novel memory-corruption attacks against randomization- and control-flow
integrity-based code-reuse defenses. Our first attack demonstrates how direct and
indirect memory-disclosure attacks are leveraged to bypass code-randomization-based
defenses (Section 3.1). Our second attack targets control-flow integrity. We demonstrate
how attackers can exploit an imprecise control-flow integrity policy to conduct
Turing-complete code-reuse attacks within the policy boundaries. Further, we highlight
the importance of binary analysis by showing how the code optimization, when
applied to two popular open source compilers, introduce a security vulnerability to
an otherwise sound control-flow integrity implementation. We conclude this chapter
by demonstrating a novel data-only attack against the intermediate representation of
a JavaScript just-in-time compiler. Contrary to previous work, our attack enables the
attacker to generate arbitrary malicious code. In Chapter 4 we turn our attention
to the mitigation of code-reuse attacks by means of code randomization. Based
on our insights from Chapter 3, we design leakage-resilience code randomization.
Specifically, we explore the potential of execute-only memory as a primitive to mitigate
information-disclosure attacks (Section 4.1). While results show that execute-only
memory is a suitable primitive, execute-only memory is not natively supported
through paging. Our initial prototype relies on a hypervisor to enable execute-only
memory for x86 desktop systems, however, most embedded systems do not feature
hardware virtualization. We overcome this limitation by implementing software-based
execute-only memory (Section 4.2). We further present the design of a linker wrapper to
create self-randomizing binaries (Section 4.3). Finally, we present a novel randomization
scheme to protect kernel page tables against data-only attacks (Section 4.4). We conclude
this dissertation in Chapter 5
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B A C K G R O U N D
In this chapter, we provide the background on memory-corruption attacks, that are
typically enabled by implementation errors while using low-level languages, such
as C and C++. These languages allow for flexible and efficient programming, and
hence, are used for almost all modern software. One of their properties is allowing
unrestricted access to the memory. This comes with the disadvantage of offloading the
responsibility of ensuring that all memory accesses are safe onto the programmer. In the
best case, failing to ensure safe memory accesses leads to a crash of the application.
In the worst case, it enables the attacker to completely compromise the application
by providing an input to the targeted application that results in the access of an
unintended section of the application’s memory. From here on we will call an unsafe
or unintended memory access, which leads to an attacker-controlled deviation of the
programmer’s intended behavior of the application, a memory-corruption vulnerability,
and its exploitation memory-corruption attack.
In the following pages, we provide the necessary concepts and technical background
which are required to understand the remainder of this dissertation. Therefore, we
first introduce memory-corruption vulnerabilities (Section 2.2), and techniques used
by attackers to exploit these vulnerabilities to take complete control of the targeted
application. Next, we give an overview how memory-corruption attacks and defenses
evolved over time. This evolution can be roughly categorized into code-injection attacks
and defenses (Section 2.3), and code-reuse attacks and defenses (Section 2.4).
In general, memory-corruption attacks and defenses are tailored to the underlying
Central Processing Unit (CPU) architecture of the targeted system, the concepts are
applicable across different CPU architectures. However, most of the attacks and defenses,
which we present in this dissertation, target x86-based desktop system, hence, we use
x86 assembly instructions in this section for our explanation if required.
2.1 low-level view of an application
Listing 1 contains the source code of a function of a vulnerable application which we
will use as an example throughout this section. It reverses a string by first copying the
input string to a temporary buffer (line 5), and then overwriting the input string in
reverse with the content of the temporary buffer (line 7-9). reverse_string() contains
two vulnerabilities: the first vulnerability is a buffer overflow (line 5) due to the use
of strcpy(), and the second vulnerability is an information leakage (line 8) due to a
missing length check.
Exploiting both vulnerabilities requires knowledge about the low-level view of an
application. Hence, we will first discuss the general layout of an application during run
9
10 background
1 void reverse_string(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buf_len) {
2 unsigned char tmp_buf[64];
3 int i;
4
5 strcpy(tmp_buf, buf);
6
7 for(i = 0; i < buf_len; ++i) {
8 buf[i] = tmp_buf[buf_len - 1 - i];
9 }
10 }
Listing 1: reverse_string() contains multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities.
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Figure 1: High-level memory layout and access permissions of an application during run time.
time before explaining how the attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to take full
control of the application.
Application Memory Layout
Figure 1 contains a simplified view of the virtual memory layout of modern applications
during run time. The memory region of the main application and (multiple) shared
libraries is generally divided into a code and data section. On x86 paging is used
to enforce memory-access permission. Unfortunately, paging does not allow setting
the read-write-execute permissions individually for a memory region. Instead, the
permissions for a memory region can be set to one of three options: non-accessible;
to readable and executable; or to readable, writable and executable. The data sections
are considered to be statically-allocated memory, and commonly consist of read-only
data (constant variables), and writable data (global variables). For dynamic allocations
two separate memory regions are used: the heap for global memory allocations, and
the stack for local, i.e., function-call-specific, memory allocations. Generally, memory
regions are separated by non-accessible memory. Finally, the operating system’s kernel
is mapped into the process space but not accessible to the application.
We now provide a brief description of the data structures that are used to organize
the stack as the vulnerabilities in Listing 1 are stack-related. We note that such
vulnerabilities can also affect heap-allocated memory, and that the concepts we discuss
with the help of our stack-related example can be applied to heap-based vulnerabilities.
Stack Memory Organization
On x86 the stack is a memory region that grows towards to lower addresses,
and is divided into stack frames. A stack frame is an Application Binary Interface
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(a) General layout of a stack frame on x86.
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reverse_string() function.
Figure 2: Stack frames on x86.
(ABI)-dependent data structure, which the application allocates during a function call,
and releases when the function returns. Figure 2a illustrates the general layout of a
stack frame on the x86 architecture. Depending on the calling convention, the first few
arguments are written onto the stack (common on x86 32-bit) or are passed through
registers (common on x86 64-bit). Independently from the calling convention and
architecture, the next element on the stack is the return address. The return address
is a code pointer, which is automatically written by the call instruction and points
to the next instruction after the call instruction. If not disabled through a compiler
flag, functions use the base pointer register to address local variables by pointing it to
the current stack frame, however, before overwriting the base register, functions save the
current base pointer value on the stack. Similarly, if a function uses callee-saved registers
for its computation, then the current values of these registers are temporarily stored on
the stack as well. Finally, each function allocates space for local variables and temporary
values, and the stack pointer is set to the beginning of the current stack frame.
Figure 2b shows the stack frame of the reverse_string() function. The actual layout
of a stack frame does not only depend on the Central Processing Unit (CPU) architecture
and ABI but also on the compiler. It can allocate additional space to align memory
addresses for faster memory access, or to optimize the code of a function such that a
local variable can be stored in a register instead of on the stack. For example, instead of
64 bytes as declared by the programmer, the compiler generates code that reserves 76
bytes for the buffer, and adds another eight bytes between the counter variable i and
the return address.
Hence, when the attacker provides an input that is larger than 76 bytes the strcpy()
function will overflow the buffer and overwrite other variables, or even the return
address.
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Next, we shortly explain what a control-flow graph (CFG) is and conclude our brief
introduction of the low-level view of an application.
Control-flow Graph
A CFG is a graph representation of all benign execution paths of an application during
run time. Each vertex in the CFG represents a Basic Block (BBL), and each edge
represents a valid execution path from one BBL to another. A BBL consists of a number
of assembly instructions, and has exactly one entry point and one exit point which is
a branch instruction. In general, we distinguish between direct and indirect branches.
A direct branch encodes the destination address of the branch within the instruction,
whereas an indirect branch encodes the data-memory address or register within the
instruction that contains the destination address. For example, the aforementioned
return address, which is written by a call instruction, and then used by a return
instruction, is such an indirect branch instruction.
2.2 memory-corruption attacks
In general, memory-corruption vulnerabilities are categorized into spatial corruption,
where the application accesses a memory buffer outside of its bounds, or temporal
corruption, where the application accesses memory before its initialization or after it was
released. An example of a spatial corruption is the classic buffer-overflow vulnerability
where a missing bound check leads to the corruption of adjacent memory. Examples
of temporal corruptions are uninitialized memory, and use-after-free vulnerabilities. In
the former case the application reads a memory value without proper initialization or
verification. If the attacker can set this memory value before it is read, the application
performs its computation based on a bogus value which, depending on what the value
is used for, either leads to further memory corruptions, or control of the application.
The latter describes the case where the application holds more than one reference to
an allocated memory buffer, which is then released without invalidating all references.
Use-after-free vulnerabilities are particularly common in C++ applications which follow
a modular design, like modern browsers, document viewers, and office applications.
In the following section, we discuss memory-corruption vulnerabilities based on a
buffer overflow vulnerability in detail, and how attackers can exploit such vulnerabilities
to hijack the control flow, or disclose arbitrary memory.
Buffer Overflow
In the past, Application Programming Interface (API) functions, which manipulate
buffers without checking the bounds of the source or destination buffer, were the
main cause for buffer overflows. The most prominent example is the strcpy(dst,
src) function which copies a string from the source buffer into the destination buffer.
However, the strcpy() function does not verify that the source buffer fits into the
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Figure 3: During a buffer overflow the attacker writes past the allocated buffer bounds.
destination buffer. As a consequence, the attacker can exploit strcpy() to overwrite
memory adjacent to the destination buffer by providing a source buffer that is larger
than the destination buffer.
Figure 3 shows an example of a buffer overflow. Here, the application allocates a
buffer of eight slots. However, the write operation writes twelve slots to the buffer.
As mentioned before, C and C++ do not check the bounds of a buffer during a write
operation, hence, the write operation will overwrite (overflow) the adjacent memory
which can be in use by the application to store other variables or temporary values.
Control-flow hijacking
The attacker can exploit the buffer-overflow vulnerability in the reverse_string()
(Listing 1, line 5) and the knowledge of the stack layout for this function (Figure 2b)
to overwrite the return address of the current stack frame. As a consequence, the return
instruction uses an attacker-controlled value as a destination address. This enables the
attacker to add a new (malicious) edge to the control-flow graph (CFG), and force the
application to behave differently from the programmer’s intention. To fully take control
of the targeted application, attackers execute either code-injection or code-reuse attacks.
Before we describe these attack techniques in detail, we explain how the second
vulnerability can be exploited to disclose memory.
Memory disclosure
The second vulnerability in reverse_string() (Listing 1) is due to an unchecked length
value. Specifically, to avoid this vulnerability the function should have verified that
the length passed as an argument matches the length of the input string. Hence, by
providing a length value that is larger than 64, the attacker can trick the application into
writing the content adjacent to the allocated temporary buffer to the output buffer. This
enables the attacker to disclose secrets, e.g., memory addresses, stored on the stack.
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2.3 code-injection attacks and defenses
In the previous section, we discussed how the attacker can exploit a memory-corruption
vulnerability to change the control flow to an attacker-controlled address. To execute
malicious code in the context of the vulnerable application, the attacker can perform a
code-injection attack. The high-level idea is that the attacker injects new vertices into the
control-flow graph (CFG) of the application, and then creates an edge to the injected
Basic Block (BBL) as shown in Figure 4.
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2) Inject malicious code
1) Exploit Memory-
    corruption vulnerability
3) Hijack Control Flow
Figure 4: Code-injection Attack
Code-injection attacks are possible due to the permission system of paging on the x86
architecture (cf. Section 2.1), which does not distinguish between the read permission
and the execute permission. Hence, the attacker can write a malicious program into
a data buffer, and overwrite a code pointer, which is subsequently used as a branch
target by the application, to point to the data buffer [8]. In the past, attackers leveraged
code-injection attacks to obtain a remote shell. Therefore, the injected malicious code is
often referred to as shellcode.
Figure 5 shows a code-injection attack against our vulnerable example application
of Listing 1. The attacker provides a buffer that contains first the shellcode, then some
padding that fills the rest of the buffer, and a code pointer which overwrites the return
address and points to the beginning of the injected shellcode. For a successful attack, it
is important that the attacker knows the exact address of the shellcode on the stack. This
is provided by the fixed memory layout of applications during run time, i.e., all memory
regions as shown in Figure 1 (Section 2.1) are loaded to the same address.
Writable xor Executable Memory Policy
Code-injection attacks are mainly enabled by the fact that the x86 architecture does
not distinguish between code and data. The reason for this is that the x86 architecture
follows the von Neumann architecture that allows mixing code and data in memory—as
opposed to the Harvard architecture, which requires separate memory for code and data.
However, with the exception of programs that generate code during run time, regular
programs do not require data memory to be executable. Hence, removing the executable
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Figure 5: Stack layout during a code-injection attack.
permission from data memory regions is an effective way to generically prevent
code-injection attacks. This memory protection policy is known as Writable⊕Executable
(W⊕X) because memory pages can be either executable or writable but not both at the
same time.
To overcome the limitations of the x86 paging permission system, previous research
leveraged segmentation [208], which is a legacy memory protection mechanism present
on x86 Central Processing Units (CPUs). Alternatively, a technique referred to as
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) splitting [207] exploits that instruction and data
reads use different caches to store paging information which also contain the memory
access permissions. Both approaches come with disadvantages: segmentation only
allows the enforcement of memory access permission for larger segments, hence, the
application space must be split into fixed-size segments during the application start,
while TLB splitting comes with a non-negligible performance overhead. Fortunately,
paging on modern CPUs was extended to include the non-executable memory permission.
This allows modern operating systems to mark all data memory as non-executable, and
therefore, to prevent code-injection attacks [136].
Next, we discuss how attackers adapt their strategy to overcome the challenge of W⊕X
memory.
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2.4 code-reuse attacks and defenses
The enforcement of a Writable⊕Executable memory policy mitigates code-injection
attacks. Therefore, attackers adapted their strategy from injecting malicious code to
chaining existing code to perform the same malicious action as the injected code.
Figure 6 shows the general idea of code-reuse attack. Similar to code-injection attacks,
the attacker first exploits a memory-corruption vulnerability. However, instead of
injecting malicious code, the attacker injects malicious data in the form of code pointers.
Generally, the chaining of existing code requires that the reused code ends in an indirect
branch instruction.
Now we discuss the two most prominent code-reuse attack techniques, return into
libc and return-oriented programming, and then two effective mitigation techniques: code
randomization and control-flow integrity.
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Figure 6: Code-reuse Attack
Return into libc
Solar Designer [198] was the first to provide a practical instantiation of a code-reuse
attack technique to bypass W⊕X memory, called Return-into-libc (RILC). He exploited
a memory-corruption vulnerability to overwrite the return address with a pointer to a
function of libc. libc is the standard C library and, aside from basic functions to process
strings and numbers, it also provides wrapper functions to invoke system calls. System
calls are the Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to the kernel functions to, e.g.,
read files from the hard disk, communicate over the network, or start new processes.
The main idea of RILC attacks is to change the control flow of an attacked application
consecutively such that it invokes a number of libc functions with attacker-controlled
arguments to achieve a specific behavior.
In the past, a common code-injection attack payload for Linux was to inject code
that would execute the system call execve(), to execute a shell, like /bin/sh/, with
the privileges of the vulnerable application. Solar Designer’s RILC attack achieved the
same by exploiting a stack-based buffer overflow to overwrite the return address to
point to the system() function of the libc. system() takes the path of an application
as an argument and eventually calls the execve() system call. His exploit targeted a
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Figure 7: Return-oriented programming attack
vulnerable application on the x86 32-bit architecture. As we mentioned in Section 2.1,
on x86 32-bit function arguments are passed through the stack. Hence, if the attacker
exploits a stack-based buffer overflow she can control the arguments passed to a
function. However, on x86 64-bit and other popular architectures, like ARM, arguments
are passed through the register, hence, the original exploitation technique from Solar
Designer would not work.
Apart from being incompatible with those architectures, RILC suffers from other
weaknesses as well. Most importantly, the attacker is limited to the functionality
implemented by loaded shared libraries. While in practice it is unlikely that such
imposed constraints would stop an attack, it increases the difficulty of creating attack
payloads. For example, an attack payload might require one to perform pointer
arithmetic for a successful execution. Another weakness of RILC is that even if
arguments can be passed through the stack, those arguments might need to include
NULL bytes. The problem arises if the cause of the buffer overflow is a string
manipulation function, like strcpy() in Listing 1. strcpy() copies byte-wise content
of the source buffer into the destination buffer until the source buffer reaches a NULL
byte which indicates the end of the input string. Hence, an RILC attack payload for
this vulnerability cannot include NULL bytes in the middle of the payload, otherwise
strcpy() will truncate the payload during the overflow.
Next, we discuss return-oriented programming [192], which is a generalization of
borrowed code chunks [117]. return-oriented programming (ROP) reuses small instruction
sequences instead of whole functions to overcome the limitations of RILC.
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Return-oriented Programming
Krahmer [117] was the first to present a code-reuse attack technique that was later
generalized by Shacham [192] to what is known as ROP. The main idea of ROP is to
chain short instruction sequences that end with a return instruction instead of whole
functions. Each short instruction sequence performs a specific task, e.g., loading a value
into a register, or adding the values of two registers. Shacham [192] defines a gadget
as one or more short instruction sequences that, when combined, perform a high-level
task like reading a value from a memory address and writing it to another. Further, he
showed that ROP is Turing-complete which means that, contrary to RILC, ROP attacks
are not limited to the existing code.
Figure 7 shows how to leverage ROP to get code execution for our example application
which we use throughout this section. Similar to the code-injection attack the attacker
overflows the local buffer, instead of injecting shellcode she overwrites the return
address with a code pointer that points to the first gadget. Hence, when the function
executes the return instruction it redirects the control flow to the first gadget. Note
that the return instruction increases the stack pointer by four (32-bit) or eight (64-bit).
Hence, the stack pointer will point to the value 0x4141414141414141 on the stack. The
application now executes the two instructions of the first gadget. The pop instruction
loads the value, to which the stack pointer points to, into the rax register, and, increases
the stack pointer by eight. Then, the return instruction reads the next code pointer from
the stack and changes the control flow to the second gadget. Using this technique, the
attacker can chain an arbitrary number of instruction sequences together to execute a
malicious payload.
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Figure 9: Example of unaligned instructions on x86 64-bit.
In practice, however, there are two common challenges that increase the difficulty
of conducting ROP attacks: first, stack-based buffer overflows are less common due
to improved compiler mitigations. For example, stack canaries [48] are random values
which the compiler places between the local variables and the return address, and whose
integrity is verified before the return instruction is executed. Hence, most (exploitable)
memory-corruption vulnerabilities are heap buffers. This increases the difficulty of ROP
attacks because they require the attacker to inject return addresses on to the stack.
Second, similar to RILC attacks, the expressiveness of ROP attacks solely depends on
the available gadgets, and in some cases the available code might not contain a gadget
which is necessary for a successful attack. Next, we discuss two techniques, called stack
pivoting and unaligned gadgets, that attackers use to overcome both challenges.
Stack pivoting is a technique that enables the attacker to change the stack pointer register
to point to an attacker-controlled memory buffer, usually on the heap. Figure 8 shows
in detail how this technique works. For our example we assume that the attacker can
overflow a buffer on the heap which is followed by a code pointer 1 . The attacker
exploits the memory-corruption vulnerability to overwrite the code pointer with a
pointer to the stack pivot gadget followed by a regular ROP payload. When the
application now performs an indirect call using the register 2 , which points to the
heap 3 , the call instruction changes the control flow to the stack pivot gadget 4 . In
this case the lea (load effective address) instruction overwrites the stack pointer register
(rsp) with the value of the rax register plus eight. This sets the stack pointer to the heap,
specifically, to the attacker’s injected ROP payload 5 . Hence, the return instruction
of the stack pivot gadget will read its return address from the heap, instead of from
the original stack 6 . From here on, the attacker can conduct a normal ROP attack as
described above. One practical challenge of this technique is for the attacker to find
a suitable stack pivot gadget because overwriting the stack pointer is not a common
functionality for benign application code. To increase the odds of finding such a gadget,
attackers exploit the fact that x86 architecture allows unaligned access to instructions
which enables the attacker to use unaligned gadgets.
Unaligned gadgets are instruction sequences that are not generated by the compiler.
They exist because the x86 architecture uses variable lengths for its instructions, and
hence, each byte of a benign instruction can be interpreted as the beginning of a
new—unaligned—instruction. Figure 9 shows an example of an unaligned gadget. The
compiler generated an add and an or instruction. However, by jumping into the middle
of the benign add instruction the Central Processing Unit (CPU) will interpret the
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Figure 10: Address Space Layout Randomization changes the base address of code and data
sections.
generated instructions as a stack-pivot gadget. Shacham [192] shows that attackers can
generate Turing-complete ROP payloads using only unintended instruction sequences.
Code and Data Randomization
A fundamental assumption for launching control-flow hijacking attacks is that the
attacker knows the process layout of the targeted application. For example, to conduct a
code-injection attack, the attacker must know the address of the injected payload, and for
a code-reuse attack she needs the address of each gadget. Randomization-based defenses
break the assumption of a deterministic process layout by randomizing the addresses
of code and data sections. Randomization can be applied in different granularity levels:
the more fine-grained the code and data is randomized the harder it is to guess the
randomization offset. However, increased randomization granularity can also negatively
impact performance [119].
Most modern operating systems, like Linux [218], Windows [97], and macOS [150],
deploy Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), which is a coarse-grained
randomization technique. ASLR randomizes the base address of the main binary,
shared libraries, and dynamically-allocated memory (heap and stack). In particular,
the operating systems divide the address space into segments in which they randomly
choose a base address, as shown in Figure 10. This design has two major disadvantages.
First, it limits the randomization entropy by defining fixed-size segments. This
particularly affects systems with a small address space like 32-bit based systems
where the randomization offset is brute-forceable [193]. Second, the offsets within a
randomized region, for example the relative gadget addresses within the libc, or
memory allocations, remain unchanged. Hence, it is sufficient for the attacker to disclose
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one valid pointer of a randomized segment, e.g., by means of a brute-force attack or a
memory-disclosure attack, to know every other address of this segment.
Windows macOS 10.12.3 Ubuntu 16.04.01
Memory Region Visual Studio 2015 clang 8.0 gcc 5.4
Main Binary 3/7 3 7
Shared Library 3/7 3/7 3
Stack 3 3 3
Heap (small) 3 3 3
Heap (big) 3 3 3
Table 1: ASLR implementation on Windows, macOS and Ubuntu. Legend: 3= Application
Restart, 3/7= System Restart, 7= Never.
In practice, the implementation of ASLR varies between different operating systems.
We conducted an experiment in which we compiled and executed a program, which
records the addresses for the main binary, shared libraries, stack, and small (10
bytes) and big (64 kilobytes) heap allocation on modern 64-bit operating systems. We
distinguish between small and big heap memory allocation because heap allocators
adjust their allocation strategy based upon the requested memory size. Table 1
summarizes the results. In general, Windows 10 provides the highest entropy for data
allocations, but only re-randomizes the location of executable code during system restart.
Ubuntu (Linux), on the other hand, does not randomize the location of the main binary
by default.
ASLR is the first practical defense deployed in all major operating systems. This
forces attackers to leverage memory-disclosure attacks to leak the randomization
secret [190] before they can conduct a code-reuse attack. Next, we discuss an alternative,
policy-based mitigation technique.
Control-flow Integrity
In general, the control-flow graph (CFG) of applications does not change during run
time. An exception to this is applications such as browsers, which include a scripting
engine that generates new code during run time [87, 139, 145]. However, during a
code-reuse attack the attacker changes the CFG by injecting new edges. Hence, to
effectively mitigate such attacks it is sufficient to prevent changes to CFG.
Control-flow Integrity (CFI) [5, 6] is a technique that prevents the attacker from adding
new edges to the CFG. In particular, CFI instruments all vertices that exit through
an indirect branch instruction with a check that verifies that the statically-computed
CFG contains an edge which connects the current and the target branch, as shown in
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Figure 11: Control-flow Integrity verifies the target of indirect branches before executing them.
Figure 11. If the CFG contains the edge then the branch is executed, otherwise the
instrumentation generates a CFI exception.
We distinguish between forward-edge (indirect call and jump instructions) and
backward-edge (return instructions) CFI because their enforcement requires different
techniques, which we will discuss later in this section. Further, CFI requires W⊕X to
be in place to prevent the attacker from modifying existing or adding new vertices to
the CFG.
Abadi et al. [5, 6] are the first to present a CFI in practice. Their approach leverages
static binary analysis and binary instrumentation to harden commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) binaries against code-reuse attacks. In particular, they first generate a CFG by
identifying all valid branch targets for each indirect branch. Next, they group the branch
targets of each indirect branch and generate a unique id (label) for each target group.
Each indirect branch is then instrumented to verify that the target is marked with the
label of the corresponding branch target group. In order to label Basic Blocks (BBLs) they
insert the x86 instruction prefetch at the entry of each BBL. The prefetch instruction
takes an address as an argument, and hints to the CPU that the application will access
this data address in the future. The advantage of this instruction is that it is has no
impact on the execution state of the application, and does not create an exception if the
address is invalid. Hence, its argument can be used to encode unique identifiers (labels).
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Figure 12: Static verification of return targets is too imprecise.
This static approach comes with the disadvantage that it is imprecise for return
instructions. For example, Figure 12 illustrates the part of the CFG where a function
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vertex (F) is called by two other vertices. In this example, A1 branches to F through a
call instruction. From a semantic point of view, the only valid branch target for the
retn instruction is A2. However, according to the static analysis A2 and B2 are possible
branch targets, because F can be called by B1 as well. Hence, the attacker could change
the semantics of the application by overwriting the return address that points to A2 to
instead point to B2. Carlini et al. [32] demonstrated that a static approach for return
instructions gives the attacker enough leeway to conduct arbitrary ROP attacks.
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Figure 13: CFI can leverage a shadow stack to enforce that return instructions only return to the
call site that invoked the current function.
To increase the precision of CFI for return instructions, Abadi et al. [5, 6] proposed a
shadow stack, which is a separate, isolated stack that is used to store and verify return
addresses. Shadow stacks are highly effective because they enforce the natural semantics
of the call/return instructions, i.e., the return instruction is supposed to transfer the
control flow to the next instruction after the call instruction that invoked the current
function. However, there are benign cases in which an application breaks this semantic
that must be considered when enforcing CFI for backward edges. For example, if the
currently executed function generates an exception, it is not always the case that the
caller function catches the exception. Instead another function in the call hierarchy or
the default exception handler can be responsible for handling such an exception. In this
case the current function returns to the function in the call stack which implements the
exception handler.
We illustrate the functionality of a shadow stack in Figure 13. The shadow stack itself
is a traditional stack without a dedicated stack pointer 1 . Hence, the first entry is the
index to the last added return address. The function entry 2 is instrumented such that
a called function first reads the return address from the regular stack 3 , and saves it
temporarily in a register. Then it increases the index of the shadow stack and saves
the return address on the shadow stack. The function exit 4 is instrumented as well.
24 background
Specifically, it reads the current return address from the shadow stack, decreases the
index, and then compares it to the current return address on regular stack. If both
return addresses are the same, the function returns normally, if they are different, a
CFI exception is generated. To provide effective isolation, Abadi et al. [5, 6] use x86’s
segmentation feature. For architectures that do not provide segmentation as a means to
isolate memory, Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [132, 187] can be leveraged.
Validating all indirect control-flow transfers can have a substantial performance
impact that prevents widespread deployment. For instance, when validating forward
and backward edges, the average run time overhead is 21% for the initially proposed
CFI [3] and 13.7% for state-of-the-art solutions (4.0% for forward [215] and 9.7%
for backward edges [56]). Several CFI frameworks attempt to reduce the run-time
overhead by enforcing coarse-grained policies. There is no clear definition in the
literature with respect to the terms fine and coarse-grained CFI policy. However, the
general understanding of a fine-grained CFI policy is that only branches intended by
the programmer are allowed. In contrast, a coarse-grained CFI policy is more relaxed and
might allow indirect branches to target the start address of any function. For instance,
ROPecker [43] and kBouncer [163] leverage the branch history table of modern x86
processors to perform a CFI check on a short history of executed branches. Zhang
and Sekar [239] and Zhang et al. [237] applied coarse-grained CFI policies using
binary rewriting to protect COTS binaries. Relaxing the CFI policies (or introducing
imprecision to the CFG) has the downside of enabling the attacker to launch code-reuse
attacks within the enforced CFG. Consequently, coarse-grained variants of CFI have been
repeatedly bypassed [31, 60, 84, 185].
3
A D VA N C E S I N M E M O RY- C O R R U P T I O N AT TA C K S
In this chapter, we present novel memory-corruption attacks against
code-randomization- and control-flow integrity-based code-reuse attack mitigations.
Specifically, we present two novel information-disclosure attacks in Section 3.1.2 and
Section 3.1.3, which target code-randomization schemes. Our attacks highlight the
necessity to implement some form of leakage resilience for randomization-based
defenses and serve as a motivation for the next chapter. Next, we present three attacks
against Control-flow Integrity (CFI) which emphasize pitfalls that need to be addressed
during the design and implementation of CFI schemes: our first attack bypasses
fine-grained control-flow integrity by exploiting a bug that is introduced during the
optimization step of compilers (Section 3.2), our second attack bypasses coarse-grained
control-flow integrity by chaining virtual function together (Section 3.2), and our third
attack bypasses control-flow integrity by manipulating the intermediate representation
of Just-in-Time (JIT)-compilers (Section 3.4). In Section 3.5 we elaborate upon related
work on memory-corruption attacks and conclude in Section 3.6.
3.1 memory-disclosure attacks
Code randomization mitigates code-reuse attacks by preventing the attacker from
knowing the exact address of the gadgets that are required for conducting the attack.
However, code randomization is vulnerable to memory-disclosure attacks. As shown
by Serna [190], Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) can be bypassed by
disclosing a single code pointer during run time. This is due the fact that ASLR shifts
each code segment by a random offset. In order to address this issue, researchers focused
on increasing the granularity of code randomization from shuffling the function order
in memory, going as far as the randomizing of single instructions. For a comprehensive
overview of different code-randomization schemes, we refer to Larsen et al. [119].
However, code randomization remains vulnerable to memory-disclosure attacks
independent of its granularity. We make a distinction between direct and indirect
disclosure attacks. Figure 14 shows the high-level idea of both techniques: the main
difference is that in a direct memory-disclosure attack the attacker reads the code
pages directly to find the required gadgets. In an indirect memory-disclosure attack
the attacker reads only code pointers from the data region, e.g., stack or heap, to infer
the gadget’s address by combining run time knowledge with an offline analysis of the
targeted binary and the applied randomization scheme.
In the following pages we explain in detail how the attacker can exploit direct
(Section 3.1.2) and indirect (Section 3.1.3) memory-disclosure attacks to bypass any
code-randomization scheme. First, however, we introduce the threat model that we
assume for both attacks.
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Figure 14: Direct and indirect memory disclosure.
3.1.1 Threat Model
For our attacks, we assume the following threat model which is in-line with previous
offensive work [192].
Defense Capabilities
Writable⊕Executable Memory. We assume that throughout the execution W⊕X
memory is enforced by the operating system. Hence, the attacker can neither inject
new code nor modify existing code.
(Fine-grained) Code Randomization. We assume that the targeted application
is protected with (fine-grained) code randomization. We do not make any
assumptions about the granularity of the code-randomization scheme. In fact, the
granularity might range from base address randomization [97, 150, 218], to function
permutation [18, 46, 113], to basic block [227], to instruction randomization [162].
Just-in-Time (JIT)-Protection. We assume that the JIT code is hardened against
JIT-spraying attacks [24]. Modern JIT-code compilers implement techniques like
constant blinding and NOP [94] insertion to fulfill this requirement [13].
Adversary Capabilities
Memory-corruption Vulnerability. We assume the presence of a
memory-corruption vulnerability, which enables the attacker to read and write
arbitrary memory. Further, the vulnerability can be exercised multiple times
consecutively without crashing the application.
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Initial Information Disclosure. We assume the attacker obtained a single valid
code pointer during run time.
Computation Engine. We assume that the attacker can perform arbitrary, but
sandboxed, computations during run time. This assumption is satisfied by script
engines that are embedded into many modern applications such as browsers, or
document viewers.
3.1.2 Just-in-Time Return-oriented Programming: Direct-disclosure Attacks
Just-in-Time Return-oriented Programming (JIT-ROP) is a generic direct-memory
disclosure attack framework that can bypass any code-randomization scheme. The
JIT-ROP framework builds upon the assumption that the attacker can exercise an
information-disclosure vulnerability multiple times and can access a computation
engine during the attack. This assumption is easily fulfilled by targets upon which
the attacker can utilize an embedded scripting engine, as it is the case for browsers
or document viewers. JIT-ROP attacks can also be launched against server applications,
e.g., web servers, as the attacker can do the necessary computation locally.
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Figure 15: Detailed workflow of a JIT-ROP attack.
3.1.2.1 Attack Description
The main idea of JIT-ROP is to perform an analysis during run time of the
randomized code, and to create an attack payload that is customized to the deployed
code-randomization scheme. The JIT-ROP attack framework takes three arguments as
input: (1) a read-write primitive which is achieved by exploiting a memory-corruption
vulnerability. (2) a pointer to a valid instruction within the code region; (3) an attack
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payload which is written in a high-level language. Unlike regular return-oriented
programming (ROP) attacks JIT-ROP does not require any knowledge about the kind of
code pointer nor to where it points to. As such JIT-ROP can take any code pointer, e.g., a
return address or a function pointer. Based on this input JIT-ROP dynamically discloses
the content of multiple code pages, searches for gadgets, and compiles the high-level
attack description into a concrete ROP attack based on the found gadgets. In the
forthcoming pages we describe in detail the workflow of a JIT-ROP attack with the help
of Figure 15. In our example, the attack is executed against a browser. However, JIT-ROP
is not limited to browsers but can be launched against every client-side application
that features a scripting engine, like document viewers, flash or word processors, or
server-side applications like web servers.
In the attack scenario, depicted in Figure 15, the attacker first lures the victim to
visit an attacker controlled website (Step 1 ). Through the website the attacker serves
a malicious JavaScript program which exploits a memory-corruption vulnerability of
the browser (Step 2 ) to corrupt its internal data structures. This corruption enables
the attacker to read and write arbitrary memory. Next, the attacker utilizes the read
access to disclose the content of the memory page to which the initially disclosed code
pointer points to (Step 3 ). This is possible because memory pages are 4KB aligned. The
content of the disclosed page is then analyzed with the help of disassembler of the attack
framework (Step 4 ). The disassembler has two tasks: first, it disassembles the code of
the current code page to extract new code pointers which are encoded into direct branch
instructions, e.g., call or jump instructions (Step 5 ). Some of the extracted code pointers
will reference other code pages. By recursively disassembling the newly discovered code
pages JIT-ROP is able to gradually disclose all code pages of the targeted application
(Step 7 ). Second, the disassembler searches each disclosed memory page for useful
ROP gadgets (Step 6 ). Once JIT-ROP found all ROP gadgets, which are required to
assemble an attack payload, it stops disclosing code page. In the final step, JIT-ROP
takes the high-level attack description, and the disclosed ROP gadgets as an input for
the attack compiler to generate a ROP payload, which is customized to the deployed
code-randomization scheme (Steps 8 -10 ). Finally, the attacker uses the write access to
overwrite a code pointer to hijack the control flow and to execute the customized ROP
payload.
3.1.2.2 Lessons learned
For our evaluation, we implement JIT-ROP by exploiting a heap-based buffer overflow
(CVE-2012-1876) in Internet Explorer 8 on Windows 7 [224]. We found that JIT-ROP
discloses the content of 301 memory pages before it gathers the required gadgets
to compile and execute our payload which first resolves Windows Application
Programming Interface (API) functions to then start the Windows calculator.
JIT-ROP dynamically adapts attack payloads to the memory layout of the targeted
application, and hence, bypasses all code-randomization techniques that aim at
mitigating code-reuse attacks. Thus, to defeat JIT-ROP attacks, code randomization
must be protected against information-disclosure attacks. Backes and Nürnberger
[16] proposed an initial approach which obfuscates the code pointers of direct
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branch instructions. However, as we will show next (Section 3.1.3), mitigating
information-disclosure attacks is far more complex than initially anticipated.
3.1.3 Isomeron: Indirect-disclosure Attacks
JIT-ROP makes no assumption about the deployed code-randomization scheme but
relies on a scripting engine to perform the analysis of the protected binary during run
time. However, in practice it is safe to assume that the attacker has exact knowledge of
the deployed mitigations.
Contrary to direct disclosure attacks, like JIT-ROP, indirect disclosure attacks do not
need to read the code section of the protected binary but solely rely on gathering code
pointers from data memory. By combining the disclosed code pointers with an offline
analysis of the targeted application, and knowledge of the deployed code-randomization
technique, the attacker can infer a Turing-complete gadget set. For example, let us
assume that a fine-grained randomization scheme, which permutes the order of the
functions in memory is chosen to mitigate code-reuse attacks. Further, direct read access
to the code sections is prevented (we elaborate on this topic in Chapter 4). Through
an offline analysis the attacker first extracts a mapping between all available gadgets
within the target application and the function that contains the gadget. Next, the
attacker compiles an attack payload based on the available gadgets, and consults the
extracted mapping to discover which functions include the used gadgets. During run
time, the attacker then learns the addresses of these functions by of means of indirect
information disclosure. Since the applied code randomization only changes the order
of the functions, but not their content, the gadgets within the functions stay intact.
Hence, the attacker only needs to disclose the address of the function, which contains
the required gadgets, after the code was randomized to conduct a code-reuse attack.
In practice, indirect information-disclosure attacks are powerful enough to bypass
code-randomization schemes because the data memory contains a large number
of code pointers. The number of code pointers, which the attacker needs to
disclose for a successful attack, greatly depends on the granularity of the deployed
code-randomization scheme, i.e., the more fine granular the randomization the more
code pointers are required. However, the attacker can increase the number of available
code pointers in the data memory by carefully choosing the input to the targeted
application in order to trigger the execution of code paths which write the required
code pointers to memory.
In the following section we provide a detailed description of how indirect disclosure
improves JIT-ROP to bypass Oxymoron [16], which was the first attempt to mitigate
JIT-ROP attacks.
3.1.3.1 Beyond Fine-grained ASLR: Bypassing Oxymoron
Recently, several [16, 17] code randomization schemes have been proposed that aim at
tackling JIT-ROP. However, Oxymoron [16] was the first published approach that claims
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Figure 16: Example of how disclosing a vtable pointer allows the attacker to identify valid
mapped code pages.
to resist JIT-ROP. Hence, we conducted a security analysis of Oxymoron, and extended
JIT-ROP to successfully bypass it.
The main goal of Oxymoron is to (i) enable code sharing for randomized code, and
(ii) hide code references encoded in direct branch instructions. The latter effectively
prevents the attacker from discovering and disassembling new code pages (Step 5 in
Figure 14), since the attacker can no longer follow a direct branch target to identify a new
mapped page. Internally, Oxymoron uses a combination of page-based randomization
and x86 segmentation to reach its goals. For this, Oxymoron transforms direct inter-page
branches into indirect branches. The original destination addresses of all transformed
branches are maintained in a special and hidden table. Specifically, the table is allocated
at a random location in memory and Oxymoron assumes that the attacker cannot
disclose the location and content of this table. In particular, Oxymoron forces the
transformed branch instructions to address the table through a segment register which
holds an index to the table. The use of a segment register creates an indirection layer
that cannot be resolved by attackers in user-mode, because the information necessary
for resolving the indirection are maintained in kernel space. While Oxymoron indeed
hinders JIT-ROP from discovering new code pages, we show in the following that the
Steps 4 - 7 in Figure 14 can be easily modified and bypass Oxymoron’s protection. To
demonstrate the effectiveness of our new technique, we developed an exploit targeting
Internet Explorer 8 which bypasses Oxymoron.
3.1.3.2 High-level Attack Description
The main weakness of Oxymoron concerns the fact that it focuses only on hiding
code pointers encoded into direct branches. However, disassembling code pages and
following direct branches to new pages, is only one way of discovering addresses of new
code pages. Using indirect memory disclosure, the attacker can leverage code pointers
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stored on the stack and heap to efficiently disclose a large number of code pages and
ultimately launch a JIT-ROP attack.
Code pointers of interest are return addresses, function pointers, as well as pointers
to virtual functions which are all frequently allocated on data memory. In case of
programs developed in object-oriented programming languages like C++, one obvious
source of information are objects which contain virtual functions. In order to invoke
these virtual functions, a vtable is used. This table is allocated as an array containing
the target addresses of all virtual functions. Since vtables are frequently used in modern
applications, and since their location can be reliably determined during run time, we
exploit them in our improved JIT-ROP attack. Nevertheless, code pointers on the stack,
such as return addresses, can be also leveraged in the same manner for the case the
target application does not populate any vtables.
As shown in Figure 16, the first step of the attack is to disclose the address of the
so-called vtable pointer which subsequently allows the attacker to disclose the location
of the vtable. Once the virtual function pointers inside the vtable are disclosed, the
attacker can determine the start and end address of those pages where virtual functions
reside. For a target application such as a web browser or a document viewer, it is very
likely to find complex objects with numerous function pointers. A large number of
function pointers increase the number of valid code pages whose page start and end the
attacker can reliably infer. Given these code pages, the attacker can then perform Step 6
to 11 as in the original JIT-ROP attack.
In the following, we apply our ideas to a known vulnerability in Internet Explorer 8,
where we assume Oxymoron’s protection mechanisms to be in-place.1 Specifically, we
take an existing heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability (CVE-2012-1876 in Internet
Explorer 8 on Windows 7, which is well-documented [224]. We exploit this vulnerability
to validate how many code pages attacker may identify using our above introduced
techniques, and whether this code base is sufficiently large to launch a reasonable code
reuse attack.
3.1.3.3 Exploit Implementation
As in any other code reuse attack, we require the target application to suffer from (i) a
memory error (buffer overflow), and (ii) a memory disclosure vulnerability. The former
is necessary to hijack the control-flow of the application, and the latter to disclose the
vtable pointer which is the starting pointer to launch our attack (see Figure 16).
An additional requirement for our attack is the identification of C++ objects in Internet
Explorer that populate virtual tables, i.e., contain many virtual functions. For this,
we reverse-engineered C++ objects in Internet Explorer and identified several complex
objects containing a large number of virtual functions (see Table 2). Once we are aware
of the main target C++ objects, we can pick one (or more), and write a small JavaScript
program that allocates our target object on the heap.
The next step is to dynamically read the vtable pointer of the target C++ object at run
time. However, this raises a challenge as ASLR randomizes code and data segments.
1 Note that Oxymoron’s source code is not public. Hence, we simply assume its protection is active.
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C++ Object Virtual Funktions
CObjectElement 150
CPluginSite 150
CAnchorElement 146
CAreaElement 146
CHyperlink 146
CRichtext 144
CButtonLayout 144
. . . . . .
Table 2: Excerpt of C++ objects in Internet Explorer containing a large number of virtual functions
The run time location of the vtable pointer is not per-se predictable. However, due to
the low randomization entropy of ASLR for data segments, the relative address (offset)
to another memory object is in most cases predictable.
Hence, in order to exploit this circumstance, the attacker needs to allocate the target
C++ object close to an information-leak object such as a JavaScript string. Carefully
arranging objects close to each other to perform memory disclosure is commonly known
as heap feng shui [201]. In fact, we re-use this attack technique and arrange objects using
JavaScript as shown in Figure 17.
Vulnerable Buﬀer
length String Text
vtable
pointer C++ Object
Heap
Overflow Direction
1) Overwrite
2) Disclose
Heap
Attacker
…
…
Figure 17: Heap-Layout of our Exploit.
Specifically, we allocate via JavaScript a buffer, a string, and our target C++ object
which contains many virtual functions. The string object consists of two fields, namely,
the string length field holding the size of the string, and the string text itself. The
memory error in Internet Explorer allows us to overflow the vulnerable buffer. As the
string object is just allocated next to the vulnerable buffer, our overflow overwrites the
string length field with a value of the attacker’s choice. As we set the value to its
maximum size (i.e., larger than the actual string length), we are able to read beyond
the string boundaries. Since our C++ object (in our exploit the CButtonLayout object) is
just allocated next to the string, we can easily disclose its vtable pointer. Afterwards, we
follow the vtable pointer to disclose all functions pointers of our C++ object.
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Note that Figure 17 actually contains a simplified view of our target C++ object
CButtonLayout. By disassembling (see Listing 2) the function which creates the
CButtonLayout object, we recognized that this C++ object contains two vtable pointers.
Altogether with these two vtables we could extract 144 function pointers, and hence
74 unique code pages. In our particular exploit, the number of code pointers resp. unique
pages could be increased to 322 resp. 87 pages due to the fact that the page where the
two vtables of the CButtonLayout object reside, contains two additional vtables of other
C++ objects. The attacker can always increase the number of leaked vtables by allocating
more complex objects (as given in Table 2) on the heap.
1 push 0xFCh ; dwBytes
2 push 8 ; dwFlags
3 push _g_hProcessHeap ; hHeap
4 call ds:HeapAlloc(x,x,x)
5 mov esi, eax
6 [...]
7 mov dword ptr [esi], offset const CButtonLayout::`vftable'{for `CLayoutInfo'}
8 mov dword ptr [esi+0xC], offset const CButtonLayout::`vftable'{for `CDispClient'}
Listing 2: Disassembled code that creates the CButtonLayout object
The 87 leaked code pages give us access to a large code base (348 KB) for a code
reuse attack. Hence, the next attack step involves gadget search on the 87 leaked code
pages. For our proof-of-concept attack, we identified all gadget types (load, store, add)
necessary to launch a practical return-oriented programming attack; including a stack
pivot gadget [241]. One important gadget is a system call gadget to allow interaction
with the underlying operating system. The original JIT-ROP attack leverages for the
dynamic loader functions LoadLibrary() and GetProcAddress() allowing the attacker
to invoke any system function of his choice. However, when the addresses of these two
critical functions are not leaked (as it is the case in our exploit), we need to search
for an alternative way. We tackle this problem by invoking system calls directly. On
Windows 32-bit, this can be done by loading (i) the system call number into the eax
register, (ii) a pointer to the function arguments into edx, and (iii) invoking a syscall
instruction on our leaked pages. At this point, we are able to compile any return-oriented
programming payload as our leaked code pages contain all the basic gadget types.
Specifically, we constructed an exploit that invokes the NtProtectVirtualMemory
system call to mark a memory page where we allocated our shellcode as executable.
We use a simple shellcode, generated by Metasploit [135] that executes the WinExec()
system function to start the Windows calculator to prove arbitrary code execution.
The last step of our attack is to hijack the execution-flow of Internet Explorer to invoke
our gadget chain. We can do that simply by exploiting the buffer overflow error once
again. In contrast to the first overflow, where we only overwrote the string length field
(see Figure 17), we overwrite this time the vtable pointer of our target C++ object, and
inject a fake vtable that contains a pointer to our first gadget. Afterwards, we call a
virtual function of the target C++ object which redirects the control-flow to our gadget
chain (as we manipulated the vtable pointer).
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3.1.3.4 Lessons learned
In summary, our attack bypasses Oxymoron as it discovers valid mapped code pages
based on code pointers allocated in data structures (specifically, virtual function
pointers). As Oxymoron only protects code pointers encoded in branch instruction on
code segments, it cannot protect against our improved JIT-ROP attack. In order to defend
against this attack, one also needs to protect code pointers allocated in data structures.
Note that our attack is general enough to be applied to any other memory-related
vulnerability in Internet Explorer, simply due to the fact that Internet Explorer contains
many complex C++ objects with many virtual functions (see Table 2).
3.1.4 Conclusion
Fine-grained code-randomization defenses shuffle the memory layout of applications
during run time. As a consequence, the attacker cannot rely on pre-computed addresses
and offsets of code snippets, which are necessary for code-reuse attacks.
In this section, we introduced two advanced memory-disclosure attacks that highlight
the conceptual weakness of randomization-based mitigations. Specifically, we show that
the attacker can repeatedly exploit memory-disclosure vulnerabilities to either directly
or indirectly disclose information about the randomized code. We adapt real-world
exploits to leverage our attack techniques to bypass any code-randomization scheme.
Our attack techniques highlight the need of leakage resilience for code-randomization
in order to provide an effective protection from sophisticated code-reuse attacks. In
fact, we utilize the insights we gain in this section to design a leakage resilient
code-randomization technique, which is based on execute-only memory, and which we
present in Chapter 4.
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3.2 losing control : attacks on fine-grained cfi
For the sake of efficiency and flexibility the C languages family eschew security features
such as automatic memory management, strong typing, and overflow detection. As
a result, programming errors can lead to memory corruption that causes unexpected
program behavior routinely exploited by attackers—often with severe consequences.
Defending against exploits is extremely challenging. Any technique hoping for
deployment in practice needs to minimize the performance impact, remain fully
compatible with vast amounts of existing code, and require no manual effort to apply.
Among the few defenses that meet this high bar are stack canaries, data execution
prevention (DEP), and address space layout randomization (ASLR). On the other hand,
the combination of these defenses has still not prevented sophisticated real-world
attacks. For this reason, the security research community is exploring a number of
potential successors to today’s standard mitigations.
The goal of this section is point out unforeseen weaknesses in recent defenses
that are thought to be substantial advances over current mitigations. Control-flow
integrity provides substantially better protection against control-flow hijacking than any
mitigation in use today. Our analysis focuses on the so called fine-grained forward edge
variant (FE-CFI) [215] because 1) a production-grade implementation is available and
2) recent research has demonstrated serious weaknesses in coarse-grained variants of
CFI [31, 60, 83, 84]. As the name implies, FE-CFI does not protect backward control-flow
edges from callee functions back to their callers. For this reason, FE-CFI must be paired
with some return address protection mechanism. We examine two such mechanisms:
StackGuard [48], which is a standard mitigation, and StackAmor [41] which represents
the state-of-the-art in the area of stack protection mechanisms. Finally, we analyze XnR,
an improvement over Data Execution Prevention (DEP). DEP implements the principle
of least privilege for virtual memory pages. Under DEP, execution permissions, imply
read permissions; XnR emulates execute-no-read permissions with the aim to prevent
JIT-ROP attacks.
Based on our analysis of the above defenses, we introduce a new class of memory
disclosure attacks that read and manipulate the stack to gain control of a vulnerable
application. To demonstrate the threat of such attacks, we constructed a non-trivial,
real-world exploit—which we named StackDefiler—that is capable of bypassing all of
the defenses we examined.
Summing up, our contributions are:
• Security analysis of state-of-the-art defenses. Defenses based on CFI are in
principle immune to memory disclosure because they do not rely on information
hiding. The two other defenses explicitly advertise resistance to memory
disclosure. In our analysis of these defenses, we found they all have weaknesses
that are exploitable through memory disclosure and corruption of the stack.
• Bypassing FE-CFI implementation. To confirm that the weaknesses we identified
are exploitable in practice, we use it to bypass Google’s Fine-Grained Forward CFI
implementation. Specifically, we found that a critical CFI pointer is spilled to the
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stack and can be corrupted by attackers to hijack the control flow. We removed this
weakness and evaluate the performance impact of our fix.
• Bypassing StackArmor. StackArmor claims to provide temporal safety for stack
contents. We demonstrate that by using multiple, malicious web workers (an
HTML5 feature to allow concurrency in JavaScript), the attacker can discover the
stack layout and overwrite control flow meta-data such as return addresses.
• Discovering the Code Layout with XnR enabled. XnR is intended to be used
in conjunction with fine-grained ASLR such as ASLP. We show that applications
protected by XnR and ASLP, we can control which return addresses are placed
on the stack and harvest return addresses to indirectly disclose the code layout
without directly reading the code.
3.2.1 Threat Model
Our threat model captures the capabilities of real-world attacks, and is in line with the
common threat model of CFI [6], as well as with the prior offensive work [68, 186, 188,
196].
Defense Capabilities
Non-Executable Memory The target system enforces data execution prevention
(DEP) [136]. Otherwise the attacker could directly manipulate code (e.g., overwriting
CFI checks), or inject new malicious code into the data section of a program. The
attacker is therefore limited to code-reuse attacks.
Randomization. The target system applies address space layout randomization
(ASLR).
Shadow Stack. We do not have access to the implementation of shadow
stacks [3, 56]. Therefore, we assume the presence of an adequate shadow stack
implementation.
Adversary Capabilities
Memory read-write. The target program contains a memory-corruption
vulnerability that allows the attacker to launch a run-time exploit. In particular, we
focus on vulnerabilities that allow the attacker to read (information disclosure) and
write arbitrary memory. Such vulnerabilities are highly likely as new vulnerabilities
are being constantly reported. Common examples are use-after-free errors [214].
Adversarial Computation. The attacker can perform computations at run time.
Many modern targets such as browsers, Flash, Silverlight, and document viewers, as
well as server-side applications and kernels allow the attacker to perform run-time
computations. Real-world attacks on client-side applications typically utilize a
scripting environment to instantiate and perform a run-time exploit. Additionally,
the attacker can use the scripting engine to generate multiple execution threads.
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3.2.2 StackDefiler
Our attacks are based on modifying data on the stack. Hence, as a first step, in the
presence of ASLR, we must disclose the address of the stack. We stress that we do
not rely on stack-based vulnerabilities to attack the stack. Instead, we used heap-based
vulnerabilities in our exploits. We observe that attackers with the ability to disclose
arbitrary memory can get a stack address by recursively disclosing data pointers (see
Section 3.2.3.2). Attacking values on the stack is challenging, because (i) only certain
functions will write critical data to the stack, and (ii) the lifetime of values on the stack
is comparatively short, i.e., generally during the execution of a function. Nevertheless,
we are able to manipulate targeted values on the stack.
In the following we give a high-level description of our attacks. For this we
discuss three different stack-corruption techniques that allow us to bypass the CFI
implementations we examined.
3.2.2.1 Corrupting Callee-Saved Registers
To maximize the efficiency of a program, the compiler tries to maximize the use of CPU
registers, instead of using the (slower) main memory. The compiler performs register
allocation to keep track which registers are currently in use and to which it can assign
new values. If all registers are in use, but a register is required to perform a computation,
the compiler temporarily saves the content of the register to the stack. When a function
(the caller) calls another function (the callee), the callee cannot determine which of
the caller’s registers are used at the moment of the call. Therefore, the callee saves
all registers it needs to use during its execution temporarily on the stack. These saved
registers are called callee-saved registers. Before the callee returns to the caller it restores
all callee-saved registers. While the registers are saved, the attacker can change the
values on the stack and therefore corrupt the callee-saved registers. This becomes a
severe problem if the caller uses the restored (and potentially corrupted) registers for
CFI checks and can affect all architectures where the application binary interface (ABI)
specifies the concept of callee-saved registers.
We found that two CFI implementations, IFCC and VTV [215], are vulnerable to
this kind of attack. As we will argue in the following, this threat becomes even more
crucial for applications that are compiled with position-independent code (PIC) for
architectures that do not support program-counter relative (PC-relative) addressing,
such as x86 32-bit.
On systems like Mac OS and Linux, ASLR compatible binaries contain
position-independent code (PIC). Position independence means that all code references
are relative to the program counter (PC). This allows the dynamic loader to load the
binary at an arbitrary base address without relocating it.
However, Intel x86 processors running 32-bit code do not directly support PC-relative
addressing. As a workaround, PIC on x86 requires the program to obtain the current
value (i.e., the absolute address) of the program counter dynamically at run time. Once
this address is known, the program can perform PC-relative references. At assembly
level this is implemented by executing a call to the subsequent instruction. The call
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Application
1   Function:
2     call get_eip
3     mov  ebx, eax
4     add  ebx, rel_offset_to_data
5     lea  eax, [ebx+str_offset]
6     [..]
7     ret
8
9   get_eip:
10    mov eax, [esp] ; read return
                      address from
                      stack
11    ret
Position Independent Code
12  str:
      "this is a String"
Data
relative
oﬀset
to data
Figure 18: Application compiled with position-independent code. To get the absolute address of
str the compiler emits instructions that first receive the absolute address of Function
at run time. The absolute address of str is then calculated by adding the relative
offset between Function and str, calculated by the compiler, to the absolute address
of Function.
automatically loads the return address onto the stack, where the return address is simply
the absolute address of the subsequent instruction. Hence, the program can obtain its
current program counter by simply popping the return address off the stack in the
subsequent instruction. Once the program counter is loaded into a register, an offset is
added to form the position-independent reference.
Figure 18 illustrates how position-independent code references the global string
variable str in the data section (line 12). At function entry, the function calls get_eip()
(line 2). This function (line 9) only reads the return address from the stack (line 10),
which is the address of the instruction following the call of get_eip() (line 3). Next,
the result is moved into the ebx register (line 3). We noticed that both LLVM and GCC
primarily use the ebx register to compute position-independent references (line 5).
Subsequently, the program can perform PC-relative addressing to access the global
string variable: the add instruction adds the relative offset between the data section and
the current function to ebx which now holds a pointer to the data section (line 4). Finally,
the offset of the string within the data section is added to ebx and the result (address of
the string variable) is saved in the eax register (line 5).
On x86 32-bit platforms PIC becomes a vulnerability for CFI, because the global CFI
policies are addressed through the ebx register. Since ebx is a callee-saved register it is
spilled on the stack by all functions that perform CFI checks.
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3.2.2.2 Corrupting System Call Return Address
Fine-grained CFI as proposed by Abadi et al. [3] validates the target address of
every indirect branch. Valid forward edges of the CFG are determined using static
analysis and are enforced through label checking. A shadow stack is used to verify the
backward edges of the CFG. We noticed that user-mode CFI only instruments user-mode
applications and not the kernel. In general, this makes sense because the kernel isolates
itself from user-mode applications, and hence, is considered trusted. However, we
discovered a way to undermine this trust to bypass CFI without compromising the
kernel. In particular, we exploit the fact that the kernel reads the return address used to
return from a system call to the user mode from the user-mode stack.
On x86 32-bit a special instruction—sysenter—was introduced to speed up the
transition between user and kernel mode [105]. The sysenter instruction does not save
any state information. Therefore, Windows saves the return address to the user-mode
stack before executing sysenter. After executing the system call, the kernel uses the
saved return address to switch back to user mode. This opens a small window of time
between the return address being pushed on the stack and the kernel reading it to switch
back to user mode. We use a second, concurrent thread that exploits this window to
overwrite the saved return address. Hence, when returning from a system call the kernel
uses the overwritten address. This allows the attacker to set the instruction pointer to
an arbitrary address and bypass CFI policy checks.
Note that this attack works within the threat model of CFI because we never modify
existing code, nor corrupt the kernel, or tamper with the shadow stack, but we exploit
a missing check of a code pointer that can be controlled by the attacker.
The 64-bit x86 architecture uses a different instruction, called syscall, to switch from
user to kernel mode. This instruction saves the user-mode return address into a register,
thus preventing the attacker from changing it. However, even 64-bit operating systems
provide an interface for sysenter to be compatible with 32-bit applications. Hence,
32-bit applications that are executed in 64-bit operating systems remain vulnerable.
Another pitfall of 64-bit x86 is that it partially deprecates memory segmentation,
hence, the shadow stack can no longer be completely protected via hardware. As a
consequence, the protection of the shadow stack relies on information hiding or less
efficient software-fault isolation techniques.
3.2.2.3 Disclosing the Shadow Stack Address
Dang et al. [56] survey the different implementations of shadow stacks and their
performance costs. One observation is that a parallel shadow stack, i.e., a shadow stack
located at a constant offset to the normal stack, provides the best performance. However,
as we demonstrate in Section 3.2.3.2 the attacker can leak the address of the normal stack
and therefore compute the address of the shadow stack.
Another shadow stack technique utilizes the thread-local storage (TLS), a per-thread
memory buffer usually used to store thread-specific variables. In the following we
discuss potential implementation pitfalls of this approach. However, we have not
implemented this attack due to the unavailability of implementations in public domain.
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TLS is addressed through a segment register. Although segmentation is no longer
available under x86 64-bit, segment registers are still present and can be used to
address memory. In general, a TLS-based shadow stack implementation first loads the
shadow-stack pointer into a general-purpose register. Next, this general-purpose register
is used to save the return address on the shadow stack [3, 56]. However, we did not find
any evidence that the general-purpose registers used during this operation are cleared
afterwards. Hence, the address of the shadow stack may be leaked when a function
pushes the used register on the stack. Further, an application might hold a reference to
TLS in one of its memory objects that can be leaked to disclose the memory address of
TLS and the shadow stack.
3.2.3 Attack Implementations
We now turn our attention to the practical implementation of the previously
described attacks. To prove the effectiveness of these attacks we start from real-world
vulnerabilities. For our proof-of-concept implementation of the attacks we chose the
Chromium web browser because it is available for all common operating systems, and
implements state-of-the-art heap and stack software defenses. We stress that our attacks
also apply to other applications that provide the adversarial capabilities we outlined in
Section 3.2.1. This includes document viewers, Flash, Silverlight, server-side applications
and kernels. We re-introduced an older software vulnerability (CVE-2014-3176) in the
most recent version of Chromium (v44.0.2396.0)—we did not make any further changes
to the source code.
To prove that stack spilled registers pose a severe threat to modern, fine-grained
forward-edge CFI implementation we compiled Chromium with IFCC for 32 and 64-bit
on Ubuntu 14.04 LTS. We disassembled IFCC and VTV protected applications to verify
that they are vulnerable to stack-spilling attacks on other operating systems (Unix and
Mac OS X) as well. We implemented our attack against the initial proposed CFI [3] on
a fully patched Windows 7 32-bit system. Since the implementation of the originally
proposed CFI [3] is not available, we assume that fine-grained CFI with a secure shadow
stack deployed and construct our attack under the constrains given by the chapter.
After giving a short introduction to browser exploitation, we give a detailed
description of our proof-of-concept exploits that bypass existing CFI implementations.
3.2.3.1 Attacking a Web Browser
While attacker-controlled JavaScript in browsers is generally sandboxed by enforcing
type and memory safety, the runtime used to interface the browser and web contents is
not. Performance critical parts of the JavaScript runtime library are written in lower level,
unsafe languages, e.g., C++. The usage of C++ opens the door for memory-related security
vulnerabilities. Memory corruption is then used to manipulate the native representation
of website objects, which cannot be done directly from JavaScript code. Next, we explain
how this can be exploited to read arbitrary memory and hijack the program control flow.
3.2 attacks on fine-grained cfi 41
Heap
Array Object Data
Length = 13
Buﬀer Pointer
Data Buﬀer of Array
overwrite
with 37
Array Object Code
read(int position)
write(int position)
calls
read(20)
if 0 ≤ position < Length:
   return buﬀer[position]
else:
   return error
C++ Object
vTable Pointer
read
1 2
Attacker
Figure 19: The attacker can overwrite the length field of an array object. He uses the native read
function to disclose memory content beyond the array buffer, e.g., the vTable pointer
of a consecutive object.
Information Disclosure
Websites create a variety of objects using the browser’s scripting engine. These objects
are stored consecutively in memory. For instance, the native representation of an array
object is usually a C++ object with two fields: the length of the array followed by its
starting address, as shown in Figure 19. A JavaScript program can read the contents of
the array by using the runtime interface provided by the native C++ object. To ensure
memory safety, the native read function uses the saved array length to ensure that
the JavaScript program does not access memory outside the arrays bounds. By using
a memory corruption vulnerability, the attacker can overwrite the array length in the
native representation of the array object with a larger value, as shown in Step 1 . This
allows the attacker to read the memory beyond the original array boundaries using
normal JavaScript code (Step 2 ) and disclose the contents of a subsequent C++ object.
vTable hijacking
To hijack the program’s control flow, the attacker must overwrite a code pointer holding
the destination of an indirect branch instruction. C++ virtual function tables (vTables)
are commonly used for this purpose. The vTable is used to resolve virtual functions
call targets at run time and contains an array of pointers to virtual functions, along
with other data. The entries of a vTable cannot be overwritten because they reside
in read-only memory. However, each C++ object that uses virtual functions maintains
a pointer to its corresponding vTable. Since this pointer is a field of the object, it is
stored in writable memory. The attacker can exploit a memory corruption vulnerability
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to overwrite the vTable pointer of a C++ object with a pointer to a fake vTable which he
created and injected beforehand. Instead of the original table of function pointers, all
function pointers in the fake vTable will point to the code the attacker aims to leverage
for a code-reuse attack. Lastly, after overwriting the vTable pointer of an object, the
attacker uses JavaScript code interfaces to the native object to invoke a virtual function
from the fake vTable.
3.2.3.2 Proof-of-Concept Exploit
Our exploit performs the following steps: (i) Gain arbitrary read and write capabilities,
(ii) locate the stack and disclosing its contents, and (iii) bypass the CFI check and hijack
the control flow.
The re-introduced vulnerability (CVE-2014-3176) allows us to manipulate the data
fields of JavaScript objects on the heap, such as 1 in Figure 19. Once an array-like object
has been corrupted, we can access adjacent memory location without failing a bounds
check (see 2 in Figure 19). In our exploit, we use the corrupted object to manipulate the
buffer pointer field of a JavaScript ArrayBuffer instance. By setting the buffer pointer
to the address we want to access, we can then read and write arbitrary memory by
accessing the first element of the ArrayBuffer via the JavaScript interface. There are
many ways to corrupt array-like objects, hence, our exploit does not depend on a specific
type of memory corruption vulnerability.
Disclosing Data Structures
Chromium places different memory objects in different heaps. For instance, the array
instance in Figure 19 is stored in the object heap while the data buffer it contains is
in the buffer heap. The use of separate heaps prevents exploit techniques such as heap
feng shui [201] which the attacker has used to co-locate vulnerable buffers and C++
objects [224].
However, during the analysis of Chromium’s heap allocator, we found a way to
force the allocator to place the vulnerable buffer at a constant offset to metadata that
is used by the allocator to manage the different heaps. Chromium’s heap allocator,
PartitionAlloc, pre-allocates memory for a range of different buffer sizes. However,
when memory for a buffer is requested that was not pre-allocated, PartitionAlloc will
request memory from the operating system. Since PartitionAlloc needs to manage the
dynamically allocated memory buffers, it requests two additional, consecutive memory
pages from the operating system. The newly requested memory is organized as follows:
(i) Meta information of allocated memory. This includes a pointer to the main
structures of PartitionAlloc, which contains all information to manage existing and
future allocations.
(ii) Guard page. This page is mapped as inaccessible, hence, continuous memory
reads/writes will be prevented. However, it does not prevent non-continuous
reads/writes.
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(iii) Memory to fulfill allocation request. This is the memory that is used by
PartitionAlloc to allocate buffers.
By allocating a large buffer (e.g., 1MB) which is very unlikely to happen during
normal execution, we ensure that PartitionAlloc will allocate a new structure as
previously described. We further know that the requested buffer will be placed at the
start of (3), because it is the first buffer of this size. Since the offset between (i) and (iii)
is constant, we can disclose the pointer to the main meta-data structure of PartitionAlloc.
This allows us to identify all memory addresses used by the heap allocator, as well as
predict which memory addresses will be used for future allocations.
This is a very powerful technique as we can predict the memory address of every
C++ object that is created. Further we can control which objects are created at run time
via the JavaScript interface. Hence, it becomes very hard to hide information (e.g., a
shadow stack address) because as long as any object contains a pointer to the hidden
information, we can disclose the information by creating the object and disclosing its
memory.
Finally, in our attack, we choose to allocate an object that contains a vTable pointer,
i.e. the XMLHttpRequest object. By overwriting the vTable pointer of this object with a
pointer to a fake vTable, we can hijack the control flow (see Section 3.2.3.1).
Disclosing the stack address
To disclose and corrupt values on the stack to bypass CFI checks, we must first locate
the stack in memory. In contrast to the heap, objects on the stack are only live until the
function that created them returns. Hence, it is challenging to find a pointer to a valid
stack address within the heap area. However, we noticed that Chromium’s JavaScript
engine, V8, saves a stack pointer to its main structure when a JavaScript runtime library
function is called. Since the ArrayBuffer.read() function, which we use for information
disclosure, is part of the runtime library, we can reliably read a pointer that points to
a predictable location on the stack. The remaining challenge is to find a reference to a
V8 object, because V8 objects are placed on a different heap than Chromium’s objects.
Hence, we need to find a reference from an object whose address we already disclosed to
the V8 object that stores the stack address. We chose XMLHttpRequest, because it contains
a pointer to a chain of other objects which eventually contain a pointer to the V8 object.
Once we disclose the address of this object, we can disclose the saved stack pointer.
At this point we have arbitrary read and write access to the memory and have
disclosed all necessary addresses. Hence, we now focus on implementing the attacks
described in Section 3.2.2.
Bypassing IFCC
IFCC implements fine-grained forward-edge CFI and is vulnerable to attacks that
overwrite registers which are spilled on the stack. For brevity, we omit the bypass of
VTV. However, from a conceptual point of view there is no difference between the IFCC
bypass and the one for VTV. Tice et al. [215] assume that the stack is protected by
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StackGuard [48] which implements a canary for the stack to prevent any stack attacks.
In practice, this does not prevent the attacker from overwriting the return address. Since
IFCC focuses on the protection of CFG forward edges, we assume an ideal shadow
stack to be in place that cannot be bypassed, though this might be hard to implement in
practice.
IFCC protects indirect function calls by creating, at compile time, a list of functions
that can be reached through indirect calls. It then creates a trampoline, i.e., a simple jump
instruction to the function, for every function in this list. The array of all trampolines is
called jump table. Finally, every indirect call is instrumented so it can only target a valid
entry in the jump table.
Listing 3 contains the disassembly of an instrumented call. In the line 8 and 9, the
target address of the indirect call and the address of the jump table are loaded into
registers. Subtracting the base address of the target pointer and then using a logical
and is an efficient way of ensuring that an offset within the jump table is used. Finally,
this offset is added again to the base address of the jump table. This ensures that every
indirect call uses the jump table, unless the attacker can manipulate the ebx register. As
we explained in Section 3.2.2.1 ebx is a callee-saved register and therefore spilled on the
stack during function calls.
For our exploit we target a protected, virtual function call Ftarget that is invoked (line
16) after another function Fspill is called (line 6), see Listing 3. During the execution of
Fspill the ebx register is spilled on the stack (line 19): we overwrite both the target
address of Ftarget through vTable injection (see Section 3.2.3.1) and the saved ebx
register. We overwrite the saved ebx register such that line 9 will load the address of
our gadget. After Fspill finishes execution, the overwritten register is restored and used
to verify the subsequent call in Ftarget. The check will pass and line 16 will call our first
gadget. After the initial bypass of CFI, we use unintended instructions to avoid further
CFI checks.
Although 64-bit x86 offers more general-purpose registers, our analysis of a 64-bit,
IFCC-protected Chromium version exposed that around 120000 out of 460000 indirect
calls CFI checks (around 26%) are vulnerable to our attacks. We did not manually
verify if all of these CFI checks are vulnerable. However, for a successful attack it is
sufficient that only one of these CFI checks is vulnerable to our attack. We exploited
one vulnerable CFI check to implement a similar attack and bypass IFCC for the 64-bit
version of Chromium.
Bypassing fine-grained CFI
It seems that overwriting a user-mode return address used by a system call is
straightforward. However, we encountered some challenges during the implementation.
The first challenge is being able to correctly time the system call and the overwrite of
the return address. We found the most reliable way is to spawn two threads: one thread
constantly makes the system call and the other constantly overwrites the return address.
The attack succeeded in 100% of our tests without any noticeable time delay.
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1 F0:
2 call F0_next
3 F0_next:
4 pop ebx ; load abs. address of F1
5 ; [...]
6 call F_spill
7 ; [...]
8 mov edi, [eax+4] ; load address F_target
9 mov eax, [ebx-149C8h] ; load jump-table
10 mov ecx, edi
11 sub ecx, eax ; get offset in jump table
12 and ecx, 1FFFF8h ; enforce bounds
13 add ecx, eax ; add base addr jump table
14 cmp ecx, edi ; compare target address
15 jnz cfi_failure
16 call edi ; execute indirect call
17
18 F_spill:
19 push ebx
20 ; [...] ; overwrite of ebx happends here
21 pop ebx
22 ret
Listing 3: Disassembly of an indirect call that is instrumented by IFCC.
1 ntdll!ZwWaitForSingleObject:
2 mov eax,187h ; System call number
3 mov edx,offset SystemCallStub
4 call [edx] ; call KiFastSystemCall
5 ret 0Ch
6
7 ; [...]
8
9 ntdll!KiFastSystemCall:
10 mov edx,esp
11 sysenter
Listing 4: ZwWaitForSingleObject System Call on Windows 7 32-bit.
We can utilize the Web Worker HTML5 API [228] to create a dedicated victim thread.
During our analysis to find a suitable function that eventually invokes a system call, we
noticed that an idle thread is constantly calling the ZwWaitForSingleObject system call
which is shown in Listing 4. Line 4 shows the call that pushes the return address on the
stack that is later used by the kernel to return to user mode.
Another challenge is that the constant invocation of the system call might corrupt any
ROP gadget chain we write on the stack. Hence, we overwrite the user-mode return
address with the address of a gadget which sets the stack pointer to a stack address
that is not constantly overwritten. From there on we use gadgets that are composed of
unintended instructions [192] to bypass the instrumented calls and returns.
This exploitation technique can bypass any fine-grained CFI solution that aims to
protect 32-bit applications on Windows. This includes the initial CFI approach by Abadi
et al. [3].
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3.2.4 Mitigations
We consider possible mitigation techniques against our attacks. First, we describe
our compiler patch for the IFCC/VTV implementation vulnerability and measure its
performance impact on the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmarks. Subsequently, we discuss the
broader problem of protecting the stack against memory disclosure and corruption
attacks.
3.2.4.1 Patching IFCC
Recall that IFCC uses the base register containing the address of the GOT to reference
the jump table validating the target of an indirect call (see Section 3.2.2.1). To prevent our
attack presented in Section 3.2.3.2, we developed a compiler patch that safely reloads the
GOT register before loading the CFI jump table. Our patch adds new instrumentation
before the CFI check so this register is always re-calculated instead of being restored
from the stack. With our proposed fix, IFCC uses three more instructions to validate
each target which brings the total number of added instructions up to 15 per indirect
call. Listing 5 shows an example of the IFCC instrumentation without our patch, and
Listing 6 shows the reload we add on lines 12-17.
We measured the performance impact of this change using the SPEC CPU 2006
benchmark suite on a dual channel Intel Xeon E5-2660 server running Ubuntu 14.04
with Linux kernel 3.13.0. We selected only the benchmarks that have indirect calls since
IFCC will not affect code that only uses direct calls. The benchmark results we report
are medians over three runs using the reference inputs.
We report overheads relative to a baseline without IFCC enabled. Since IFCC uses
link-time optimization, we also compile the baseline with link-time optimization turned
on. Figure 20 shows that our patched version of IFCC performs between 0.12% and
1.19% slower (0.46% on average) than unpatched IFCC. Tice et al. [215] also found cases
where IFCC outperforms the baseline, and we did not analyze these cases further. The
patch for the 64-bit version is similar and was omitted for brevity.
We reported the weaknesses in IFCC and VTV and our mitigation for IFCC to the
original developers of these mitigations.
3.2.4.2 Securing Stack
The machine stack is difficult to simultaneously secure against all types of attacks, since
it must be readable and writable by the program. Similar to other exploit mitigation
schemes, stack protection schemes can be categorized into schemes that rely on applying
randomization to the stack or ensuring the integrity of the stack through isolation.
We found that current stack randomization schemes introduce a lower performance
overhead but remain vulnerable to our attack as the randomization secret can be
disclosed, as we will discuss in the next section. On the other hand, isolating the stack
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1 ; store current eip in ebx
2 call .next
3 .next:
4 pop ebx
5 add ebx, GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE
6 ...
7 ; call function which stores ebx to the stack
8 ...
9 ; Load destination function address
10 lea ecx, vtable+index
11 ; Load jump table entry relative to ebx
12 mov eax, [ebx + _jump_table_@GOT]
13 <perform CFI-check>
14 call ecx
Listing 5: Example IFCC assembly before fix
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Figure 20: SPEC CPU2006 performance of IFCC-protected programs before and after we applied
our fix relative to an unprotected baseline.
can potentially mitigate our attacks. However, current stack mitigation techniques are
either not effective or suffer from non-negligible performance overheads.
Next, we shortly discuss the effectiveness of these mitigation schemes under our threat
model.
Randomization-based Defenses
StackGuard [48] attempts to prevent stack-based buffer overflows by inserting a random
stack cookie between potentially vulnerable buffers and the return address. However,
this defense is insufficient against current attackers. An attacker with the capability to
read the stack, as we have demonstrated with our attacks, can read and forge this cookie,
even without an arbitrary memory write vulnerability.
The recently proposed StackArmor [41] further protects the stack not only from
buffer overflows, but also from, but also stack buffer over/under reads and stack-based
temporal vulnerabilities. However, StackArmor’s protections are confined to the stack
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1 ; store current eip in ebx
2 call .next
3 .next:
4 pop ebx
5 add ebx, GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE
6 ...
7 ; call function which stores ebx to the stack
8 ...
9 ; Load destination function address
10 lea ecx, [vtable+index]
11
12 ; PATCH: Reload ebx with current eip, instead of
13 ; untrusted, corruptible value
14 call .next2
15 .next2:
16 pop ebx
17 add ebx, GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE
18
19 ; Load jump table entry relative to ebx
20 mov eax, [ebx + _jump_table_@GOT]
21 ;
22 ; perform CFI check
23 ;
24 call ecx
Listing 6: Example IFCC assembly after fix
itself. Without any heap protection, an attacker can use heap-memory corruption to
read and write arbitrary memory locations and can disclose metadata used by the
StackArmor allocator to find and modify the stack.
Isolation-based Defenses
One possible mitigation strategy against our attacks is to isolate the stack from the
regular data memory.
Lockdown [167] is a DBI-based (dynamic binary instrumentation) CFI implementation
with a shadow stack. DBI re-writes the binary code of the application at run time, hence,
it can control application memory accesses. This allows it to prevent access and leakage
of the shadow stack address. However, these security guarantees come with an average
run time overhead of 19% which is considered impractical.
Recently LLVM integrated a component of CPI, called SafeStack [118, 210]. It
aims to isolate critical stack data, like return addresses or spilled registers from
buffers that potentially can be overflown. During a static analysis phase the compiler
identifies buffers that are located on the stack and relocates them to a separate stack,
called the unsafe stack. The regular stack is then assumed to be the safe stack. The
separation of buffers and critical values is likely to prevent most stack-based memory
vulnerabilities from being exploitable. However, if we can leak the stack pointer register
(see Section 3.2.3.2) , i.e., the pointer to the safe stack, we can overwrite the protected
values.
Full CPI [118] and provides more comprehensive protection of code pointers through
isolation. On 32-bit x86 the isolation is enforced through segmentation. In principle,
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this can prevent our attack attacks, however, on 64-bit x86 or other architectures, e.g.,
ARM, this feature is not available. The authors suggest alternative implementations
to the segmentation-based isolation. All come with their own pros and cons: While
the randomization approach provides good performance, it was shown to be prone to
information leakage attacks [68]. A more secure implementation is based on software
fault isolation (SFI) [225], however, this adds an additional 7% [187] to the 8% average
run-time overhead induced by CPI itself [118]. In general, the overhead depends on the
number of objects that must be protected, e.g., the authors report of CPI an overhead of
138% for a web server that serves dynamic webpages, which is impractical.
3.2.4.3 Securing CFI Implementations
Zeng et al. [236] compiled a list of requirements to implement a secure inline-reference
monitor, e.g., for CFI, in which they also mention the danger of stack-spilled variables.
However, the threat of stack-spilled registers was not considered in two major compiler
implementations. Our work proves that register spills are a severe threat to CFI, which
should be address by future implementations.
Ultimately, while stack-oriented defenses help to mitigate stack vulnerabilities, they
do not offer sufficient protection to complex software such as web browsers, where
dynamic code generation, heap vulnerabilities and attacker-controlled scripting provide
many alternative attack vectors to the attacker. Defenders must combine these types of
defenses with other protection against heap-based memory corruption to be secure.
3.2.5 Discussion
Memory disclosure was previously used to attack code-randomization schemes [196].
Although attacking code randomization is not the main focus of this section, it suggests
itself to use stack disclosure against code randomization. In particular, we investigated
the impact of stack disclosure against mitigation schemes that aim to prevent direct
memory disclosure by marking the code segment as execute-only: XnR [17] and
HideM [80]. We performed some preliminary experiments in which we used our
capabilities to read the stack of a parallel thread to disclose a large number of return
addresses. Considering that we can control which functions are executed in the parallel
thread, we were able to leak the addresses of specific gadgets. The results of our
experiments are that indirect code disclosure, i.e., disclosing data pointers to infer
information about the randomized code layout, [51, 61] via return addresses can be used
to bypass fine-grained code-randomization schemes, e.g., function permutation [113] or
basic-block permutation [227], that are protected by XnR or HideM. Readactor by Crane
et al. [51] performs code-pointer hiding and hence, does not seem vulnerable to return
address leakage. Further, the authors extended their work to protect function tables as
well [52] which prevents vTable hijacking as described in Section 3.2.3.1.
50 advances in memory-corruption attacks
3.2.6 Conclusion
In this section, we present StackDefiler a set of stack corruption attacks that we use
to bypass CFI implementations. Our novel attack techniques corrupt the stack without
the need for stack-based vulnerabilities. Doing so we contradict the widely held belief
that stack corruption is a solved problem. To the best of our knowledge, this section
presents the first comprehensive study of stack-based memory disclosure and possible
mitigations.
Surprisingly, we find that fine-grained CFI implementations for the two premier
open-source compilers (used to protect browsers), LLVM and GCC, are not safe from
attacks against our stack attacks. IFCC spills critical pointers to the stack which we can
exploit to bypass CFI checks. We verified that a similar vulnerability exists in VTV—a
completely separate implementation of fine-grained CFI in a separate compiler. Next,
we demonstrated that unprotected context switches between the user and kernel mode
can lead to a bypass of CFI. Further, we show the challenges of implementing a secure
and efficient shadow stack and provide evidence that information disclosure poses a
severe threat to shadow stacks that are not protected through memory isolation. Finally,
we analyzed several stack-based defenses and conclude that none are able to counter
our StackDefiler attack.
Based on our findings, we recommend that new defenses should (i) consider the
threat of arbitrary memory reads and writes to properly secure a web browser and
other attacker-scriptable programs, (ii) never trust values from writable memory, and
(iii) recommend complementary approaches to protect the stack and heap to mitigate
the threat of memory disclosure.
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3.3 function-reuse attacks : attacks on coarse-grained cfi
In the previous section, we bypassed (fine-grained) Control-flow Integrity (CFI) by
exploiting a compiler-introduced vulnerability. In this section, we will turn our
attention to bypassing coarse-grained CFI by exploiting the overly permissive CFI
policy. This means that we can change the control flow within the enforced policy
boundaries, yet still execute malicious payloads. Our attack, called Counterfeit
Object-oriented Programming (COOP), chains C++ virtual functions together to
achieve Turing-complete code execution. COOP can successfully bypass real-world
coarse-grained CFI implementations that Microsoft [137] and Intel [107] are currently
deploying.
3.3.1 Background on Coarse-grained CFI and C++
In the following we first provide an explanation of Microsoft’s and Intel’s CFI
implementation, and of the memory representation of C++ objects which are essential
for COOP attacks. We then explain the main idea of COOP, and how to increase its
resilience against ad-hoc mitigations.
3.3.1.1 Coarse-grained CFI
In a recent effort to mitigate code-reuse attacks, Microsoft implemented CFI for
Windows 8 and enabled it by default for Windows 10. Their CFI implementation,
named Control-flow Guard (CFGuard) [137], enforces coarse-grained CFI for forward
branches, and fine-grained CFI for backward branches by implementing a shadow stack.
While CFGuard is currently implemented and enforced in software, it was designed
during a collaboration with Intel who provides a preview of the planned Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA) extension, called Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [107]
that can enforce CFGuard in hardware. We categorize CFGuard’s CFI policy for forward
branches as coarse-grained CFI because indirect jump and call instructions can target
any benign jump or call target of the entire application during run time. For backward
branches, i.e., return instructions, CFGuard leverages a shadow stack to ensure that a
function can only return to its caller. As a consequence, traditional [192], as well as
sophisticated [61, 196] return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks are mitigated by
CFGuard.
Before we show how the attacker can exploit virtual function calls to execute arbitrary
malicious payloads without violating CFGuard’s policy, we provide the necessary
technical background on C++ in the next section.
3.3.1.2 C++ Virtual Function Calls
C++ is an extension of the C language to support object-oriented programming. It allows
for the declaration of classes, which are custom data structures that contain primitive
data types such as integers or chars, nested classes, and can be associated with functions.
A class is called subclass if it extends another class which is then called parent class.
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The relationship is called inheritance, and, as the name suggests, the subclass inherits
all properties of the parent class. Another important feature of C++ is the support for
polymorphism. In particular, a subclass can override functions of the base class if the
function of the parent class was declared a virtual function.
Next, we explain with the following example program how these concepts work in
practice, and how attackers take advantage of function overriding.
1 #include <iostream>
2
3 class Animal {
4 public:
5 virtual void print_animal_name(void) = 0;
6 int get_length(void);
7
8 private:
9 int length;
10 };
11
12 int Animal::get_length(void) {
13 return length;
14 }
15
16 class Dog : public Animal {
17 public:
18 virtual void print_animal_name(void);
19 };
20
21 class Cat : public Animal {
22 public:
23 virtual void print_animal_name(void);
24 };
25
26 void Dog::print_animal_name(void) {
27 std::cout << "Dog" << std::endl;
28 }
29
30 void Cat::print_animal_name(void) {
31 std::cout << "Cat" << std::endl;
32 }
33
34 void print_name(Animal *a) {
35 a->print_animal_name();
36 }
37
38 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
39 if(argc > 2) print_name(new Dog());
40 else print_name(new Cat());
41 return 0;
42 }
Listing 7: Example C++ program that demonstrates the concept of virtual functions.
Listing 7 shows the definition of a class Animal (Line 3). The Animal class defines two
functions of which print_animal_name() (Line 5) is marked as virtual which means it
can be overridden by other classes that inherit from the Animal class. In fact, the program
declares two further classes, Dog (Line 16) and Cat (Line 21), which both extend the
Animal class and override the print_animal_name() (Line 26 and Line 30). Depending on
the number of arguments that are passed to the main() function, it either instantiates a
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Dog or a Cat class and passes a pointer to this object as an argument to the print_name()
function. During compile time it is impossible for the compiler to determine which
implementation of print_animal_name() should be called (Line 35) because it depends
on the number of arguments with which the application is executed (Line 38-40). To
resolve the destination of the function call during run time, the compiler generates for
each class, which contains virtual functions, a virtual function table (vtable).
C++ Object of Type Animal
Virtual Table: Class Dog
Pointer to 
Dog::print_animal_name()
Code Section
Dog::print_animal_name(void) {
   …
}
…
Cat::print_animal_name(void) {
   …
}
Virtual Table: Class Cat
Pointer to 
Cat::print_animal_name()
+0
+8
Virtual Table Pointer
int length
Heap (read-write) Global Data (read-only) Code (read-execute)
Figure 21: Memory representation of C++ memory objects.
Figure 21 shows the simplified memory representation of the C++ objects that are
allocated by the main() function in Listing 7. The virtual table (vtable) pointer, which
is stored at the beginning of the memory of the object, is set either to the Dog or the
Cat vtable. The vtable of a class contains all virtual function pointers. During run time,
print_name() (Line 34) first dereferences the virtual table, and then the function pointer
to resolve the correct destination of the indirect call (Line 35).
From a security perspective, the concept of C++ vtables has two problems: First,
the vtable pointer is writable. Attackers can overwrite a vtable pointer of an object
with an address to attacker-controlled memory, which contains function pointers to
arbitrary addresses, to hijack the control flow. In fact, most of today’s exploits against
C++ applications rely on overwriting a vtable pointer. Second, if CFI is applied to a C++
application, the CFI implementation needs to be aware of C++ semantics, like virtual
tables. If C++ semantics are not considered, the enforced CFI policy must allow every
virtual function call site to target any virtual function to avoid breaking the application.
As we demonstrate next, a relaxed policy such as this, as well as coarse-grained
CFI, e.g., CFGuard and CET, provides ample freedom for the attacker to chain virtual
function calls together to gain arbitrary code execution.
3.3.2 Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming
Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP), like ROP, is a Turing-complete
code-reuse attack [186]. The idea is to exploit a memory-corruption vulnerability to
inject counterfeit C++ objects, and then to hijack the control flow to execute a virtual
function of each injected object. The main distinction from traditional ROP attacks [192]
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are: 1) COOP gadgets consist of whole virtual functions instead of small instruction
sequences that end in a return, 2) COOP gadgets are chained through indirect calls
instead of return instructions, and 3) COOP overlaps member variables of C++ objects to
pass values between two gadgets instead of registers.
Next, we will explain how COOP gadgets are chained, and how values are passed
between gadgets.
3.3.2.1 Chaining COOP Gadgets
In COOP, gadgets are connected using a Main Loop Gadget (ML-G). The purpose of
the ML-G is to iterate over all injected objects, and invoke a virtual function of each
object. Therefore, the ML-G is typically comprised of a benign function of the application
that contains a loop, which iterates over a list of objects, e.g., an array or linked list of
objects. From an application’s perspective, ML-G functions are used, e.g., to perform the
necessary de-initialization of a list of objects before deleting them.
ML-G
Get next object in list
Call 2nd virtual function
Array of COOP Objects
Pointer Object 1
Pointer Object 2
…
Pointer Object n
COOP Object 1
Virtual Table Pointer 1
…
COOP Object 2
Virtual Table Pointer 2
…
Virtual Table 1
Virtual Function Pointer 1
Virtual Function Pointer 2
Virtual Table 2
Virtual Function Pointer 1
Virtual Function Pointer 2
Virtual Function Pointer 3
Code Section
VT1::VF1(void) {
   …
}
VT1::VF2(void) {
   …
}
…
VT2::VF3(void) {
   …
}
1
4
5
3
8 9
7
2
6
Figure 22: Process of chaining COOP gadgets.
Figure 22 shows in detail how the ML-G works: The attacker hijacks the control flow
by exploiting a memory-corruption vulnerability to execute the ML-G, and provides a
list of pointers that references injected COOP objects 1 . The ML-G 2 then takes the
first object in the list 3 , dereferences the vtable pointer 4 , reads the virtual function
pointer by adding a constant offset (here plus one entry 5 ), and finally invokes the
function 6 . After the virtual function returns, the ML-G will take the next COOP object
from the list, and repeat the previous action 7 . Note that the ML-G will always call the
second virtual function of a referenced vtable and, it is unlikely that all required virtual
function gadgets are referenced by the second entry of a vtable. However, the attacker
can easily overcome this limitation by setting the vtable pointer to an entry of vtable,
instead of the beginning, such that when the ML-G adds the constant offset it results
in the desired function. For example, in Figure 22 the attacker crafts the second COOP
objects such that the vtable pointer points to the second entry of the vtable 8 . Hence,
3.3 attacks on coarse-grained cfi 55
by dereferencing the second entry, the ML-G actually dereferences and calls the third
entry 9 .
3.3.2.2 Unrolled COOP
It is natural to question whether COOP attacks can be mitigated by eliminating potential
ML-Gs in an application. To disprove this hypothesis, we developed two refined versions
of COOP that do not require ML-Gs and emulate the original main loop through recursion
and loop unrolling.
Given a virtual function with not only one virtual function invocation but many, it is
also possible to mount a simple unrolled COOP attack that does not rely on a loop or
recursion. Consider for example the following virtual function:
1 void C::func() {
2 delete obj0;
3 delete obj1;
4 delete obj2;
5 delete obj3;
6 }
Listing 8: Example C++ program that demonstrates virtual functions
If objects obj0 through obj3 each feature a virtual destructor, C::func() can be
misused to consecutively invoke four virtual functions. We refer to virtual functions
that enable unrolled COOP as UNR-Gs.
We found that even long UNR-Gs are not uncommon in larger C++ applications.
For example, in recent Chromium versions, the virtual destructor of the class
SVGPatternElement is an UNR-G allowing for as many as 13 consecutive virtual function
invocations. In practice, much shorter UNR-Gs are already sufficient to compromise a
system; we demonstrate in Section 3.3.3 that the execution of three virtual functions is
sufficient for the attacker to execute arbitrary code.
3.3.2.3 Data flow between COOP Gadgets
To pass values from one gadget to the next, traditional ROP attacks use registers,
however, this is not possible for COOP attacks. This is due to the fact that COOP reuses
whole functions which follow calling conventions. For example, when the ML-G invokes
a virtual function that loads a value from memory into a callee-save register, this register
is restored before the virtual function returns and the ML-G invokes the next function.
However, for a successful attack, passing values from one gadget to another is inevitable
because each gadget performs only a specific task, e.g., reading or writing a value from
memory, or performing an arithmetic operation.
We overcome this restriction by overlapping C++ objects to enable data flow between
gadgets. Overlapping means that two objects share the same memory, as illustrated
in Figure 23. The array of COOP objects 1 is the same as in Figure 22. However, the
difference is that in Figure 23 both objects share memory. This is possible because the
attacker can set the object pointers to arbitrary addresses. In this example, the size of the
first object is 32 byte 2 . Instead of setting the pointer of the second object to the offset
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Figure 23: Concept of overlapping C++ objects.
+32 byte, we can set the pointer to point at the offset +8 byte 3 . Hence, the memory at
offset +16 byte is interpreted as variable 2 or variable 1 depending on if the virtual
function of the first or second object is executed. This enables data flow between gadgets,
e.g., the first gadget writes a value to variable 2, and the second gadget reads a value
from its variable 1 to perform a different operation.
3.3.3 Evaluation
To evaluate the practical strength of COOP, we created attacks against the three most
popular browsers (Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome). We then continued our
evaluation by analyzing whether COOP attacks could be prevented by existing CFI
solutions.
For Chrome, we re-introduced an exploitable bug (CVE-2014-3176) into a recent
version of Chromium on Ubuntu 14.04 64-bit. The vulnerability allows an attacker to
manipulate JavaScript objects in memory and, consequently, to construct an arbitrary
memory read-write primitive. This can be used to reliably disclose memory pointers
and hijack the control flow.
We created a COOP exploit for the vulnerability. As is common practice, our exploit
changes the protection of a memory region in order to execute injected shellcode. For
a successful COOP attack, an attacker must use three virtual function gadgets: The
first function loads all needed arguments into the register, and the second calls the
memory protection function. The final gadget is an extra function to chain the gadgets.
This third function may be a conventional ML-G, or an UNR-G (see Section 3.3.2.2).
In our experiments, we successfully executed our attack on an unprotected version of
Chromium.
After confirming that COOP is as powerful as state-of-the-art ROP attacks [196],
we turn our attention to its effectiveness in the presence of CFI. We found that
coarse-grained CFI, as it is enforced by CFGuard, is ineffective against COOP attacks
because they do not violate the policy. We further found that CFI solutions, which
operate only on the binary [5, 75, 143, 173, 237, 238], and those which do not consider
C++ semantics [11, 152, 215] are ineffective as well.
COOP can be mitigated by making CFI C++ aware [111], or by our novel
randomization-based defense, which we explain in more detail in Section 4.1.2.
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3.3.4 Conclusion
In this section, we introduced a novel code-reuse attack technique, called Counterfeit
Object-oriented Programming (COOP), which attackers can exploit to bypass
coarse-grained CFI. COOP chains C++ virtual functions through the main-loop gadget
together to achieve arbitrary code execution. We further demonstrate that in practice
the attacker does not rely on the existence of a main-loop gadget but can leverage the
destructor of C++ objects.
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3.4 dojita : data-only attack on jit compilers
Dynamic programming languages, like JavaScript, are increasingly popular since they
provide a rich set of features and are easy to use. They are often embedded into other
applications to provide an interactive interface. Web browsers are the most prevalent
applications embedding JavaScript run-time environments to enable website creators
to dynamically change the content of the current web page without requesting a new
website from the web server. For efficient execution, modern run-time environments
include just-in-time (JIT) compilers to compile JavaScript programs into native code.
Code-injection/reuse. Unfortunately, the run-time environment and the application that
embeds dynamic languages often suffer from memory-corruption vulnerabilities due to
the usage of unsafe languages such as C and C++ that are still popular for compatibility
and performance reasons. Attackers exploit memory-corruption vulnerabilities to access
memory (unintended by the programmer), corrupt code and data structures, and
take control of the targeted software to perform arbitrary malicious actions. Typically,
attackers corrupt code pointers to hijack the control flow of the code, and to conduct
code-injection [9] or code-reuse [151] attacks.
While code injection attacks have become less appealing, mainly due to the
introduction of Data Execution Prevention (DEP) or writable xor executable memory
(W⊕X), state-of-the-art attacks deploy increasingly sophisticated code-reuse exploitation
techniques to inject malicious code-pointers (instead of malicious code), and chain
together existing instruction sequences (gadgets) to build the attack payload [192].
Code-reuse attacks are challenging to mitigate in general because it is hard to
distinguish whether the execution of existing code is benign or controlled by the
attacker. Consequently, there exists a large body of literature proposing various defenses
against code-reuse attacks. Prominent approaches in this context are code randomization
and control-flow integrity (CFI). The goal of code randomization [119] schemes is to
prevent the attacker from learning addresses of any gadgets. However, randomization
techniques require extensions [17, 27, 51, 52, 80] to prevent information-disclosure
attacks [61, 190, 196]. Control-flow integrity (CFI) [5] approaches verify whether
destination addresses of indirect branches comply to a pre-defined security policy at
run time. Previous work demonstrated that imprecise CFI policies in fact leave the
system vulnerable to code-reuse attacks [31, 32, 45, 60, 83, 84, 186]. Further, defining
a sufficiently accurate policy for CFI was shown to be challenging [69].
Data-only attacks. In addition to the aforementioned attack classes, data-only attacks [38]
have been recently shown to pose a serious threat to modern software security [99].
Protecting against data-only attacks in general is even harder because any defense
mechanism requires the exact knowledge of the input data and the intended data flow.
As such, solutions that provide memory safety [148, 149] or data-flow integrity [33]
generate impractical performance overhead of more than 100%.
JIT attacks. Existing defenses against the attack techniques mentioned above are mainly
tailored towards static code making their adoption for dynamic languages difficult. For
example, the JIT-compiler regularly modifies the generated native code at run time for
optimization purposes. On the one hand, this requires the code to be writable, and hence,
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Figure 24: Main components of a JavaScript JIT engine.
enables code-injection attacks. On the other hand, it makes state-of-the-art defenses
challenging to adopt, either due to the increased performance overhead in the case
of CFI [154] (+9.6%; in total 14.6%)2, or due to unclear practicability of code-pointer
hiding [51] to protect code-randomization applied to the JIT code. Further, the attacker
controls the input of the JIT compiler, and can input a program that is compiled to native
code containing all required gadgets. Finally, the attacker can tamper with the input of
the JIT compiler to generate malicious code, as we show in Section 3.4.3.
Goals and Contributions. In this section, we present a novel data-only attack
against the JIT compiler that allows to execute arbitrary code, and can bypass all
existing code-injection and code-reuse defenses. Concurrently to our work, researchers
published a data-only attack that targets internal data structures of Microsoft’s JIT
Engine [213].
3.4.1 Background on SGX and JIT Compilation
To understand We start with a short introduction of Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [104] which constitutes the trusted computing base for our defense tool JITGuard.
Then we explain the basic principles of just-in-time compilers for browsers, which is the
main use-case for our proof-of-concept implementation in this chapter.
3.4.1.1 JIT Engines
JIT engines provide a run-time environment for high-level scripting languages, allowing
the script to interact with application-specific functionality. They leverage so-called
2 Compared to MCFI [153], a CFI implementation by the same author for static code.
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just-in-time (JIT) compilers to transform an interpreted program or script into native
code at run time. Browsers in particular make heavy use of JIT compilers to increase
the performance of JavaScript programs. JavaScript is a high-level scripting language
explicitly designed for browsers to dynamically change the content of a website, e.g., in
reaction to user input. In general, JIT engines consist of at least three main components,
as shown in Figure 24: 1 an interpreter, 2 a JIT compiler and 3 a garbage collector.
The purpose of JIT compilers is to increase the execution performance of JavaScript by
compiling the script to native code. Since compilation can be costly, usually not all of the
scripting code is compiled. Instead, JIT engines include an interpreter which transforms
the input program into not optimized bytecode, which is executed by the interpreter.
During the execution of the bytecode, the interpreter profiles the JavaScript program to
identify parts (i.e., functions) of the code which are executed frequently (hot code). When
the interpreter identifies a hot code path, it estimates if compilation to native code would
be more efficient than continuing to interpret the bytecode. If this is the case, it passes
the hot code to the JIT compiler.
The JIT compiler takes the bytecode as input and outputs corresponding native
machine code. Similar to regular compilers, the JIT compiler first transforms the
bytecode into an intermediate representation (IR) of the program, which is then compiled
into native code, also called JIT code. In contrast to the bytecode, which is interpreted
in a restricted environment through a virtual machine, this native code is executed
directly by the processor that runs the browser application. To ensure that malicious
JavaScript programs cannot harm the machine of the user, the JIT compiler limits the
capabilities of the emitted JIT code. In particular, the compiled program cannot access
arbitrary memory, and the compiler does not emit potentially dangerous instructions,
e.g., system call instructions. Further, the emitted native code is continuously optimized,
and eventually, de-optimized when the JIT compiler determines that this is not
needed anymore. Because the JIT compiler has to write the emitted native code to
memory as part of its output, the permissions of JIT code pages are usually set to
read-write-executable.
The last major component is the garbage collector. In contrast to C and C++, in
JavaScript the memory is managed automatically. This means that the garbage collector
tracks memory allocations and releases unused memory when it is no longer needed.
3.4.1.2 JIT-based Attacks and Defenses
Typically attacks on JIT compilers exploit the read-write-executable JIT memory in
combination with the fact that attackers can influence the output of the JIT compiler
by providing a specially crafted input program. In the popular pwn2own exploiting
contest, Gong [86] injected a malicious payload into the JIT memory to gain arbitrary
code execution in the Chrome browser without resorting to code-reuse attacks like
return-oriented programming (ROP) [192]. To prevent code-injection attacks, W⊕X was
adapted for JIT code [36, 37, 51, 144]. However, as discussed in the previous section, JIT
code pages must be changed to writable for a short time when the JIT compiler emits
new code, or optimizes the existing JIT code. Song et al. [199] demonstrated that this
small time window can be exploited by attackers to inject a malicious payload. They
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Address     Opcodes       Disassembly 
1:          90            nop
2:          90            nop
3:          90            nop
4:          3C35          cmp al, 35 
6:          90            nop
7:          90            nop
8:          90            nop
9:          90            nop
Unaligned Native Code
Address     Opcodes       Disassembly 
0:          B8 9090903C   mov  eax, 0x3C909090
5:          35 90909090   xor  eax, 0x90909090
Native Code
function foo() {
    var y = 0x3C909090 ^ 0x90909090;
}
JavaScript
Figure 25: During JIT spraying the attacker exploits that large constants are directly transferred
into the native code. By jumping into the middle of an instruction the attacker can
execute arbitrary instructions that are encoded into large constants.
propose to mitigate this race condition by splitting the JIT engine into two different
processes: an untrusted process which executes the JIT code, and a trusted process
which emits the JIT code. Their architecture prevents the JIT memory from being
writable in the untrusted process at any point in time. Since the split JIT engine now
requires inter-process communication and synchronization between the two processes,
the generated run-time overhead can be as high as 50% for JavaScript benchmarks.
Further, this approach does not prevent code-reuse attacks. Microsoft [141] recently
adapted out-of-process JIT generation for their JavaScript engine Chakra to avoid
remapping the JIT-code region as writable during code generation. This is done by
using a double mapping of the JIT-code region which is mapped as read-execute in the
untrusted and read-write in the trusted process. The compiler executes in the untrusted
process, generates the JIT code and sends it to the trusted process, which then copies
it to the double-mapped region and signals to the untrusted process that it is ready for
execution.
Code-reuse attacks chain existing pieces of code together to execute arbitrary
malicious code. JIT engines facilitate code-reuse attacks because the attacker can provide
input programs to the JIT compiler, and hence, influence the generated code to a certain
degree. However, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1.1, the attacker cannot force the JIT
compiler to emit arbitrary instructions, e.g., system call instructions which are required
for most exploits. To bypass this restriction Blazakis [24] observed that numeric constants
in a JavaScript program are copied to the JIT code, as illustrated in Figure 25: the
attacker can define a JavaScript program which assigns large constants to a variable,
here the result of 0x3C909090 xor 0x90909090 is assigned to the variable y. When the
compiler transforms this expression into native code, the two constants are copied into
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the generated instructions. This attack is known as JIT spraying and enables the attacker
to inject 3-4 arbitrary bytes into the JIT code. By forcing the control flow to the middle
of the mov instruction, the CPU will treat the injected constant bytes as an instruction
and execute them.
JIT spraying can be mitigated by constant blinding, i.e., masking large constant C
through xor with a random value R at compile time. The JIT compiler then emits an xor
instruction to unblind the masked constant before using it (((C⊕ R)⊕ R = C⊕ 0 = C).
While constant blinding indeed prevents JIT spraying it decreases the performance
of the JIT code. Further, Athanasakis et al. [13] demonstrated that JIT spraying can
also be performed with smaller constants, and that constant blinding for smaller
constants is impractical due to the imposed run-time overhead. Recently, Maisuradze et
al. [127] demonstrated a JIT-spraying attack by controlling the offsets of relative branch
instructions to inject arbitrary bytes into the JIT code.
Another approach to mitigate JIT-spraying is code randomization. Homescu et al. [94]
adopted fine-grained randomization for JIT code. However, similar to static code, code
randomization for JIT code is vulnerable to information-disclosure attacks [196]. While
Crane et al. [51] argued that leakage resilience based on execute-only memory can be
applied to JIT code as well, they do not implement code-pointer hiding for the JIT code
which makes the performance impact hard to estimate. Tang et al. [206] and Werner et
al. [229] proposed to prevent information-disclosure attacks through destructive code
reads. Their approach is based on the assumption that benign code will never read
from the code section. Destructive code reads intercept read operations to the code
section, and overwrite every read instruction with random data. Hence, all memory
leaked by the attacker is replaced by random data, rendering it unusable for code-reuse
attacks. However, Snow et al. [197] demonstrated that this mitigation is ineffective in
the setting of JIT code. In particular, the attacker can use the JIT compiler to generate
multiple versions of the same code by providing a JavaScript program with duplicated
functions. Upon reading the code section the native code of the first function will be
overwritten while the other functions are intact and can be used by the attacker to
conduct a code-reuse attack.
Niu et al. [154] applied CFI to JIT code and found that it generates on average 14.4%
run-time overhead and does not protect against data-only attacks which do not tamper
with the control flow but manipulate the data flow to induce malicious behavior.
3.4.2 Threat Model
The main goal is to demonstrate that data-only attacks against the Just-in-Time (JIT)
compiler constitute a severe threat. Therefore, our threat model and assumptions
exclude attacks on the static code. Our threat model is consistent with the related work
in this area [24, 51, 127, 154, 199].
Defense Capabilities
Static code is protected. We assume state-of-the-art defenses against code-injection
and code-reuse attacks for static code are in-place. In particular, this means
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that code-injection is prevented by enforcing DEP [136], and code-reuse attacks
are defeated by randomization-based solutions [51, 52], or (hardware-assisted)
control-flow integrity [5, 107, 215]. Additionally, we assume that the static code of
the application and the operating system are not malicious.
Data randomization. We assume the targeted application to employ Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [165]. This prevents the attacker from knowing
any addresses of allocated data regions a priori. This also enables us to hide sensitive
data from the attacker.
Adversary Capabilities
Memory-corruption vulnerability. The target program suffers from at least
one memory-corruption vulnerability. The attacker can exploit this vulnerability
to disclose and manipulate data memory of known addresses. This is a common
assumption for browser exploits [45, 186, 196].
Scripting Engine. The attacker can utilize the scripting engine to perform arbitrary
(sandboxed) computations at run time, e.g., adjust the malicious payload based on
disclosed information.
We note that any form of side-channel, e.g., cache and timing attacks to leak
randomized memory addresses, or hardware attacks are out of scope.
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Figure 26: DOJITA enables the attacker to execute arbitrary code through a data-only attack. In
particular, the attacker manipulates the IR which is then used by the JIT compiler to
generate native code that includes a malicious payload.
3.4.3 Our Data-only Attacks on JIT Compilers
As mentioned in the previous section, existing JIT protections only aim to prevent
code-injection or code-reuse attacks. However, in our preliminary experiments we
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observed that arbitrary remote code execution is feasible by means of data-only
attacks which corrupt the memory without requiring to corrupt any code pointers. We
implemented an experimental data-only attack against JIT compilers, coined DOJITA
(Data-Only JIT Attack), that manipulates the intermediate representation (IR) to trick the
JIT compiler into generating arbitrary malicious payloads. Our experiments underline
the significance of data-only attacks, in the presence of defenses against control-flow
hijacking, and will motivate new defenses. Figure 26 shows the high-level idea of
DOJITA:
The attacker 1 exploits a memory-corruption vulnerability to read and write arbitrary
data memory; 2 identifies a hot function F in the input program, which will be compiled
to native code; 3 during the compilation of F the JIT compiler will generate the
corresponding IR; the attacker discloses the memory address of the IR in memory
which is commonly composed of C++ objects; 4 injects crafted C++ objects (the malicious
payload) into the existing IR. 5 Finally the JIT compiler uses the IR to generate the native
code 6 . Since the IR was derived from the trusted bytecode input, the JIT compiler does
not check the generated code again. 7 Thus, the generated native code now contains a
malicious payload and is executed upon subsequent invocations of the function F.
3.4.3.1 Details
For our experiments, we chose to attack the open source version of Edge’s JavaScript
engine, called ChakraCore [139]. Our goal is to achieve arbitrary code execution by
exploiting a memory-corruption vulnerability without manipulating the JIT code or
any code pointers. Further, we assume that the static code and the JIT code are
protected against code-reuse and code-injection attacks, e.g., by either fine-grained
code randomization [51], or fine-grained (possibly hardware-supported) control-flow
integrity [107, 154]).
For our attack against ChakraCore we carefully analyzed how the JIT compiler
translates the JavaScript program into native code. We found that the IR of ChakraCore
is comprised of a linked list of IR::Instr C++ objects where each C++ object embeds
all information, required by the JIT compiler, to generate a native instruction or an
instruction block. These objects contain variables like m_opcode to specify the operation,
and variables m_dst, m_src1, and m_src2 to specify the operands for the operation. To
achieve arbitrary code execution, we carefully craft our own objects, and link them
together. Figure 27 shows the IR after we injected our own IR::Instr objects (lower part
of the figure), by overwriting the m_next data pointer of the benign IR::Instr objects
(upper part of the figure). When the JIT compiler uses the linked list to generate the
native code it will include our malicious payload. It is noteworthy that m_opcode cannot
specify arbitrary operations but is limited to a subset of instructions like (un-)conditional
branches, memory reads/write, logic, and arithmetic instructions. This allows us to
generate payloads to perform arbitrary computations, and to read and write memory.
However, for a meaningful attack we have to interact with the system through system
calls. We could inject a call instruction to the system call wrapper function which
is provided by system libraries. However, this would require leaking the address of
the wrapper which might not be possible, e.g., if defenses such as Readactor [51]
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Figure 27: The IR of ChakraCore consists of a linked list of IR:Instr C++ objects. The attacker
injects instructions by overwriting the m_next pointer of a benign object (dotted line)
to point to a linked list of crafted objects.
are in place that mitigate the disclosure of code pointers. Hence, we use unaligned
instructions [192] by embedding the system call instruction in another instruction. In
particular, we could generate an add or jmp [128] instruction where the operator is
set to the constant 0xC3050F which encodes the instructions syscall; ret. Finally, we
generate a call instruction into the middle of the add instruction to execute the unaligned
code and issue a system call.
3.4.3.2 Implementation
For our proof-of-concept of DOJITA we implemented an attack framework that allows
the attacker to specify an arbitrary attack payload. Our framework parses and compiles
the attack payload to the ChakraCore IR, i.e., the framework automatically generates
C++ memory objects that correspond to the instruction of the attack payload. Next,
the framework exploits a heap overflow in Array.map() (CVE-2016-7190), which we
re-introduced to the most recent public version of ChakraCore (version 1.4), to acquire
read/write primitive. After disclosing the internal data-structures of the JIT compiler,
we modify data pointers within these structures to include our malicious IR. The JIT
compiler will then iterate through the IR memory objects, and generate native code.
While the injection of malicious IR into the benign IR depends on a race condition we
found that the attack framework can reliable win this race by triggering the execution
of the JIT compiler repeatedly. In our testing, DOJITA succeeded 99% of the times.
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Our proposed data-only attack against the JIT compiler cannot be mitigated by any
state-of-the-art defenses or defenses proposed in the literature [51, 154]. The reason is
that these defenses cannot distinguish the benign IR from the injected IR.
3.4.3.3 Comparison to Related Work
Independently from our work, Theori [213] published a similar attack that also targets
the internal data structures of Microsoft’s JIT compiler. Their attack targets a temporary
buffer which is used by the JIT compiler during compilation to emit the JIT code. This
temporary buffer is marked as readable and writable. However, once the JIT compiler
generated all instruction from the IR, it relocates the content of the temporary buffer
into the JIT memory which is marked as readable and executable. By injecting new
instructions into this temporary buffer, one can inject arbitrary code into the JIT memory.
Microsoft patched the JIT compiler to include a cyclic redundancy checksum of the
emitted instructions during compilation. The JIT code is only executed if the checksum
of the relocated buffer corresponds to the original checksum.
This defense mechanism which was recently added by Microsoft does not prevent
our attack. While the attack by Theori [213] is similar to ours, we inject our malicious
payload at an earlier stage of the compilation. As a consequence, the checksum, which
is computed during compilation, will be computed over our injected IR. Since we do not
perform any modifications in later stages, the checksum of the relocated buffer is still
valid and the JIT compiler cannot detect our attack.
3.4.4 Conclusion
Protection of modern software against run-time attacks (code injection and code
reuse) has been a subject of intense research and a number of solutions have been
deployed or proposed. Moreover, recently, researchers demonstrated the threat of the
so-called data-only attacks that manipulate data flows instead of the control flow
of the code. These attacks seem to be very hard to prevent because any defense
mechanism requires the exact knowledge of the input data and the intended data flow.
However, on the one hand, most of the proposed defenses are tailored towards statically
generated code and their adaption to dynamic code comes with the price of security or
performance penalties. On the other hand, many widespread applications, like browsers
and document viewers, embed just-in-time compilers to generate dynamic code.
We present a novel data-only attack, dubbed DOJITA, against JIT compilers that can
successfully execute malicious code even in the presence of defenses against control-flow
hijacking attacks such as Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) or randomization-based defenses.
Specifically, this attack manipulates the intermediate representation of JIT programs,
which is used by the compiler to generate the dynamic code, to trick the JIT compiler
into generating malicious code. We found that state-of-the-art JIT code defenses cannot
mitigate this attack. To protect against DOJITA the internal data structures must
be protected against modifications. This is a non-trivial challenge, e.g., isolating the
JIT compiler by swapping it out to a separate process is likely to result in a large
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performance overhead because the JIT compiler is often invoked during the execution
of (compiled) JavaScript for further optimization purposes.
Recently, Frassetto et al. [72] proposed a new design for JIT engines which leverages
Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [104] to isolate the JIT compiler, and hence,
mitigates attacks like DOJITA.
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3.5 related work
In this section, we provide an overview of three classes of related memory-corruption
attacks. First, we discuss different techniques of attack mitigations that rely on memory
secrecy. We then elaborate on different ways to attack Control-flow Integrity, and
conclude with the related work on data-only attacks.
Many exploit mitigations introduce randomness into the in-memory representation
of applications. Such mitigations rely on the assumption that the attacker cannot read
the memory. However, in the presence of memory-disclosure vulnerabilities, assuming
memory secrecy is neither justified nor realistic.
Bhatkar et al. [20] note that contemporary schemes (ASLR, StackGuard [48],
PointGuard [49]) are vulnerable if the attacker can read arbitrary values in memory.
Strackx et al. [203] later demonstrate that memory disclosure through buffer overread
errors allows attackers to bypass ASLR and stack canaries. Fresi Roglia et al. [74] then
use return-oriented programming to disclose the randomized location of libc. Based
on the insight that ASLR was highly vulnerable to simple memory-disclosure attacks,
researchers argued that fine-grained code randomization solutions would provide
sufficient resilience [59, 82, 93, 109, 119, 162, 227]. However, as we have shown in
Section 3.1, the attacker can bypass all randomization-based defenses by leveraging a
direct or an indirect memory-disclosure attack.
Bittau et al. [22] develop another memory disclosure attack against services that
automatically restart after crashes. This attack exploits the fact that some servers (created
using fork without execve) do not re-randomize after a crash. By sending such servers
a malformed series of requests and by analyzing whether the requests cause the server
to crash, hang, or respond, the attacker can guess the locations of the gadgets required
to launch a simple ROP attack that sends the program binary to the remote attacker.
Like Just-in-Time Return-oriented Programming (JIT-ROP) (cf. Section 3.1.2), this attack
undermines fine-grained code randomization.
Siebert et al. [188] present a memory disclosure attack against servers that uses a
timing side-channel. By sending a malformed request to a web server, the attacker can
control a byte pointer that controls the iteration count of a loop. This creates a correlation
between the target of the pointer and the response time of the request that the attacker
can use to (slowly) scan and disclose the memory layout of the victim process. In a
similar vein, Hund et al. [101], Wojtczuk [232], Jang et al. [112], and Gruss et al. [89]
exploit a timing side-channel to infer the memory of the privileged ASLR-randomized
kernel address space.
Gras et al. [88] present an evict and time cache side-channel attack against Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) that can be launched from within the JavaScript
sandbox. Hence, attackers can use this technique when executing an attack against
browsers to bypass ASLR without relying on an information-disclosure vulnerability.
Evans et al. [68] use a memory-disclosure attack to bypass an implementation of the
code pointer integrity (CPI) by Kuznetsov et al. [118]. CPI works by storing control
flow and bounds information in a safe region which is separate from non-sensitive
data. This prevents control-flow hijacking and spatial memory corruption. Whereas the
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32-bit x86 implementation uses memory segmentation to isolate the safe region, the
fastest 64-bit x86 implementation uses randomization to implement information hiding.
However, it turns out that the hidden safe region was sufficiently large to be located and
parsed using a modified version of the memory disclosure attack by Siebert et al. [188].
Kuznetsov et al. [118] also provide a 64-bit CPI implementation where the safe region is
protected by Software Fault Isolation (SFI), which has not been bypassed.
Göktas¸ et al. [85] and Oikonomopoulos et al. [157] discuss attack techniques to break
memory secrecy by lowering the entropy. Specifically, many modern client and server
applications provide interfaces that the attacker can use to reliably perform memory
allocations. The attacker can exploit allocation oracles to reliably guess the address of
hidden memory.
Gawlik et al. [76] present Crash Resistant Oriented Programming which enables
brute-force attacks against randomization-based defenses. Their attack combines
information-disclosure vulnerabilities with fault-tolerant functionality of browsers to
probe memory addresses. In particular, they found that threads, which the attacker
can spawn through JavaScript, install their own exception handler, which prevents the
browser from crashing if a thread accesses an invalid memory address. In a follow-up
work Kollenda et al. [116] explore techniques which attackers use to automate the
process of finding crash-resistant primitives.
Snow et al. [197] present memory-disclosure attacks against defenses that aim
to prevent direct memory-disclosure of randomized code by means of destructive
code reads [206, 229]. This means that every byte of the code section is overwritten
with a random byte after it was read. However, this does not prevent an attacker
from performing direct disclosure attacks. In particular, the attacker can exploit the
Just-in-Time (JIT) engine of a browser or document viewer to generate native code of
two identical functions. The attacker then discloses the content of the first function to
find the addresses of suitable code-reuse gadgets. Since the two functions were identical,
the attacker can use the gadgets of the second function for her attack. Further, the
attacker can in some cases reload a shared library after disclosing its content. Finally,
Snow et al. [197] find that the attacker can guess part of the randomized code. For
example, a function epilog performs the reversed operations of a function prolog,
hence, by disclosing the function prolog the attacker can reliably guess the instruction
of the function epilog. This attack assumes the usage of certain code-randomization
schemes. Pewny et al. [171] demonstrate that the combination of code inference and
whole-function reuse can bypass destructive code reads, regardless of the applied
code-randomization technique.
Rudd et al. [179] explore the possibilities of reusing code pointers, which are protected
by a layer of indirection, e.g., by means of code pointer hiding (cf. Section 4.1.2.3). Their
results show that, in the case of a vulnerable web server, pointer protection through
a layer of indirection is not sufficient and gives the attacker enough leeway to gain
arbitrary code execution. van der Veen et al. [222] present a generalization of this idea
in the form of an analysis framework which identifies the remaining attack surface for
an application after a certain mitigation has been applied. Specifically, it allows the
definition of a number of constrains which are imposed on the attacker by a code-reuse
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mitigation. The result of the analyses are gadgets which do not violate these constrains,
and hence, can be leveraged for a code-reuse attack.
3.5.1 Attacks against Control-flow Integrity
Control-flow Integrity is one of the promising alternatives to randomization-based
defenses that are effective in mitigating code-reuse attacks. However, as for
randomization-based defenses, researchers identified pitfalls of different Control-flow
Integrity (CFI) schemes as well.
After Shacham [192] published his work on return-oriented programming (ROP),
researchers focused on ensuring the integrity of return addresses on the stack [5, 56, 57].
Checkoway et al. [35] and Bletsch et al. [25] present an alternative technique of
performing ROP attacks, coined Jump-oriented Programming (JOP). The principle of
JOP is the same as ROP: the attacker chains short instruction sequences together in
order to execute arbitrary malicious payloads. However, instead of leveraging return
instruction to chain gadgets, JOP leverages on indirect jump instructions. To chain
gadgets through an indirect jump instruction, JOP either relies on gadgets that end
in pop reg / jmp reg pair, and hence, emulate a return instruction, or on a dispatcher
gadget. A dispatcher gadget can chain JOP gadgets that all end with jmp reg by first
setting reg to the start address of the dispatcher gadget, then loading the next JOP
gadget pointer from an attacker provided list of JOP gadget pointers into a register, and
finally jumping to it.
Lettner et al. [121] port the idea of Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP)
to Objective-C. Specifically, they exploit the msgSend() dispatcher function which makes
this attack hard to defeat. Their attack shows that COOP style attacks are practical and
a powerful alternative to classic ROP attacks.
Zhang and Sekar [239] propose binCFI which is similar to the original CFI by Abadi
et al. [5] but relaxes the CFI policies to improve run-time performance. The enforced
CFI policy by binCFI for return instruction requires return addresses to target a
call-preceded instruction. However, Davi et al. [60] and Göktas et al. [83] demonstrate
that this policy is too imprecise for real-world applications. In particular, they found that
the attacker can construct Turing-complete ROP chains that conform to the CFI policy
of binCFI.
Pappas et al. [163], Cheng et al. [43], and Fratric [73] present CFI schemes that aim
to mitigate ROP attacks, and to have a better performance than traditional shadow
stacks [56]. The main idea of these schemes is to only verify the return address(es)
on the stack when an attack is likely to be executed, e.g., during a system call because
most attack payloads need to interact with the kernel at some point to perform malicious
actions. For efficiency reasons these schemes only verify a configurable amount of return
addresses with the help of heuristics to detect ROP attacks, e.g., if a certain number of
return addresses point to short instruction sequences. Carlini and Wagner [31] Davi et al.
[60], Schuster et al. [185], and Göktas et al. [84] present attacks that demonstrate that
these heuristics provide the attacker with enough freedom to perform Turing-complete
attacks. Wollgast et al. [233] implement a gadget finding framework, which discovers
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ROP gadgets that conform to a given CFI policy. In particular, their attacks demonstrate
that real-world applications contain ROP gadgets, which are indistinguishable from
benign instruction sequences that end in a return instruction. Hence, they can be
exploited by the attacker to evade the heuristics that aim to detect traditional ROP
gadgets. Further, they demonstrate the limitations of Central Processing Unit (CPU)
features like the Last Branch Record (LBR) for enforcing CFI as the attacker can flush
the LBR to evade the detection of ROP payloads.
Carlini et al. [32] explore the limitations of static fine-grained CFI that does not
consider any state information. This means that a return instruction cannot only return
to the original caller of its function but to any potential caller. With their attack, coined
control-flow bending, Carlini et al. [32] provide evidence that a shadow stack is required
to provide precise enforcement of the control-flow graph (CFG).
In general, the effectiveness of CFI greatly depends on the precision of the enforced
CFG that is derived for the protected application. The aforementioned attacks on CFI
mainly exploit the fact that the attacked CFI schemes decrease the precision of the
enforced CFG on purpose to lower the performance overhead. Evans et al. [69] assume
the best-case scenario (from a defender’s perspective) to create the CFG, which provides
access to the source code and compile-time information. In Control Jujutsu they analyze
the precision of the state-of-the-art algorithm [120] that is used to derive forward edges
in the CFG, and find that the derived CFG contains imprecisions that can be exploited
and thus allow arbitrary code execution.
3.5.2 Data-only Attacks
Data-only attacks are an attack class which, unlike code-injection and code-reuse attacks,
does not require the attacker to maliciously modify the control-flow graph. As a
consequence, previously discussed defenses that attempt to mitigate control-flow attacks
are ineffective in terms of preventing data-only attacks.
Chen et al. [38] demonstrate data-only attacks against server applications. Specifically,
they show how the attacker can manipulate the data flow within the application to
bypass authentication check, disclose configuration files, and even escalate privileges by
changing decision-making data.
Heartbleed [133] is a buffer-overread bug in OpenSSL [211] which allows the attacker
to reliably disclose memory of server applications that utilize OpenSSL. The Heartbleed
bug affected a wide variety of applications and allowed in most cases for the attacker
to execute a data-only attack to disclose the private keys of the server or data of other
users.
Hu et al. [98] present FlowStitch which tries to automate the process of creating
data-only attacks. The idea is that the attacker provides three inputs to the FlowStitch
framework which then automatically generates a data-only attack: the first input triggers
a memory-corruption vulnerability in the target application, the second one triggers the
execution of the same execution path as the first input without crashing the application,
and the third input identifies data that are interesting to the attacker, e.g., cryptographic
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keys. FlowStitch then automatically generates an exploit that combines different data
flows within the application that allow the attacker to exfiltrate the interesting data.
In a follow-up, Hu et al. [99] extend their previous work by introducing the notion
of Date-oriented Programming (DOP). Their main goal was to subvert existing CFI
defenses by showing how data-only attacks can be used to implement Turing-complete
attacks without changing the control-flow.
Browsers pose an interesting target because they are highly complex software and
serve as an execution environment for web applications. As a result, browsers handle
some of the most sensitive data that range from banking information, credit card
numbers and passwords. Rogowski et al. [178] explore data-only attacks in the context of
a browser. Specifically, they present a framework that automatically generates exploits
that perform a data-only attack to disclose authentication tokens, or enable malicious
websites to bypass the same-origin policy which normally isolates different websites
from one other.
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3.6 summary and conclusion
In this chapter, we demonstrated novel memory-corruption attacks against code
randomization and control-flow integrity.
In the first part of this chapter we presented novel information-disclosure attacks. Our
attacks repeatedly leverage information-disclosure vulnerabilities without crashing the
application. We use this primitive to disclose the content of the code section to analyzing
the randomized code, and to compile a customized return-oriented programming
payload during run time. We further show that even if the attacker cannot directly
read the code but is limited to the disclosing content of the data section she can still
bypass code-randomization. Specifically, we show that the attacker can infer the location
of return-oriented programming gadgets by disclose a large number of code pointers
from data memory and combining them with offline knowledge about the applied
code randomization. Our attacks highlight the need for hardening code-randomization
schemes against memory-disclosure attacks.
In the second part of this chapter we turn our attention to coarse- and fine-grained
control-flow integrity schemes. We demonstrate how attackers can chain virtual
function calls of C++ applications to bypass coarse-grained control-flow integrity
defenses without violating the enforced policies. One might assume that fine-grained
control-flow integrity would solve this issue and provide the perfect protection against
code-reuse attacks. However, we highlight the importance of binary security analysis
by finding how the optimization pass of two open source compilers introduce a
security vulnerability into a conceptually secure compiler-based control-flow integrity
implementation. Specifically, the optimization pass forced a value, which used during
a control-flow integrity check and which is supposed to be only readable, to be
temporarily spilled to memory. This gives the attacker a small time window in which
she can tamper with this value to bypass fine-grained control-flow integrity. Finally,
we bypass control-flow integrity by manipulating the intermediate representation of
a just-in-time compiler for JavaScript. As a consequence, the just-in-time compiler
generates attacker controlled, hence, bypassing control-flow integrity as well as other
just-in-time compiler defenses.
To conclude, both randomization-based and control-flow integrity-based defenses
may offer good protection against the vast majority of memory-corruption and
code-reuse attacks. However, all it takes for the attacker to succeed is to find one
weakness in the defense, and neither randomization- nor integrity-based defenses offer
complete protection.

4
A D VA N C E S I N M E M O RY- C O R R U P T I O N D E F E N S E S
In this chapter, we focus on using code-randomization techniques to mitigate the
effectiveness of code-reuse attacks. Code randomization is, besides control-flow integrity,
an efficient and effective mitigation against code-reuse attacks. Unfortunately, as we
demonstrated in the previous chapter, code-randomization can be bypassed by means
of memory-disclosure attacks. Following, we discuss techniques that mitigate the effects
of disclosure attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate how execute-only memory can serve
as a primitive to mitigate direct and indirect memory-disclosure attacks. In Section 4.1
we leverage memory virtualization to implement execute-only memory. However,
not all platforms support memory virtualization. Hence, we explore software-based
techniques to implement execute-only memory in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we
present the design of a linker extension that embeds necessary meta-data and code
to produce self-randomizing binaries. Next, we turn our attention toward a method
for leveraging randomization to efficiently mitigate data-only attacks against the page
table. Specifically, we relocate the page tables to a memory region that provides enough
entropy. We also apply leakage resilience to ensure that an attacker, who can leak kernel
memory, cannot find references that point to the new memory location. Our results
show that randomization-based defenses can be hardened to provide resilience against
memory-disclosure attacks. Lastly, we summarize related work on code-reuse defenses
in Section 4.5 and conclude this chapter in Section 4.6.
4.1 readactor : memory-disclosure resilient code randomization
Today code-reuse attacks are the most prevalent technique for attackers to gain full
control of a system. Therefore, attackers exploit a memory-corruption vulnerability to
overwrite a code pointer which is then used by the vulnerable application as a target
address of an indirect branch. The overwritten code pointer points to a gadget, which
is existing application code that performs an attacker-desired task. Despite a substantial
amount of research over the last decade the problem of code-reuse attacks remains
unsolved. Existing mitigations can roughly be classified as Control-flow Integrity (CFI)
and code-randomization-based solutions.
CFI mitigates code-reuse attacks by verifying each code pointer against a policy before
it is used as a branch target, hence, limiting the gadgets available to the attacker. The
enforced policy is derived from a statically computed control-flow graph (CFG) [6]. The
effectiveness of CFI greatly depends on the precision of the CFG, which is hard to
compute even when the source code is available [69]. Further, CFI based on a precise
CFG often negatively impacts the performance of the protected program. Therefore,
recent work on CFI investigated the feasibility of trading the precision of the enforced
CFG for increased performance [43, 73, 163, 237, 239]. However, this idea was quickly
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rejected because it allows the attacker to construct code-reuse attacks that do not violate
the enforced policy, hence, fully bypass the mitigation [31, 60, 83, 84, 185].
Recently, Kuznetsov et al. [118] published Code Pointer Integrity (CPI), which follows
a similar approach to CFI. The difference is CPI verifies write accesses to code pointers
whereas CFI verifies the usage of code pointers. Therefore, CPI isolates all code pointers
from non-control data, as originally suggested by Szekeres et al. [205], by moving it
to a special memory area, called safe region. The main challenge for CPI is to protect
the safe region from attackers with arbitrary read-write capabilities. Due to the lack of
in-process memory isolation schemes on 64-bit architectures, Kuznetsov et al. [118] try
to hide the safe region using randomization. Unfortunately, this quickly turned out to
be an insufficient protection when Evans et al. [68] bypassed CPI by exploiting a side
channel to reveal the location of the safe region.
Code randomization mitigates code-reuse attacks by reorganizing the layout of
the application in memory [119] during run time. As a consequence, the addresses
of gadgets, which the attacker identified during an offline analysis, become invalid.
However, once major applications adopted code randomization, attackers started to
utilize memory-disclosure vulnerabilities to leak the randomization secret [189, 203]. As
discussed in Section 3.1, we distinguish between direct and indirect memory-disclosure.
The main difference between both types is that in a direct memory-disclosure attack
the leakage is based on code pointers that are encoded into instructions residing on
code pages. In an indirect memory-disclosure attack the attacker leaks multiple code
pointers that reside in data memory, and combines it with offline knowledge about the
application and the applied randomization to infer the layout during run time.
Since randomization-based defenses are more efficient and easier to adopt [59, 95,
97, 150, 218], recent work in the area of code randomization focused on increasing
its resilience against disclosure attacks. For example, Oxymoron [16] obfuscates code
pointers, which are encoded in instructions, whereas Execute-no-Read (XnR) [17] marks
code pages, which are currently not being executed, as non-accessible to prevent
Just-in-Time Return-oriented Programming (JIT-ROP) [196] attacks. However, as we
described in Section 3.1 both techniques cannot mitigate indirect disclosure attacks, and
can easily be bypassed.
Goals and contributions. Our main goal is to tackle the challenge of memory disclosure
to harden code-randomization based defenses. We use our classification of direct and
indirect memory disclosure which we presented in Section 3.1. We present the design
and implementation of Readactor, the first practical fine-grained code-randomization
defense that resists both classes of memory-disclosure attacks. Readactor utilizes
hardware-enforced eXecute-only Memory (XoM) as a trusted computing base. By
combining XoM with our novel compiler transformation we achieve resilience against
direct and indirect memory disclosure. Contrary to previous work, we do not rely on
insecure software emulation [17], or legacy hardware [80] but base our implementation
of XoM on virtualization [103] which is supported by commodity Intel CPUs. To
summarize, our main contributions are:
• Comprehensive ROP resilience. Readactor prevents all existing ROP attacks:
conventional ROP [192], ROP without returns [35], and dynamic ROP [22, 196].
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Most importantly, Readactor improves the state of the art in JIT-ROP defenses by
preventing indirect memory disclosure through code-pointer hiding.
• Novel techniques. We introduce compiler transformations that extend
execute-only memory to protect against the new class of indirect information
disclosure. We also present a new way to implement execute-only memory that
leverages hardware-accelerated memory protections.
• Covering statically & dynamically generated code. We introduce the first
technique that extends coverage of execute-only memory to secure just-in-time
(JIT) compiled code.
• Realistic and extensive evaluation. We provide a full-fledged prototype
implementation of Readactor that diversifies applications, and present the
results of a detailed evaluation. We report an average overhead of 6.4% on
compute-intensive benchmarks. Moreover, our solution scales beyond benchmarks
to programs as complex as Google’s popular Chromium web browser.
We covered the technical background of return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks
in Section 2.4, and of memory-disclosure attacks in Section 3.1. In the reminder of this
chapter we first introduce our threat model, then provide an overview of the design
and implementation of Readactor. We continue with a detailed performance/security
evaluation, and conclude with a discussion about potential weaknesses.
4.1.1 Threat Model
Our threat model is consistent with prior offensive and defensive work, particularly the
powerful model introduced in JIT-ROP [196].
Defense Capabilities
Writable⊕Executable. The target system provides built-in protection against code
injection attacks. Today, all modern processors and operating systems support data
execution prevention (DEP) to prevent code injection.
Secure loading. The attacker cannot tamper with our implementation of
Readactor.
Code Randomization. The attacker has no a priori knowledge of the in-memory
code layout. We ensure this through the use of fine-grained diversification.
Adversary Capabilities
Known System Configuration. The attacker knows the software configuration and
defenses on the target platform, as well as the source code of the target application.
Memory Corruption. The target program suffers from at least from one memory
corruption vulnerability which allows the attacker to hijack the control-flow.
Information disclosure. The attacker is able to read and analyze any readable
memory location in the target process.
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Figure 28: System overview. Our compiler generates diversified code that can be mapped with
execute-only permissions and inserts trampolines to hide code pointers. We modify
the kernel to use EPT permissions to enable execute-only pages.
We cannot rule out the existence of timing, cache, and fault side channels that can leak
information about the code layout to attackers. Although information disclosure through
side-channels is outside the scope of this chapter, we note that Readactor mitigates
recent remote side-channel attacks against diversified code since they also involve direct
memory disclosure [22, 188].
4.1.2 Readactor Design and Implementation
In this section, we first provide an overview of our overall design of Readactor before
providing details on its core components: execute-only memory and code-pointer
hiding.
4.1.2.1 Overview
Readactor leverages eXecute-only Memory (XoM) as primitive to mitigate direct and
indirect memory-disclosure attacks (see Chapter 3.1). We note that x86 does not natively
support mapping memory as execute-only. Previous related work [17] tried to overcome
this issue by emulating XoM in software, however, this leaves at least the page, which
contains the code that is currently executed, readable (in fact, for performance reasons
Backes et al. [17] utilize a sliding window which leaves n pages readable). Readactor, on
the other hand, utilizes the hardware virtualization support of commodity x86 Central
Processing Units (CPUs) to implement XoM. Hence, we prevent the attacker from
directly disclosing memory at any time during the program execution. We introduce
code-pointer hiding to protect all code pointers against indirect memory-disclosure attacks.
Code-pointer hiding is based on trampolines, which are direct jump instructions that are
protected using execute-only memory.
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Our approach to protecting code pointers requires precise control-flow information
to identify all code pointers. Therefore, we opt for a compiler-based approach because
binary analysis approaches are too error prone due to the information loss during which
occurs during compilation. As we show in Section 4.1.4, this approach allows us to
scale Readactor to complex real-world applications like browsers and JavaScript engines
without imposing an unpractical performance hit.
Figure 28 illustrates the architecture of Readactor. As a first step, our compiler
extension creates a readacted application in three steps: first, the compiler ensures
that code and data are strictly separated from each other. In particular, we prevent
the compiler from embedding data, like jump tables, into the code section, which is
normal done for performance reasons, and ensure that code and data sections start
on a new page, and are not appended to each other. Second, we randomize the code
layout of the application. There are a large number of randomization strategies [119],
however, we found that function permutation [113] and callee-save register slot
reordering [162] provides an optimal tradeoff between performance and security. In our
current implementation, we randomize the application only during compile time. This
assumes that the randomized application remains secret from the attacker. However, this
is merely an implementation limitation rather than a conceptual limitation. In fact, in
Section 4.3 we designed and implemented a linker wrapper to create self-randomizing
binaries. Third, we create a trampoline for every code pointer.
To enable execute-only memory on commodity x86 CPUs, we implemented a thin
hypervisor that enables and configures memory virtualization (Extended Page Tables
(EPT)), and provides an interface to the operating system kernel to mark single pages as
execute-only. Finally, we patch the operating system kernel to support loading readacted
applications by mapping their code pages as execute-only by interacting with the
hypervisor.
Next, we provide detailed information on the implementation of Readactor’s core
components: execute-only memory and code-pointer hiding.
4.1.2.2 Execute-only Memory
Execute-only memory is not natively supported by modern operating systems. In the
following we discuss how we overcome the challenges of enabling execute-only memory
for modern operating systems on the x86 architecture. Therefore, we first provide a short
technical background on memory protection before we explain how we leverage a thin
hypervisor to enable execute-only memory, and patch the operating system to use it.
Extended Page Tables
The x86 architecture uses multiple layers of indirection to manage access to the
memory. During the translation from one layer to another the CPU enforces an access
control policy that can be configured through software. Traditionally, x86 uses two
indirection layers for memory management: segmentation and paging. Segmentation
is a legacy feature, which does not enforce any memory protection on 64-bit systems
anymore. Therefore, modern operating systems rely solely on paging to enforce memory
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Figure 29: Relation between virtual, guest physical, and host physical memory. Page tables
and the EPT contain the access permissions that are enforced during the address
translation.
protection. The operating system configures paging through a data structure, called page
table, which contains the information to translate virtual addresses to physical addresses,
and the corresponding memory permissions. Interestingly, x86 paging was extended to
support non-executable memory [10, 103], however, not execute-only memory.
In late 2008 Intel introduced hardware virtualization, which includes memory
virtualization. Memory virtualization is implemented by adding another layer of
indirection for memory accesses. When virtualization is active, physical addresses,
as seen by the operating system, are now called guest physical addresses, and are
translated to host physical addresses, which are the real physical addresses, using the
Extended Page Tables (EPT) [103]. The EPT contain, similar to the regular page tables,
translation information and memory permissions. However, in contrast to the regular
page tables, the EPT do allow the enforcement of (non-)readable, (non-)writable, and
(non-)executable memory permissions independently.
Figure 29 illustrates the translation process from virtual memory to physical memory
with paging and memory virtualization enabled. Here, the loaded application consists
of a code and a data page. The effective permission for both pages is the intersection
of the permission sets of the regular and the extended page table. For example, if the
attacker tries to read from the code page, the first translation using the regular page
tables will succeed because, here, the memory protection is set to allow read and execute
access. However, the second translation from the guest physical memory to host physical
memory will fail, and create a memory-access violation exception because the memory
protection is set to only allow execute access.
To enable the EPT we have to enable the hardware virtualization feature of the CPU.
Once enabled, the virtualization features (including the EPT) are managed by a piece of
software called hypervisor. Next, we explain how we created a minimal hypervisor that
only enables and configures memory virtualization.
Hypervisor
Readactor requires the implementation or extension of an existing hypervisor [140,
158, 160, 223, 234] to provide an interface to the operating system to mark individual
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pages as execute only. For our implementation of Readactor we chose to implement a
small stand-alone hypervisor for two reasons: first, the majority of sophisticated attacks
require a scripting environment [39, 40, 60, 61, 186, 196], as is typically provided by
browsers and document viewers, and target end users that commonly run their software
in a non-virtualized environment. Second, implementing a stand-alone hypervisor
allows us to measure the run-time overhead of using execute-only memory with greater
precision because it avoids the possibility that any overhead is masked by other features
of an existing hypervisor.
Although the original purpose of hardware virtualization was to execute multiple
operating systems in parallel on a single hardware platform, in mid 2017, Microsoft
started to deploy a hypervisor on Windows 10 to enforce security policies as well [142].
This confirms that our approach of a stand-alone hypervisor for end-user systems is
indeed practical.
Our implementation of the hypervisor us allows to enable and disable virtualization
on-the-fly. This process is fully transparent to the operating systems, and was inspired
by previous work [115, 180] which used this approach to load stealth, hypervisor-based
rootkits. However, contrary to rootkits, our hypervisor enables only execute-only
memory, and provides an interface to the operating system to manage it. The fact that
our hypervisor only needs to enable and configure memory virtualization allows us
keep the hypervisor as small as 500 lines of code which benefits both security and
performance.
The naïve approach to enable execute-only memory would be to create an identity
EPT mapping where the guest physical address is the same as the host physical address,
and to provide a hypercall, which is a hypervisor function that can be invoked by the
operating system, to change the permission of the EPT mappings. Such an approach
comes with two disadvantages: first, it gives the operating system full control of the
EPT mapping, hence, the hypervisor is not properly isolated from the operating system.
Although the operating system in trusted in our threat model, a solution that allows the
hypervisor to isolate itself from the operating system is a desirable design goal. Second,
every hypercall requires a context switch from the operating system to the hypervisor
and back which negatively impacts the performance of the overall system. We found that
by providing two mappings, one normal and one readacted mapping, the host physical
memory avoids both weaknesses of the naïve approach.
Figure 30 shows an example of the EPT mapping: On the far right is the actual physical
memory of the system which has a total size of 4 GB in this example configuration. Our
hypervisor configures the EPT such that from the operating system’s point of view, the
system appears to have 20 GB available. However, the address 0 GB and 16 GB of the
guest physical memory both map to the same physical memory page. The difference
is, that for the address 0 GB the permissions in the EPT are set to read-write-execute
whereas for the address 16 GB the permissions are set to execute-only. Hence, the effective
permissions for the normal mapping are the permissions of the regular page table, and
execute-only for the readacted mapping. Note that our hypervisor maps the readacted
mapping at an offset that is to the power of two. Hence, the operating system can change
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Figure 30: Readactor creates two mappings for each physical memory page: a readacted
mapping, which maps the physical memory as execute-only, and a normal mapping
which maps the physical memory as read-write-execute. The operating system can
map individual pages as execute-only by mapping virtual memory of a process either
to the normal or readacted guest physical memory page.
the permission of a virtual memory page by flipping a bit of the corresponding entry in
the regular page table.
Further, our design is fully compatible with legacy applications because the normal
mapping is used by default, even when Readactor is active. In fact, Figure 30
demonstrates how shared memory between a legacy and a readacted application.
Naturally, the legacy does not prevent the attacker from reading the memory, thus
disclosing the content of the code page. As a consequence, the attacker could use the
gained knowledge to compromise the readacted application. Therefore, while sharing
code pages between readacted and legacy applications is possible it is not advised.
Operating System
We extended the Linux kernel to use the interface of our hypervisor. However, the
concept of Readactor is operating system agnostic and can be applied to other operating
system, like Windows or macOS, as well.
Our patch to the Linux kernel is adds an additional 82 lines of code to the Linux kernel.
Specifically, it extends the part of the kernel that is responsible for loading binaries: every
binary includes a header that defines the permissions for each section of the binary.
While the compiler can already set the read-write-execute permission independently
for a section in the binary header, the operating system could not map a section as
execute-only as the execute and read permission are the same in the x86 page table.
However, with our hypervisor in place we patched the Linux kernel to map sections of
a binary as execute-only if the permission is set in the binary header.
4.1.2.3 Code-pointer Hiding
Ideally, two instances of a fine-grained code-randomization hardened application do
not share any common gadgets. In such cases, execute-only memory offers sufficient
protection against memory-disclosure attacks because the attacker can neither read,
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Figure 31: Readacted applications replace code pointers in readable memory with trampoline
pointers. The trampoline layout is not correlated with the function layout. Therefore,
trampoline addresses do not leak information about the code to which they point.
nor infer the memory content through an indirect disclosure attack. However, ideal
fine-grained code randomization is not practical due to increased run-time and memory
overhead [119]. Therefore, practical fine-grained randomization schemes rely on coarser
granularity. In an indirect memory-disclosure attack (cf. Section 3.1), the attacker
exploits that two instances of code-randomization-hardened applications share common
gadgets. In particular, the attacker performs an offline analysis to find gadgets where
the offset to a code pointer remains constant after the application is randomized.
With code-pointer hiding we present a technique that relaxes the requirement of ideal
fine-grained code randomization by ensuring that the offsets between code pointers and
gadgets are no longer constant. We achieve this by creating a layer of indirection for
code pointers which is protected through execute-only memory. Specifically, we create
so-called trampoline for each code pointer. A trampoline is a direct jump instruction,
which encodes the value of a code pointer in the jump instruction. All trampolines are
located in execute-only memory, thus, protected from disclosing the jump target through
direct disclosure attack.
Figure 31 illustrates a call trampoline. First, the call instruction in Function_A is
substituted with a jump instruction because a call instruction writes the return address,
which is the address of the next instruction after the call, on the stack that would
allow the attacker to disclose the location of the code section 1 . Next, our compiler
extension generates a trampoline for each call site that consists of a direct call to
the original target, and a jump to the return side 2 . As a consequence, the return
instruction, which is pushed onto the stack during the call of Function_A, points to the
trampoline section, hence, revealing no information about the code section 3 . Finally,
our compiler extension ensures that function pointers are substituted with pointers to
the corresponding trampoline 4 .
4.1.2.4 Code-pointer Hiding for Function Tables
Our design for trampolines prevents the attacker from performing indirect-disclosure
attacks. However, for Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP) attacks (cf.
Section 3.3) the attacker reuses whole functions instead of small instruction sequences.
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Figure 32: In readacted applications, the function pointer tables are substituted with trampolines.
Further, their entries are randomized, and, to counter brute-force attack on the entropy
of the table layout, we insert trampolines to trap functions.
For an unprotected application, the attacker first discloses function pointers of function
tables, like virtual tables (vtables) or the Processor Linkage Table (plt). Since in a
readacted application each function pointer is substituted with a pointer to a trampoline,
which jumps to the corresponding function, the attack can simply reuse trampolines
pointers to achieve the same results.
To counter COOP style attacks, we extend Readactor, to protect function tables. Our
extension, called Readactor++, converts function tables into trampolines and randomizes
the order of the entries, as shown in Figure 32. As in Readactor, call sites are
instrumented to prevent disclosing a valid code address through a return address.
However, in some cases randomizing the order is not sufficient because the original
function-pointer table contains only a few entries. Thus, only randomizing the order
leaves the possibility of brute-force attacks. We mitigate brute-force attacks on the table
layout by inserting additional entries into the randomized table that redirect the control
flow to trap functions. Depending on the implementation, trap functions can terminate
the whole process tree to prevent brute-force attacks on the table layout [76], or notify
an intrusion detection system about an on-going attack.
4.1.3 Security Evaluation
The main goal of Readactor is to prevent code-reuse attacks constructed using either
direct or indirect disclosure vulnerabilities. Thus, we have analyzed and tested its
effectiveness based on five different variants of code-reuse attacks, namely (1) static
ROP attacks using direct and indirect disclosure, (2) Just-in-Time Return-oriented
Programming attacks using direct disclosure, (3) Just-in-Time Return-oriented
Programming attacks using indirect disclosure, (4) whole-function reuse attacks, such
as return-into-libc or COOP. We present a detailed discussion on each type of
code-reuse attack and then evaluate the effectiveness of Readactor using a sophisticated
proof-of-concept JIT-ROP exploit.
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4.1.3.1 Static ROP
To launch a traditional ROP attack [35, 192], the attacker must know the run-time
memory layout of an application and identify ROP gadgets based on an offline analysis
phase. To defeat regular Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR), the attacker
needs to leak a single run-time address through either direct or indirect disclosure.
Afterwards, the addresses of all target gadgets can be reliably determined.
Since Readactor performs fine-grained randomization using function permutation, the
static attacker can only guess the addresses of the target gadgets. In other words, the
underlying fine-grained randomization ensures that the attacker can no longer statically
determine the addresses of all gadgets as offsets from the run-time address of a single
leaked function pointer. In addition, we randomize register allocation and the ordering
of stack locations where registers are saved to ensure that the attacker cannot predict
the run-time effects of gadgets. Using these fine-grained diversifications, Readactor fully
prevents static ROP attacks.
4.1.3.2 JIT-ROP with direct disclosure
JIT-ROP attacks bypass fine-grained code randomization schemes by disassembling code
pages and identifying ROP gadgets dynamically at run time. One way to identify
a set of useful gadgets for a ROP attack is to exploit direct references in call and
jump instructions [196]. Readactor prevents this attack by marking all code pages as
non-readable, i.e., execute-only. This differs from a recent proposal, XnR [17], that always
leaves a window of one or more pages readable to the attacker. Readactor prevents all
reading and disassembly of code pages by design.
4.1.3.3 JIT-ROP with indirect disclosure
Preventing JIT-ROP attacks that rely on direct disclosure is insufficient, since advanced
attacks can exploit indirect disclosure, i.e., harvesting code pointers from the program’s
heap and stack (see Section 3.1). Readactor defends against these attacks with
a combination of fine-grained code randomization and code-pointer hiding. As
stated above, pointer hiding ensures that the attacker can access only trampoline
addresses but cannot disclose actual run-time addresses of functions and call sites
(see Section 4.1.2.3). Hence, even if trampoline addresses are leaked and known to the
attacker, it is not possible to use arbitrary gadgets inside a function because the original
function addresses are hidden in execute-only trampoline pages. Code-pointer hiding
effectively provides at least the same protection as coarse-grained CFI, since only valid
address-taken function entries and call-sites can be reused by an attacker. However, our
scheme is strictly more secure, since the attacker must disclose the address of each
trampoline from the stack or heap before he can reuse the function or call-site. In
addition, we strengthen our protection by employing fine-grained diversifications to
randomize the dataflow of this limited set of control-flow targets.
Specifically, when exploiting an indirect call (i.e., using knowledge of a trampoline
address corresponding to a function pointer), the attacker can only redirect execution
to the trampoline but not to other gadgets located inside the corresponding function.
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In other words, we restrict the attacker who has disclosed a function pointer to
whole-function reuse.
On the other hand, disclosing a call trampoline allows the attacker to redirect
execution to a valid call site (e.g., call-preceded instruction). However, this still does
not allow the attacker to mount the same ROP attacks that have been recently been
launched against coarse-grained CFI schemes [31, 60, 83, 185], because the attacker only
knows the trampoline address and not the actual run-time address of the call site. Hence,
leaking one return address does not help to determine the run-time addresses of other
useful call sites inside the address space of the application. Furthermore, the attacker is
restricted to only those return trampoline addresses that are leaked from the program’s
stack. Not every return trampoline address will be present on the stack, only those that
are actually used and executed by the program are potentially available. This reduces
the number of valid call sites that the attacker can target, in contrast to the recent CFI
attacks, where the attacker can redirect execution to every call site in the address space
of the application without needing any disclosure.
Finally, to further protect call-site gadgets from reuse through call trampolines, we
use two fine-grained diversifications proposed by Pappas et al. [162] to randomize
the dataflow between gadgets: register allocation and stack slot randomization.
Randomizing register allocation causes gadgets to have varying sets of input and output
registers, thus disrupting how data can flow between gadgets. We also randomly reorder
the stack slots used to preserve registers across calls. The program’s Application Binary
Interface (ABI) specifies a set of callee-saved registers that functions must save and
restore before returning to their caller. In the function epilogue, the program restores
register values from the stack into the appropriate registers. By randomizing the storage
order of these registers, we randomize the dataflow of attacker-controlled values from
the stack into registers in function epilogues.
4.1.3.4 Whole-Function Reuse Attacks
Our goal is to prevent attacks utilizing whole-function reuse such as return-into-libc
and COOP which rely on disclosing function addresses from function pointer tables.
With Readactor in place, the attacker can still disclose the addresses of trampolines
stored in readable structures. However, as Readactor randomizes the layouts of function
tables, identifying the matching trampoline with a function becomes a challenge for
the attacker. This leaves the attacker with only the option of guessing the entries in
randomized function tables.
As mentioned at the end of Section 4.1.2.3 we can mitigate brute-force attacks by
terminating the application after a trap function is hit. Booby traps will not be hit during
correct program execution.
Since hitting a booby trap will terminate the attack, a successful attacker needs
to make an uninterrupted sequence of correct guesses of entries in the randomized
function table. What exactly constitutes a correct guess depends on the concrete attack
scenario. In the best case, the attacker must always guess a particular entry in a
particular function table; in the worst case, a good guess for the attacker may be
any entry that is not a booby trap. Considering the nature of existing COOP and
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return-to-libc attacks [186, 216], we believe that the former case is the most realistic.
Further, assuming in favor of the attacker that she will only attempt to guess entries
in tables with exactly 16 entries (the minimum), we can roughly approximate the
probability for Readactor to prevent an attack that reuses n functions with P ≈ 1−( 116)n.
Our experiments in the following indicate that an attacker needs at least two or
three hand-picked functions (most-likely from distinct tables) to mount a successful
return-to-libc (RILC) or COOP attack respectively. Thus, the probability of preventing
these attacks is lower bounded by PRILC,min ≈ 1− ( 116)2 = 0.9960 and PCOOP,min ≈
1− ( 116)
3 = 0.9997.
4.1.3.5 Proof-of-concept exploit
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our protection, we introduce an artificial
vulnerability into V8 that allows an attacker to read and write arbitrary memory. This
vulnerability is similar to a vulnerability in V81 that was used during the 2014 Pwnium
contest to get arbitrary code execution in the Chrome browser. In an unprotected
version of V8, the exploitation of the introduced vulnerability is straightforward.
From JavaScript code, we first disclose the address of a function that resides in the
JIT-compiled code memory. Next, we use our capability to write arbitrary memory to
overwrite the function with our shellcode. This is possible because the JIT-compiled
code memory is mapped as RWX in the unprotected version of V8. Finally, we
call the overwritten function, which executes our shellcode instead of the original
function. This attack fails under Readactor, because the attacker can no longer write
shellcode to the JIT-compiled code memory, since we set all JIT-compiled code pages as
execute-only. Further, we prevent any JIT-ROP like attack that first discloses the content
of JIT-compiled code memory, because that memory is not readable. We test this by
using a modified version of the attack that reads and discloses the contents of a code
object. Readactor successfully prevents this disclosure by terminating execution of the
JavaScript program when it attempted to read the code.
4.1.4 Performance Evaluation
We rigorously evaluated the performance impact of Readactor on both the SPEC
CPU2006 benchmark suite and a large real-world application, the Chromium browser.
Finally, we measure the performance of Readactor++ independently.
4.1.4.1 SPEC CPU2006
The SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite contains CPU-intensive programs, which are ideal
for testing the worst-case overhead of our compiler transformations and hypervisor. To
fully understand the impact of each of the components that make up the Readactor
system, we measure and report their performance impact independently.
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Figure 33: Performance overhead for SPEC CPU2006 with Readactor enabled relative to an
unprotected baseline build.
We perform all evaluations using Ubuntu 14.04 with Linux kernel version 3.13.0. We
primarily evaluate SPEC on an Intel Core i5-2400 desktop CPU running at 3.1 GHz with
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (Turbo Boost) enabled. We also independently
verify this evaluation using an Intel Xeon E5-2660 server CPU running at 2.20 GHz with
Turbo Boost disabled, and observe identical trends and nearly identical performance
(within one percent on all averages). We summarize our SPEC measurements in
Figure 33.
Enabling code-pointer hiding along with page protections provided by the hypervisor
results in a slowdown of 5.8% (Hypervisor XO + Hiding in Figure 33). This overhead
is approximately the sum of the overheads of both components of the system, the
execute-only hypervisor enforcement and pointer hiding. This confirms our hypothesis
that each component of the Readactor system is orthogonal with respect to performance.
With the addition of our fine-grained diversity scheme (function, register, and
callee-saved register slot permutation) we now have all components of Readactor in
place. For the final integration benchmark, we build and run SPEC using three different
random seeds to capture the effects of different code layouts. Altogether we observe that
the full Readactor system incurrs a geometric mean performance overhead of 6.4% (Full
Readactor in Figure 33). This shows the overhead of applying our full protection scheme
to a realistic worst-case scenario of CPU-intensive code, which bounds the overhead of
our system in practice.
4.1.4.2 Chromium Browser
To test the performance impact of our protections on complex, real-world software, we
compile and test the Chromium browser, which is the open-source variant of Google’s
Chrome browser. Chromium is a highly complex application, consisting of over 16
million lines of code [23]. We are easily able to apply all our protections to Chromium
with the few minor changes described below. Overall, we find that the perceived
performance impact on web browsing with the protected Chromium, as measured by
Chromium’s internal UI smoothness benchmark, is 4.0%, which is in line with the
average slowdown we observe for SPEC.
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To understand the perceived performance impact during normal web browsing we
benchmark page scrolling smoothness with Chromium’s internal performance testing
framework. We run the scrolling smoothness benchmark from the Chromium source
tree on the Top 25 sites selected by Google as representatives of popular websites.
Overall, we find that the slowdown in rendering speed for our full Readactor system
was about 4.0%, averaged over 3 different diversified builds of Chromium. This overhead
is slightly lower than what we found for SPEC, which is natural considering that
browser rendering is not as CPU-intensive as the SPEC benchmarks. However, browser
smoothness and responsiveness are critical factors for daily web browsing, rather than
raw computing performance.
We also evaluated the performance impact of our techniques on Chromium using
the extensive Dromaeo benchmark suite to give a worst-case estimate for browser
performance.
We found that execute-only code protection alone, without code-pointer hiding,
introduces a 2.8% overall performance slowdown on Dromaeo. Combining the
hypervisor execute-only code pages along with code-pointer hiding results in a 12%
performance slowdown. However, Dromaeo represents a worst-case performance test,
and rendering smoothness on real websites is a far more important factor in browsing.
4.1.4.3 Readactor++ Extension
We further, evaluate the performance of our extension Readactor++ on
computationally-intensive code with virtual function dispatch using the C++
benchmarks in SPEC CPU2006. Overall, we find that Readactor++ introduces a
minor overhead of 1.1%. We measure this slowdown independently of the slowdown
introduced by the Readactor itself, which depends on the protection system used and
whether hardware natively supports execute-only memory. For a complete system
evaluation, we also use the Readactor system to enforce execute-only memory and
code-pointer hiding. However, even with this additional slowdown, we find that
Readactor++ is competitive with alternative mitigations with an average overhead of
8.4% on SPEC, while offering increased security.
4.1.5 Discussion: Trampoline-based attacks
We use trampolines to hide code pointers. However, the addresses of individual
trampolines are still exposed in readable memory. To mitigate trampoline-reuse attacks,
we randomize the instructions at the trampoline destination, i.e., register allocation
randomization and callee-saved register save slot reordering. Currently, we randomize
only the used registers, hence, trampoline destinations where only a few registers
are used are randomized with a low entropy compared to trampoline destinations
that use many of registers. The attacker could exploit the low entropy and attack
the randomization using a brute-force attack. While we could increase the entropy by
adding more registers this would have a negative impact on the run-time performance.
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Further, the attacker can reuse the trampolines to launch whole-function reuse attacks.
As described in Section 4.1.2.4, we mitigate whole-function reuse attacks by hardening
function pointer tables, like vtables and the plt, with trampolines. We find that in certain
cases the attacker can exploit single function pointers in data structures to execute
whole-function reuse attacks [179]. Our investigation shows that such attacks could be
mitigated using pointer authentication schemes [131, 179].
4.1.6 Conclusion
Previous research demonstrated that code randomization is a practical and efficient
mitigation against code-reuse attacks. However, memory disclosure poses a threat to all
these probabilistic defenses. Without resistance to such leaks, code randomization loses
much of its appeal. This motivates our efforts to construct a code randomization defense
that is not only practical but also resilient to all recent bypasses.
We built a fully-fledged prototype system, Readactor, to prevent attackers from
disclosing the code layout directly by reading code pages and indirectly by harvesting
code pointers from the data areas of a program. We prevent direct disclosure by
implementing hardware-enforced execute-only memory and prevent indirect disclosure
through code-pointer hiding.
Our careful and detailed evaluation verifies the security properties of our approach
and shows that it scales beyond simple benchmarks to complex, real-world software
such as Google’s Chromium web browser. Compared to prior JIT-ROP mitigations,
Readactor provides comprehensive and efficient protection against direct disclosure, is
the first defense to address indirect disclosure, and is also the first technique to provide
uniform protection for both statically and dynamically compiled code.
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The recent “Stagefright” vulnerability exposed an estimated 950 million Android
systems to remote exploitation [63]. Similarly, the “One Class to Rule them All” [168]
zero-day vulnerability affected 55% of all Android devices. These are just the most
recent incidents in a long series of vulnerabilities that enable attackers to mount
code-reuse attacks [151, 177] against mobile devices. Moreover, because these devices
run scripting capable web browsers, they are also exposed to sophisticated code-reuse
attacks that can bypass ASLR and even fine-grained code randomization by exploiting
information-leakage vulnerabilities [45, 61, 188, 196]. Just-in-time attacks (JIT-ROP) [196]
are particularly challenging because they misuse run-time scripting to analyze the target
memory layout after randomization and relocate a return-oriented programming (ROP)
payload accordingly.
There are several alternatives to code randomization aimed to defend against
code-reuse attacks, including control-flow integrity (CFI) [6] and code-pointer integrity
(CPI) [118]. However, these defenses come with their own set of challenges and tend
to have high worst-case performance overheads. We focus on code randomization
techniques since they are known to be efficient [59, 94] and scalable to complex,
real-world applications such as web browsers, language runtimes, and operating
system kernels without the need to perform elaborate static program analysis during
compilation.
Recent code randomization defenses offer varying degrees of resilience to JIT-ROP
attacks [17, 21, 51, 52, 61, 80, 124, 143]. However, all of these approaches target x86
systems and are, for one reason or another, unfit for use on mobile and embedded
devices, a segment which is currently dominated by ARM processors. This motivates
our search for randomization frameworks that offer the same security properties as
the state-of-the-art solutions for x86 systems while removing the limitations, such as
dependence on expensive hardware features, that make them unsuitable for mobile and
embedded devices.
The capabilities of mobile and embedded processors vary widely. For instance, many
micro-processors do not have a full memory management unit (MMU) with virtual
memory support. Instead they use a memory protection unit (MPU) which saves space
and facilitates real-time operation2. Processors without an MMU can therefore not
support defenses that require virtual memory support [17, 51, 52, 80]. High-end ARM
processors contain MMUs and therefore offer full virtual memory support. However,
current ARM processors do not support3 execute-only memory (XoM) [1] which is
a fundamental requirement for randomization-based defenses offering comprehensive
resilience to memory disclosure [51, 52].
Therefore, our goal is to design a leakage-resilient layout randomization approach,
dubbed LR2, that enforces XoM purely in software making our technique applicable to
MMU-less hardware as well. Inspired by software-fault isolation techniques (SFI) [184,
2 MPUs can still enforce W⊕X policies for a given address range.
3 Firmware executed from non-volatile storage can be marked as execute-only. Code executing out of RAM
cannot be marked execute-only on current processors.
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187, 225], we enforce XoM by masking load addresses to prevent the program from
reading from any code addresses. However, software-enforced XoM is fundamentally
different from SFI: First, XoM protects trusted code that is executing as intended
whereas SFI constrains untrusted code that may use return-oriented programming
techniques to execute instruction sequences in an unforeseen manner to break isolation
of the security sandbox. We take advantage of these completely different threat models
to enforce XoM in software using far fewer load-masking instructions than any SFI
implementation would require; Section 4.2.2.2 provides a detailed comparison. A second
key difference between SFI approaches and LR2 is that we hide code pointers because
they can otherwise lead to indirect leakage of the randomized code layout. Code pointers
reveal where functions begin and return addresses reveal the location of call-preceded
gadgets [60, 83]. We protect pointers to (virtual) functions (forward pointers) by
replacing them with pointers to trampolines (direct jumps) stored in XoM [51]. We
protect return addresses (backward pointers) using an optimized pointer encryption
scheme that hides per-function encryption keys on XoM pages.
Thanks to software-enforced XoM, LR2 only requires that the underlying hardware
provides code integrity by enforcing a writable XOR executable (W⊕X) policy. This
requirement is met by all recent ARM processors whether they have a basic MPU or a full
MMU. Support for W⊕X policies is similarly commonplace in recent MIPS processors.
In summary, our contributions are:
• LR2, the first leakage-resilient layout randomization defense that offers the full
benefits of execute-only memory (XoM) without any of the limitations making
previous solutions bypassable or unsuitable for mobile devices. LR2 prevents direct
disclosure by ensuring that adversaries cannot use load instructions to access
code pages and prevents indirect disclosure by hiding return addresses and other
pointers to code.
• An efficient return address hiding technique that leverages a combination of XoM,
code randomization, XOR encryption, and the fact that ARM and MIPS processors
store return addresses in a link register rather than directly to the stack.
• A fully-fledged prototype implementation of our techniques capable of protecting
Linux applications running atop ARM processors.
• A detailed and careful evaluation showing that LR2 defeats a real-world JIT-ROP
attack against the Chromium web browser. Our SPEC CPU2006 measurements
shows an average overhead of 6.6% which matches the 6.4% overhead for a
comparable virtualization-based x86 solution [51].
4.2.1 Threat Model
We use the following threat model:
Defense Capabilities
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Secure Loading. The attacker cannot compromise the protected program at
compile or load-time. Therefore, the attacker has no a priori knowledge of the code
layout.
Writable⊕Executable. The underlying hardware enforces a W⊕X policy which
prevents code injection. Note that even low-end devices that have an MPU (rather
than an MMU) are able to meet this requirement.
Hardware Attacks. Attacks against the underlying hardware or operating system
fall outside the scope of this chapter. This includes any attack that uses timing, cache,
virtual machine, or fault side channels to disclose the code layout.
Adversary Capabilities
Memory Corruption. At run time, the attacker can read and write data memory
such as the stack, heap and global variables. This models the presence of memory
corruption errors that allow control-flow hijacking and information leakage.
Our threat model is consistent with prior research on leakage-resilient layout
randomization [17, 21, 51, 52, 61, 80].
4.2.2 LR2
Like similar defenses, LR2 consists of a series of code transformations. We prototype
these transformations as compiler passes operating on source code. Compile-time
transformation is not fundamental to our solution. The same approach could be applied
by rewriting the program on disk or as it is being loaded into memory.
We perform the following transformations:
• Load masking to enforce XoM in software (Section 4.2.2.1). XoM prevents direct
disclosure of the code layout and forms the basis for the following transformations.
We describe conventional and novel optimizations for efficient instrumentation in
Section 4.2.2.2.
• Forward-pointer hiding (Section 4.2.2.3). We replace forward pointers to (virtual)
functions with pointers into an array of trampolines, i.e., direct jumps to the
original pointer address, stored in XoM to prevent indirect disclosure similar to
Crane et al. [51].
• Return-address hiding (Section 4.2.2.4). While we could have hidden return
addresses in the same way as we hide forward code pointers, this approach is
sub-optimal. First, the return address trampolines (a call and a jump) take up
more space than trampolines for forward code pointers (a single jump). Second,
this naive approach would require a trampoline between each caller and callee
which further increases the memory overhead.
• Fine-grained code randomization (Section 4.2.2.5). The preceding techniques
prevent disclosure of the code layout, so we must evaluate our system in
conjunction with fine-grained diversity techniques.
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Figure 34: Left: In legacy applications, all pages are observable by attackers. The stack, heap and
global areas contain pointers that disclose the location of code pages. Right: In LR2
applications, attackers are prevented from observing the upper half of the address
space which contains all code. Moreover, attacker observable memory only contains
trampoline pointers (dotted arrows) that do not disclose code locations. Finally, return
addresses on the stack are encrypted (not shown).
We describe each of these components in detail in the following subsections,
along with our prototype LLVM-based toolchain, including dynamic loading and full
protection of system libraries.
4.2.2.1 Software-Enforced XoM
On ARM and other RISC instruction sets, all reads from memory use a load instruction
(ldr on ARM). To enforce XoM purely in software (to avoid reliance on MMU features),
we prevent all memory loads from reading program code. We enforce this property
by 1) splitting the program code and data memory into separate memory regions, and
2) by ensuring that no load instruction can ever access the code region. We mask every
attacker-controlled address that may be used by a load instruction to prevent it from
addressing a code page.
We split the virtual memory address space into two halves to simplify load address
masking; data resides in the lower half of the address space and code in the upper half
(see the right side of Figure 34). Note that we include a guard region which consists
of 2 memory pages marked as non-accessible. The guard region allows us to optimize
loads that add a small constant offset to a base address. With this split, our run-time
instrumentation simply checks the most significant bit (MSB) of the address to determine
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whether it points to data or code. All valid data addresses (and thus all safe memory
loads) must have a zero MSB.
Since we enforce a memory-access policy rather than program integrity in the face of
memory corruption, we can optimize our checks to fail safely if the program attempts
to read a code address. The ARM instruction set has two options we can use to enforce
efficient address checks: the bit clear instruction (bic) or a test instruction (tst) followed
by a predicated load. Either clearing or checking the MSB of the address before a load
ensures that the load will never read from the code section. The program may still
behave incorrectly if the attacker overwrites an address, but the attacker cannot read
any execute-only memory.
The following code uses bic masking instrumentation which clears the MSB of
the address before accessing memory. This instrumentation is applicable to all load
instructions.
bic r0, r0, #0x80000000
ldr r1, [r0]
Listing 9: bic masking example
The tst masking shown below instead avoids a data dependency between the
masking instruction and the load by predicating the load based on a test of the MSB
of the address. If an attacker has corrupted the address to point into the code section,
the load will not be executed at all since the test will fail. The tst masking has the added
benefit that we can handle failure gracefully by inserting instrumentation which jumps
to an address violation handler in case of failure. However, tst is not applicable to loads
which are already predicated on an existing condition. In addition, we found that the
bic masking is up to twice as efficient as tst masking on our test hardware, even with
the data dependency. One possible reason for this is that the predicated instruction will
be speculatively executed according to the branch predictor, causing a pipeline discard
in the case of a misprediction. At the same time, bic masking benefits greatly from
out-of-order execution if the load result is not immediately required.
tst r0, #0x80000000
ldreq r1, [r0]
Listing 10: tst masking example
4.2.2.2 Optimized Load Masking
Masking addresses before every load instruction is both redundant and inefficient as
many loads are provably safe. To optimize our instrumentation, we omit checks for loads
that we can guarantee will never read an unconstrained code address. We start with
similar optimizations to previous work, including optimizations adapted specifically for
ARM, and then discuss a novel optimization opportunity that is not applicable to any
SFI technique.
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SFI-Inspired Optimizations
We perform several optimizations mentioned by Wahbe et al. [225] in their seminal work
on SFI. We allow base register plus small constant addressing by masking only the base
register, avoiding the need for an additional address computation add instruction. We
also allow constant offset stack accesses without needing checks by ensuring that the
stack pointer always points to a valid address in the data section. All stack pointer
modifications with a non-constant operand are checked to enforce this property.
Additionally, we do not constrain program counter relative loads with constant offsets.
ARM does not allow for 32-bit immediate instructions operands, and therefore large
constants are stored in a constant pool allocated after each function. These constant
pools are necessarily readable data in the code section, but access to the constant pool
is highly constrained. All constant pool loads use a constant offset from the current
program counter and therefore cannot be used by attackers to access the surrounding
code.
XoM-Specific Optimizations
Although software XoM is inspired by SFI, the two techniques solve fundamentally
different problems. SFI isolates potentially malicious code whereas software XoM
constrains benign code operating on potentially malicious inputs. In other words, SFI
must operate on the assumption that the attacker is already executing untrusted code
in arbitrary order whereas software XoM trusts the code it instruments and therefore
assumes that the control-flow has not yet been hijacked.
Since we trust the executing code, we can make optimizations to our software XoM
implementation that are not applicable when performing traditional SFI load masking.
Specifically, we do not need to mask load addresses directly before the load instruction.
Instead, we insert the masking operation directly after the instructions that compute
the load address. In many cases, a single masking operation suffices to protect multiple
loads from the same base address. Registers holding the masked address may be spilled
to the stack by the register allocator. Since the stack contents are assumed to be under
attacker control (Conti et al. [45] recently demonstrated such an attack), we re-mask any
addresses that are loaded from the stack. In contrast, SFI requires that address checks
remain in the same instruction bundle as their use, so that a malicious program may not
jump between the check and its use. In our experiments, the ability to hoist masking
operations allows us to insert 43% fewer masking operations relative to SFI policies that
must mask each potentially unsafe load in untrusted code. Figure 35 shows an example
in which we are able to remove a masking operation in a loop which substantially
reduces the number of bic instructions executed from 2n+ 1 to n+ 1 where n is the
number of loop iterations.
4.2.2.3 Forward-Pointer Hiding
As explained in Section 3.1, adversaries can scan the stack, heap, and static data areas for
code pointers that indirectly disclose the code layout. We therefore seek ways to identify
functions and return sites without revealing their location. The first major category of
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1 ; calculate address
2 add r0 , r0 , r8
3 ; store address on stack
4 s t r r0 , [ sp +#12]
5
6 loop :
7 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
8 ; load address
9 ldr r1 , [ r0 ]
10 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
11 ; load + constant offset
12 ldr r2 , [ r0 +#4]
13 add r0 , r0 , #8
14 ; check loop condition
15 cmp r0 , r3
16 bne loop
17
18 loopend :
19 ; restore address from
20 ; stack , now unsafe
21 ldr r0 , [ sp +#12]
22 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
23 ; load address
24 ldr r2 , [ r0 ]
Software-Fault Isolation
1 ; calculate address
2 add r0 , r0 , r8
3 ; store address on stack
4 s t r r0 , [ sp +#12]
5
6 loop :
7 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
8 ; load address
9 ldr r1 , [ r0 ]
10
11 ; load + constant offset
12 ldr r2 , [ r0 +#4]
13 add r0 , r0 , #8
14 ; check loop condition
15 cmp r0 , r3
16 bne loop
17
18 loopend :
19 ; restore address from
20 ; stack , now unsafe
21 ldr r0 , [ sp +#12]
22 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
23 ; load address
24 ldr r2 , [ r0 ]
Software XoM
Figure 35: Differences between load-masking for software-fault isolation (left) and
software-enforcement of XoM (right). Because SFI must consider existing code
malicious, it must mask load addresses directly before every use. In contrast, software
XoM is protecting trusted code executing legitimate control-flow paths, and can
therefore use a single masking operation to protect multiple uses.
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code pointers are function pointers, used by the program for indirect function calls.
Closely related are basic block addresses used in situations such as switch case tables.
We handle all forward code pointers in the same manner but use a special, optimized
scheme for return addresses as explained in the following section.
We protect against an attacker using forward code pointers to disclose code layout
by indirecting all code pointers through a randomized trampoline table, as proposed
by Crane et al. [51]. For each code location referenced by a readable code pointer, we
create a trampoline consisting of a direct jump to the target address. We then rewrite all
references to the original address to refer instead to the trampoline. Thus, the trampoline
address, rather than the function address, is stored in readable memory. We randomize
trampoline ordering to remove any correlation between the address of the trampoline
(potentially available to the attacker) and the actual code address of the target. Hence,
even if an attacker leaks the address of a trampoline, it does not reveal anything about
the code layout.
4.2.2.4 Return-Address Hiding
In principle, we could hide return addresses using the same trampoline mechanism that
we use to protect forward pointers. However, the return address trampolines used by
Crane et al. [51] require two instructions rather than the single direct jump we use for
forward pointers. At every call site, the caller jumps to a trampoline containing 1) the
original call instruction, and 2) a direct jump back to the caller. This way, the return
address that is pushed on the stack points into a trampoline rather than a function.
However, due to the direct jump following the call, every call site must use a unique
return address trampoline.
Return addresses are extremely common. Thus, the extra trampoline indirections add
non-trivial performance overhead. Additionally, code size is critical on mobile devices.
For these reasons, we take an alternative approach. Due to the way ARM and other
RISC instruction sets perform calls and returns, we can provide significantly stronger
protection than the return address trampolines of Crane et al. [51] without expensive
trampolines for each call site. We build upon the foundation of XoM to safely secure an
unreadable, per-function key to encrypt every return address stored on the stack.
While x86 call instructions push the return address directly onto the stack, the branch
and link instruction (bl) on ARM and other RISC processors instead places the return
address in a link register. This gives us an opportunity to encrypt the return address
when it is spilled onto the stack4. We XOR all return addresses (stored in the link register)
before they are pushed on the stack similarly to the PointGuard approach by Cowan
et al. [49]. PointGuard, however, uses a much weaker threat model. It assumed that the
attacker cannot read arbitrary memory. In our stronger attacker model (see Section 4.2.1),
we must prevent the attacker from disclosing or deriving the stored XOR keys. We
therefore use a per-function key embedded as a constant in the code which, thanks to
XoM, is inaccessible to adversaries at run time. In our current implementation, these
4 Leaf functions do not need to spill the return address onto the stack.
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1 func t ion :
2 ldr r12 , .FUNCTION_KEY
3 eor l r , l r , r12
4 push { l r }
5
6 [ func t ion contents here ]
7
8 pop { l r }
9 ldr r3 , .FUNCTION_KEY
10 eor l r , l r , r3
11 bx l r
12
13 .FUNCTION_KEY : ; constant pool entry , embedded
14 . long ; in non-readable memory
15 0xeb6379b3
Listing 11: Return-address hiding example. Note that constant pool entries are embedded
in non-readable memory, as described in Section 4.2.2.2.
keys are embedded at compile time. As this might be vulnerable to offline analysis, we
are currently working on extending LR2 to randomize the keys at load time.
Listing 11 shows an example of our return-address hiding technique. Line 2 loads
the per-function key for the current function, and on line 3 it is XORed into the current
return address before this address is spilled to the stack in line 4. Lines 8-11 replace
the normal pop {pc} instruction used to pop the saved return address directly into the
program counter. On lines 8-10, the encrypted return address is popped off the stack
and decrypted, and on line 11 the program branches to the decrypted return address.
Considering the advantages of protecting return addresses using XOR encryption, the
question arises whether forward pointers can be protected with the same technique.
An important difference between forward pointers and return addresses is that the
former may cross module boundaries. For instance, an application protected by LR2
may pass a pointer to an unprotected library or the OS kernel to receive callbacks. The
trampoline mechanism used for forward pointers ensures transparent interoperability
with unprotected code while XOR encryption does not without further instrumentation,
since legacy code would not know that forward pointers are encrypted. In practice,
function calls and returns occur more frequently than forward pointer dispatches, so
optimizing return address protection is far more important.
Exception Handling
Itanium ABI exception handling uses stack unwinding and matches call sites to
exception index tables. Since our return-address hiding scheme encrypts call site
addresses on the stack, stack unwinding will fail and break exception handling. All
indirect disclosure protections which hide return addresses from an attacker will be
similarly incompatible with stack unwinding, which depends on correctly mapping
return addresses to stack frame layout information.
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We modified LLVM’s stack unwinding library implementation libunwind to handle
encrypted return addresses. Since the first return address is stored in the link register,
the stack unwinder can determine the first call site. From the call site, the stack unwinder
is able to determine the function and read the XOR key that was used to encrypt the
next return address using a whitelisted memory load. By recursively applying this
approach, the unwinder can decrypt all return addresses until it finds a matching
exception handler. This approach requires that we trust that the unwinding library does
not contain a memory disclosure bug.
4.2.2.5 Fine-Grained Code Randomization
LR2 does not depend on any particular type of code randomization and can be
combined with most of the diversifying transformations in the literature [119]. We
choose to evaluate our approach using a combination of function permutation [113]
and register-allocation randomization [51, 162] as both transformations add very little
run-time overhead. As Backes and Nürnberger [16] point out, randomizing the layout at
the level of code pages may help allow sharing of code pages on resource-constrained
devices. Note that had we only permuted the function layout, adversaries may be
able to harvest trampoline pointers and use them to construct an attack without
knowing the code layout. Because these pointers only target function entries and return
sites (instructions following a call) this constrains the available gadgets much like a
coarse-grained CFI policy would. Therefore, we must assume that gadget-stitching
attacks [60, 83] are possible. However, stitching gadgets together is only possible with
precise knowledge of how each gadget uses registers; register randomization therefore
helps to mitigate such hypothetical attacks.
4.2.2.6 Decoupling of Code and Data Sections
References between segments in the same ELF object usually use constant offsets as
these segments are loaded contiguously. To prevent an attacker from inferring the code
segment base address in LR2, we replace static relocations that are resolved during link
time with dynamic relocations. This allows us to load the segments independently from
each other, because the offsets are adjusted at load time. By entirely decoupling the
code from the data section we prevent the attacker from inferring any code addresses
from data addresses. As a convenient side-effect of this approach, code randomization
is possible without the need for position-independent code (PIC). PIC is necessary to
make applications compatible with ASLR by computing addresses relative to the current
program counter (PC). Since we replace all PC-relative offsets with absolute addresses
to decouple the code and data addresses, we observed slightly increased performance
relative to conventional, ASLR-compatible position-independent executables at the cost
of slower program loading.
4.2.2.7 Implementation in LLVM
We implemented our proof-of-concept transformations for LR2 in the LLVM compiler
framework. Our approach is not specific to LLVM, however, and is portable to any
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compiler or static rewriting framework. However, access to compile-time analysis and
the compiler intermediate representation (IR) made our implementation easier. In
particular, the mask hoisting optimization described previously is easier at compile time,
but not impossible given correct disassembly and rewriting.
Since blindly masking every load instruction is expected to incur a high performance
overhead due to the high frequency of load instructions, we take a number of
steps to reduce the number of necessary mask instructions. LLVM annotates memory
instructions such as loads and stores with information about the type of value that is
loaded. We can use this information to ensure that load masking is not applied to loads
from a constant address. Such loads are used to access jump table entries, global offset
table (GOT) offsets, and other constants such as those in the constant pool. These loads
account for less than 2% of all load operations in SPEC CPU2006, so this optimization
has a small impact.
LLVM-based SFI implementations (e.g., Sehr et al. [187]) operate purely on
the machine instructions late in the backend, roughly corresponding to rewriting
the assembly output of the compiler. This makes the insertion of fault isolation
instrumentation easier, but misses opportunities for additional optimization that is
specific to our load-masking techniques. In order to hoist the masking of potentially
unsafe addresses to their definition and avoid redundant re-masking, we leverage
static analysis information about the program available earlier in the compiler pipeline.
Specifically, we begin by marking unsafe address values while the program values
are still in static single assignment (SSA) form [55]. This allows us to easily find the
definition of address values used by load instructions, and mask these values. Since stack
spilling takes place after this point in the compilation, we must be careful to remask
any source addresses restored from the stack, since the attacker may have modified
these values while on the stack. In particular, we add markers to values that we mask
while the program representation is still in SSA form. During register allocation, we
check if marked values are spilled to memory. In the case of spills, we insert a masking
instruction when restoring this value from the untrusted stack.
As in Native Client (NaCl) [187], it is necessary to prevent the compiler from
generating load instructions using both a base and offset register (known as
register-register addressing), to be sure that masking will properly restrict the resulting
addresses. We modify the LLVM instruction lowering pass, where generic LLVM IR
is converted to machine-specific IR, to prevent register-register addressed instructions.
Instead, we insert a separate add instruction to compute the effective address. We make
an exception if the load is known to be safe (e.g., a jump table load).
Finally, we insert return address protection instrumentation, stack pointer checks, and
trampolines for forward code pointers during compilation as described in the previous
sections.
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4.2.2.8 Full LR2 Toolchain
Code-Data Separation
By masking all load addresses we effectively partition the memory into a readable
and unreadable section. Our fully-fledged prototype system uses a slightly modified
Linux kernel and dynamic loader to separate the process memory space into readable
and unreadable sections (see Figure 34 for an overview of this separation). The kernel
and dynamic loader normally load entire ELF objects contiguously. Data segments are
usually loaded consecutively above the corresponding module’s code. In LR2, however,
readable segments are placed exclusively in the lower 2GiB region of the process address
space, while unreadable (code) segments must be placed in the higher 2GiB region.
Consequently, this requires ELF objects to be split. We applied small patches to the
Linux kernel (121 LoC) and musl dynamic loader (196 LoC) to load each ELF segment
into the proper area.
Furthermore, we modified the usual kernel memory mapping mechanism to comply
with our memory layout restrictions. By passing an internal flag to mmap, an application
can specify which memory region the requested memory must be allocated in. This
allows the loader to ensure that a program’s data segment is mapped low enough
in memory that the corresponding executable segment lies between 0x80000000 and
0xC0000000 which is where reserved kernel memory begins. Finally, our patch ensures
that memory areas allocated by the kernel (e.g., stacks and heaps) are in the readable
region.
We also needed to slightly modify the linker to prepare an executable for use with
LR2 memory layout. Specifically, we patched the gold linker to not mark executable
sections as readable5 and to assign these sections to high addresses. This type of
patch is needed for all XoM solutions, since current linkers mark executable segments
with read-execute, rather than execute-only permissions. Additionally, we added linker
support for 32-bit offsets in Procedure Linkage Table (PLT) entries, which comes at
the cost of one additional instruction per PLT entry. This is necessary because the PLT
(unreadable memory) refers to the Global Offset Table (GOT) (readable memory), and
therefore might be too far away for the 28-bit address offset previously used.
Libraries
For memory disclosure resilience, all code in an application needs to be compiled with
LR2, including all libraries. Since the popular C standard library glibc does not compile
with LLVM/Clang, we tested our implementation with the lightweight replacement
musl instead. It includes a dynamic loader, which we patched to support our code layout
with the same approach as applied to the kernel. We use LLVM’s own libc++ as the C++
standard library, since the usual GNU libstdc++ depends on glibc and GCC.
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Figure 36: LR2 overhead on SPEC CPU2006. We use the performance of unprotected position
independent binaries as the baseline.
4.2.3 Performance Evaluation
We evaluate the performance of LR2 using the CPU-intensive SPEC CPU2006 benchmark
suite, which represents a worst-case, CPU-bound performance test. We measure the
overall performance as well as the impact of each technique in our mitigation
independently to help distinguish the various sources of overhead. In addition, we
measured the code size increase of our transformations, since code size is an important
factor in mobile deployment. Overall, we found that with all protections enabled, LR2
incurs a geometric mean performance overhead of 6.6% and an average code size
increase of 5.6%. We summarize the performance results in Figure 36. Note that these
measurements include results for the hmmer and soplex benchmarks, which are known
to be very sensitive to alignment issues (±12% and ±6%, respectively) [134].
We want to measure the impact of LR2 applied to whole programs (including
libraries), so we compile and protect a C and C++ runtime library with our modifications
for use with the SPEC suite. Since the de-facto standard libraries on Linux, glibc and
libstdc++, don’t compile with LLVM/Clang, we use musl and LLVM’s own libc++
instead. We extended the musl loader to support our separated code and data layout.
The perlbench and namd benchmarks required small workarounds since they contain
glibc/ libstdc++ specific code. h264ref on ARM fails for unknown reasons when
comparing the computation result, both for the unmodified and the LR2 run; since it
completes the computation we include the running time nonetheless. Finally, the stack
unwinding library used by LLVM’s libc++ fails with omnetpp, so we exclude it from
all benchmark measurements. We report all measurements as the geometric mean over
all other SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. All measurements are from a Chromebook model
CB5-311-T6R7 with an Nvidia Tegra Logan K1 System-on-Chip (SoC), running Ubuntu
14.04 with Chromium OS’s Linux 3.10.18 kernel.
5 Note that the memory permission execute normally implies readable due to the lack of hardware support
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4.2.3.1 Forward-Pointer Hiding
We measured impact of forward-pointer hiding, which introduces an additional direct
jump instruction for each indirect call. We found that this transformation resulted in an
overhead of less than 0.3% on average over all benchmarks, with a maximum overhead
of 3%.
4.2.3.2 Return-Address Hiding
Return-address hiding requires one extra load and XOR at the entry of each function
that spills the link register. At each function return it replaces the return instruction
with one load, one XOR and one branch. We found that this instrumentation added an
overhead of less than 1% on average, with a maximum overhead of 3% over the baseline
time. Combining forward-pointer hiding and return-address hiding, we measured an
average overhead of 1.4%. We show the combined results in Figure 36, labeled Pointer
Hiding. This overhead compares favorably to Readactor’s [51] 4.1% overhead for full
code pointer hiding, since our return-address hiding scheme does not require expensive
return trampolines for each call site.
For both forward-pointer and return-address hiding, we noticed that a few
benchmarks ran slightly faster with the instrumentation than without. We attribute this
variance to measurement error and slight code layout differences resulting in different
instruction cache behavior.
4.2.4 Register-Register Addressing Scheme Restrictions
An important feature of the ARM instruction set is register offset addressing for array
or buffer loads. As described in Section 4.2.2, we have to disable this feature in LR2,
since it interferes with XoM address masking. We measured the overhead that this
restriction incurs by itself and found that restricting register addressing schemes incurs
2.3% overhead on average and a 9% worst-case overhead on the gobmk benchmark.
Benchmarks like hmmer, bzip2 and sjeng are affected because a large portion of the
execution time is spent in one hot loop with accesses to many different arrays with
varying indices.
4.2.4.1 Software XoM
The last component to analyze individually is our XoM instrumentation—masking
unsafe loads. We found that, after applying the optimizations outlined in Section 4.2.2.2,
software-enforced XoM results in an overhead of 6.6% on average (labeled Software
XoM in Figure 36), with a maximum overhead of 16.4% for one benchmark, gobmk.
We attribute this primarily to data dependencies introduced between the masking and
load instructions, as well as hot loop situations such as mentioned above.
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4.2.4.2 Code and Data Decoupling
Normally the code and data segments of a program have a fixed offset in memory,
allowing PC-relative addressing of data. However, this also allows an attacker to locate
the beginning of the code segment from any global data address. As we describe in
Section 4.2.2.6, we decouple the location of the data segment from the code segment,
allowing the loader to independently randomize the position of each. To do this, we
replace the conventional PC-relative address computation with dynamic relocations
assigned by the program loader. This change led to a geometric mean speedup of 4%
(labeled Code and Data Section Decoupling in Figure 36).
4.2.4.3 Full LR2
The aggregate cost of enabling all techniques in LR2 is 6.6% on average (see Full
LR2 in Figure 36). This includes the cost of pointer hiding, software-enforced XoM,
register-register addressing restrictions, fine-grained diversity, and the impact of
decoupling code and data. This means that our pure software approach to leakage
resilient diversity for ARM has about the same overhead as hardware-accelerated
leakage resilient diversity for x86 systems (6.6% vs. 6.4% [51]). Because the removal
of PC-relative address computations yields a speedup, the cost of individual
transformations sometimes exceeds the aggregate cost of LR2. An earlier version of our
prototype that did not remove PC-relative address computations to decouple code and
data sections had an average overhead of 8.4%.
4.2.4.4 Memory Overheads
Finally, in addition to running time, we also measured code section size of the protected
SPEC CPU2006 binaries. Forward-pointer hiding had very little overall impact on code
size, leading to an increase of 0.9%. Return-address hiding adds at least four instructions
to most functions, which resulted in a 5.2% code size increase. The additional load
address masking for software-enforced XoM increases the code size by another 10.2%.
However, removing the PC-relative address computations decreases the code size by
about 14% on average. Comparing the size of full LR2 binaries to legacy position
independent code shows an average increase of just 5.6%.
4.2.4.5 Impact of XoM-Specific Optimizations
Recall that the differences in threat models between software XoM and SFI
(Section 4.2.2.2) allow us to protect multiple uses of a load address using a single
masking instruction. To measure the impact of this optimization, we compare the
running time of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks that run correctly when protected with
NaCl to the cost of enforcing XoM. For this experiment, we used the latest version6
of the NaCl branch (pnacl-llvm) that is maintained as part of the Chromium project.
The results are shown in Figure 37. When enforcing XoM using load masking, the
average overhead is 6.6% (for the set of benchmarks compatible with NaCl) whereas
6 As of August 10, 2015
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Figure 37: Comparing software XoM to SFI (NaCl) to quantify effect of load-mask optimization.
software-fault isolation, which also masks writes and indirect branches, costs 19.1%
overhead. We stress that we are comparing two different techniques with different
purposes and threat models. However, these numbers confirm our hypothesis that our
XoM-specific load-masking instrumentation reduces overheads. A bigger impact can
be seen when comparing code sizes: XoM led to a 5.8% increase, while NaCl caused
an increase of 100%. This is a valuable improvement in mobile environments where
memory is a scarce resource.
4.2.5 Security Analysis
Our primary goal in LR2 is to prevent disclosure of the code layout, which enables
sophisticated attacks [196] against code randomization schemes [119]. By securing
the code from disclosure we can then rely on the security properties of undisclosed,
randomized code.
In order to launch a code-reuse attack the attacker must know the code layout. By
applying fine-grained randomization, e.g., function or page reordering, we prevent all
static code-reuse attacks, since these attacks are not adjusted to each target’s randomized
code layout. For our proof-of-concept we chose to build on function permutation as
it is effective, efficient, and easy to implement. However, as all code randomization
techniques, function permutation by itself is vulnerable to an attacker who discloses
the code layout at run time [45, 61, 196]. Hence, we focus our security analysis of
LR2 on resilience against direct and indirect information-disclosure attacks targeting
randomized program code.
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4.2.5.1 Direct Memory Disclosure
Direct memory disclosure is when the attacker reads the memory storing randomized
code. JIT-ROP [196] is a prominent example of this type of attack. JIT-ROP recursively
discloses and disassembles code pages at run time until enough gadgets are disclosed
to assemble and launch a ROP attack.
We prevent all direct disclosure attacks by masking memory loads in the protected
application, i.e., we prevent loads from reading the program code directly. Masking
the load address restricts any attempt to read the code section to the lower half of
the memory space which contains only data. Naively masking every load operation is
inefficient; we therefore apply the optimizations described in Section 4.2.2.2 to reduce
the number of masking instructions. Allowing some unmasked load operations may
appear to increase the risk of an unsafe load instruction. However, we are careful to
ensure that all unsafe loads are restricted, as we show in the following.
PC-Relative Loads
All PC-relative loads with a constant offset are guaranteed to be safe, since an attacker
cannot influence the address used during the load operation and only legitimate data
values are loaded in this manner. Therefore, we need not mask these load instructions.
Constant Offsets
We allow loads from known safe base addresses (i.e., already masked values) plus
or minus a small constant offset (less than 4KiB). Thus, if we ensure that the base
address must point into the data section, adding a guard page between the data and
code sections prevents the computed address from reaching into the code section. We
place an unmapped 8KiB (2 pages) guard region between the data and code sections to
safeguard all possible constant offsets. In addition, the addresses above 0xC0000000 are
reserved for kernel usage and will trigger a fault when accessed, so programs are already
safe from address under-runs attempting to read from the highest pages in memory by
subtracting a constant from a small base address.
We also allow limited modification of masked addresses without re-masking the result.
If an address has already been masked so that it is guaranteed to point into the data
section, adding or subtracting a small constant will result in either an address that is
still safe, or one that falls into the guard region. In either case, the modified address still
cannot fall into the code section, and thus we do not need to re-mask it. We perform this
optimization for all constant stack pointer adjustments.
Spilled Registers
When a program needs to store more values than will fit into the available registers,
it stores (spills) a value temporarily onto the stack to free a machine register. As
recently demonstrated, stack spills of sensitive register contents can allow adversaries to
completely bypass code-reuse mitigations [45]. In our case, an attacker could attempt to
bypass LR2 by manipulating a previously masked register while it is spilled to writable
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memory. Therefore, we do not trust any address that is restored from writable memory
and always re-mask it before the value is used to address memory.
4.2.5.2 Indirect Memory Disclosure
Mitigating direct memory disclosure alone does not fully prevent an attacker from
leaking the code layout. An attacker can indirectly gain information about the code
layout by leaking readable code pointers from the data section [45, 61]. The necessary
number of leaked code pointers for a successful code-reuse attack depends on the
granularity of the applied randomization. For instance, in the presence of page-based
randomization, one code pointer allows the attacker to infer 4 KiB of code due to
page alignment, whereas the attacker has to leak more code pointers in the presence
function-level randomization to infer the same amount of code. To counter indirect
memory disclosure, we create trampolines for forward code pointers and encrypt return
addresses.
Forward-Pointer Protection
An attacker cannot use function pointers to infer the code layout because they point
to trampolines which reside in code segment. Hence, the destination address of a
trampoline cannot be disclosed. The order of the trampolines is randomized to prevent
any correlation between the trampolines and their target functions. This constraints the
attacker to whole-function reuse attacks. To mitigate such attacks, we suggest using the
XoM-based technique presented by Crane et al. [52] to randomize tables of function
pointers. This extension should be completely compatible with the software-only XoM
provided by LR2 without modification and would protect against the most prevalent
types of whole-function reuse: return-into-PLT and vtable-reuse attacks.
Return-Address Protection
Return addresses are a particularly valuable target for attackers because they are
plentiful, easy to access, and useful for code-reuse attacks, even with some mitigations
in place. For example, when attacking an application protected by function permutation,
an attacker can leak return addresses to infer the address of the functions and in turn
the addresses of gadgets within those functions [45]. We prevent this by encrypting each
return address with a per-function 32-bit random number generated by a secure random
number generator. However, our threat model allows the attacker to leak all encrypted
return addresses spilled to the stack. Whiles she cannot infer code addresses from the
encrypted return addresses we conservatively assume that she can relate each return
address to its corresponding call site.
We must also address reuse of unmodified, disclosed return addresses. In a previous
indirect disclosure protection scheme, Readactor [51], return addresses were vulnerable
to reuse as-is. Although Readactor prevented attackers from gaining information
about the real location of code surrounding a call site, an attacker could potentially
reuse call-preceded gadgets. An attacker could disclose the trampoline return address
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corresponding to a given call site and jump into that trampoline, which in turn
jumps directly after the real call site. This allows attackers to reuse any disclosed
return addresses. To mitigate this threat, the Readactor authors proposed additional
randomizations (register and callee stack slot permutation) to attempt to disrupt data
flow between call-proceeded gadgets and mitigate this threat.
In LR2 arbitrary reuse of return addresses is impossible. By encrypting every return
address with a per-callee encryption key, our system prevents the attacker from invoking
a call-site gadget from anywhere but the corresponding callee’s return instruction. In
other words, encrypted return addresses can only be used to return from the function
that originally encrypted the address. Thus, the attacker is confined to the correct, static
control-flow graph of the program. This restriction is similar to static CFI policies.
However, we further strengthen LR2 by applying register-allocation randomization.
During our analysis of state-of-the-art ROP attacks we determined that the success of
these attack is highly dependent on the data flows between specific registers. Register
randomization will disrupt the attacker’s intended data flow between registers and
hence, have unforeseen consequences on the control flow which will eventually result
in a crash of the application.
While our XOR encryption scheme uses a per-function key, this key is shared across
all invocations of a function. That is, each time a return address is spilled from a function
F it is encrypted with the same key KF. In most cases this is not a problem, since function
permutation prevents an attacker from correlating return addresses encrypted with the
same key. However, if a function F1 contains two different calls to another function F2,
the return addresses, R1 and R2 respectively, are encrypted with the same key KF2 . The
attacker has a priori knowledge about these addresses, since with function permutation
they are still placed a known (constant) offset apart. We believe this knowledge could
be exploited to leak some bits of the key KF2 . To prevent this known-plaintext attack
we propose two options: (1) we can either apply more fine-grained code randomization,
e.g., basic-block permutation to remove the correlation between return addresses or
(2) fall back to using the trampoline approach to protect return addresses as presented
by [51] when a function contains more than one call to the same (other) function. These
techniques remove the a priori knowledge about the encrypted return addresses. In fact,
return-address encryption even strengthens the second approach because it prevents
trampoline-reuse attacks for return addresses.
4.2.5.3 Proof-of-Concept Example Exploit
We evaluate the effectiveness of LR2 against real-world attacks by re-introducing a
known security vulnerability (CVE-2014-1705) into the latest version of Chromium
(v46.0.2485.0) and conducted our experiments on same setup we used in our
performance evaluation. The vulnerability allows to overwrite the length field of a buffer
object. Once this is done we can exploit this manipulated buffer object via JavaScript to
read and write arbitrary memory.
We constructed a JIT-ROP style attack that first leaks the vtable pointer of an object
Otarget to disclose its vtable function pointers. Using one of these function pointers
we can infer the base address of the code section of Chromium. Next, we use our
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1 ldr r0 , [ r1 , #0 ]
2
3 mov r12 , #28
4 ldr r3 , [ r0 , #7 ]
5 ldr r1 , [ r0 , #11 ]
6 bfi r0 , r12 , #0 , #20
7
8 add r1 , r3
9 ldr r0 , [ r0 , #0 ]
10
11
12 ldr r1 , [ r1 , r2 , l s l #2 ]
13 [ . . . ]
Before Instrumentation
1 ldr r0 , [ r1 , #0 ]
2 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
3 mov r12 , #28
4 ldr r3 , [ r0 , #7 ]
5 ldr r1 , [ r0 , #11 ]
6 bfi r0 , r12 , #0 , #20
7 bic r0 , r0 , #0 x80000000
8 add r1 , r3
9 ldr r0 , [ r0 , #0 ]
10 add r1 , r1 , r2 , l s l #2
11 bic r1 , r1 , #0 x80000000
12 ldr r1 , [ r1 ]
13 [ . . . ]
After Instrumentation
Figure 38: Simplified disassembly of the function v8::internal::ElementsAccessorBase::Get
that is used to read arbitrary memory. The load instruction in line 12 reads the
memory from the base address provided in register r1 plus the offset in register r2.
After the instrumentation, this load is restricted by masking the MSB (line 11) which
prevents reads into the code segment.
information disclosure vulnerability to search the executable code at run time for
predefined gadgets that allow us to launch a ROP attack to mark data memory that
contains our shellcode as executable. Finally, we overwrite the vtable pointer of Otarget
with a pointer to an injected vtable and call a virtual function of Otarget which redirects
control flow to the beginning of our shellcode to achieve arbitrary code execution.
There are currently some efforts by the Chromium community to achieve
compatibility with the musl C library. By the time of writing this chapter Chromium
remains incompatible which prevents us from applying the full LR2 toolchain. However,
we applied our load-masking component while compiling Chromium and analyze the
effect this load-masking would have on the memory disclosure we exploit.
Our analysis indicates that Chromium would immediately crash when the attempted
code read was restricted into an unmapped memory area within the data section.
Figure 38 shows how the function that this exploit uses to leak memory is instrumented.
After instrumentation, all load instructions in the function cannot read arbitrary memory
and must only read from addresses that point into the data segment. Thus, our
proof-of-concept exploit would fail to disclose the code segment at all and would instead
crash the browser with a segmentation violation.
4.2.6 Discussion and Extensions
4.2.6.1 Auto-Vectorization
When loops have no data dependencies across iterations, consecutive loop iterations may
be vectorized automatically by the compiler, using an optimization technique called
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auto-vectorization. This technique computes multiple loop iterations in parallel using
vector instructions that perform the same operation on a contiguous set of values.
While investigating the source of the higher overhead for the hmmer benchmark,
we found that one function—P7Viterbi—accounts for over 90% of the benchmark’s
execution time. The main loop of this function is amenable to vectorization as it exhibits
a high degree of data parallelism [174]. Modern ARM processors support the NEON
instruction set extension which operate on four scalar values at a time. Unfortunately,
support for automatic vectorization in LLVM was only added in October 2012 and is
still maturing. Using the older and more capable vectorization passes in GCC, ICC from
Intel, and XLC from IBM may allow more loops to be vectorized [129].
In the context of LR2, vectorization would not only reduce the running time by
exploiting the data parallelism inherent to many computations; it would also reduce
the number of required load masking operations by a factor of more than four. First
of all, vectorized loads read four consecutive scalars into vector registers using a single
(masked) address. Second, the NEON instructions operate on dedicated, 128-bit wide
registers which means that fewer addresses would be spilled to the stack and re-masked
when reloaded.
4.2.6.2 Assembly code
LLVM does not process inline assembly on an instruction level and therefore
transformation passes can only work with inline assembly blocks as a whole. Therefore,
our current prototype does not handle inline assembly; this is not a fundamental
limitation of our approach however. To make sure that every load is properly masked
in the presence of assembly code, we could extend the LLVM code emitter or an
assembly-rewriting framework such as MAO [102] with load-masking and code pointer
hiding passes. Since the code is not in SSA form at this stage we cannot apply our
optimizations.
4.2.6.3 Dynamically Generated Code
JIT-ROP attacks are ideally mounted against browsers containing scripting engines. To
ensure complete leakage-resilience, we must ensure that XoM and code-pointer hiding
is also applied to just-in-time compiled code. Crane et al. [51] patched the V8 JavaScript
engine used in the Chrome browser to make it compatible with XoM. To use this patch
for LR2, we would have to add functionality to ensure that every load emitted by the JIT
compiler is properly masked. This would simply involve engineering effort to patch the
JIT compiler.
A special property of JIT-compiled code is that it is treated as both code and data
by the JIT compiler; when the compiler needs to rewrite or garbage collect the code,
it is treated as read-write data, and while running it must be executable. When XoM
is enforced natively by the hardware, the page permissions of JIT compiled code can
be changed by updating the page tables used by the memory management unit. With
software-enforced XoM, we can make JIT compiled code readable by copying it (in
part or whole) into the memory range that is accessible to masked loads. However,
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that would require a special memcpy function containing unmasked loads. Therefore, we
believe that a better solution would be to adopt the split-process technique presented by
Song et al. [199]. The key idea of this work is to move the activities of the JIT compiler
into a separate, trusted process. Specifically, the code generation, optimization, and
garbage collection steps are moved to a separate process in which the JIT code cache
always has read-write permissions. In the main process, the JIT code cache is always
mapped with execute-only (or read-execute if XoM is unavailable) permissions. The two
processes access the JIT code cache through shared memory. The main process invokes
JIT compilation functionality in the trusted process through remote procedure calls.
4.2.6.4 Whole-Function reuse attacks
Since LR2 raises the bar significantly for ROP attacks against mobile architectures,
attackers may turn to whole-function reuse techniques such as the classic return-into-libc
(RILC) technique [151] or the recent counterfeit object-oriented programming (COOP)
attack [186]. Our core techniques—execute-only memory and code-pointer hiding—can
be extended to mitigate RILC and COOP attacks, as proposed by Crane et al. [52]. To
thwart COOP, we would split C++ vtables into a data part (rvtable) and a code part
(xvtable) stored on execute-only pages. The xvtable contains trampolines, each of which
replaces a pointer to a virtual function. Randomly permuting the layout of the xvtable
breaks COOP attacks because they require knowledge of the vtable layout. We can break
RILC attacks by similarly randomizing the procedure linkage table (PLT) or analogous
data structures in Windows.
4.2.6.5 Compatibility
Due to the nature of its load masking and return-address hiding scheme, LR2 is fully
compatible with unprotected third-party libraries. However, if an unprotected library
contains an exploitable memory-disclosure vulnerability it compromises the security of
the entire process.
In some cases application developers use the mmap() function to map memory to a
specific address. In LR2 we do not allow mapping to arbitrary addresses because the
application will fail when trying to read memory mapped into the XoM region. Hence,
we only allow mapping memory into the data region. This is still consistent with the
correct semantics of mmap() because the kernel considers requested addresses merely as
a hint rather than a requirement
4.2.6.6 AArch64
Our implementation currently targets 32-bit ARMv7 processors. ARM recently released
ARMv8, which implements the new AArch64 instruction set for 64-bit processing. LR2
can be ported directly to AArch64. Though AArch64 does not provide a bit clear
instruction with immediate operands, we can achieve the same effect with a bitwise
AND instruction.
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4.2.7 Conclusion
Software that is vulnerable to memory corruption remains exposed to sophisticated
code-reuse exploits. The problem of code reuse is not specific to x86 systems but
threatens RISC-based mobile and embedded systems too. Code randomization can
greatly improve resilience to code reuse as long as the code layout is not disclosed ex
post facto. The combination of execute-only memory and code-pointer hiding provides
comprehensive resilience against leakage of code layout information. Unfortunately, the
implementation of these techniques has so far relied on x86-specific features or has
increased resource requirements beyond reasonable limits for mobile and embedded
devices.
Unlike previous solutions, our leakage-resilient layout randomization
approach—LR2—only requires that the host system enforces a W⊕X policy.
Our software enforcement of execute-only memory is inspired by prior work on
software-fault isolation. However, since our threat model is fundamentally different
from SFI (we protect trusted code whereas SFI isolates untrusted code), we are able
to insert fewer load-masking operations than comparable SFI implementations. This
significantly reduces overheads.
We reuse existing techniques to protect forward pointers but present a new optimized
XOR pointer encryption scheme relying on XoM and function permutation to protect
return addresses. Since LR2 does not require any special hardware support, it can
protect applications running on a broad range of non-x86 devices, including MMU-less
micro-controllers. Even though LR2 prevents memory disclosure purely in software, its
performance is similar to defenses offering comparable security.
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4.3 selfrando : practical load-time randomization
In the previous sections, we presented techniques to increase the resilience
of code-randomization schemes against memory disclosure attacks. For our
proof-of-concept implementation of Readactor (Section 4.1) and LR2 (Section 4.2) we
used compile-time randomization. However, this comes with the disadvantage that
the hardened application must be recompiled for every user. In this section, we
tackle this issue by designing and implementing practical load-time randomization,
coined selfrando. To prove practicability, we enable load-time randomization for Tor
Browser [212] which is a browser by the Tor Project for easy access to the Tor Network.
Summing up, our main contributions are:
• Practical Randomization Framework. Unlike other solutions that have only been
tested on benchmarks, selfrando can be applied to the Tor Browser (TB) without
any changes to the source code. To the best of our knowledge, selfrando is the first
approach that avoids risky binary rewriting or the need to use a custom compiler,
and instead works with existing build tools.
• Hardening the Tor Browser. We demonstrate the practicality of selfrando by
applying it to the entire TB without requiring any code changes. Our detailed and
careful evaluation shows that the startup and performance overheads of selfrando
are negligible.
4.3.1 Design and Implementation
Objectives
Our main objective is to design and implement practical and efficient load-time
randomization that can be combined with existing memory-disclosure mitigations. For
practicality reasons, we choose to support complex C/C++ programs (e.g., a browser)
without modifying their source code. Further, we retain full compatibility with current
build systems, i.e., we should avoid any modification to compilers, linkers, and other
operating system components. To be applicable for privacy-preserving open-source
tools, we must not rely on any third-party proprietary software. Finally, our solution
should not substantially increase the size of the program in memory or on disk.
Selfrando
The easiest way to perform fine-grained code randomization is by customizing the
compiler to take a seed value and generate a randomized binary [71, 96]. Unfortunately,
compiling and distributing a unique binary for each is impractical for introducing
diversity among a population of programs [70, 230]. With more implementation
effort, we can delay randomization until load-time, which has several benefits. Most
importantly, software vendors only need to compile and test a single binary. A single
binary also means that users can continue to use hashes to verify the authenticity of
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Figure 39: Workflow of selfrando.
the downloaded binary. Finally, modern content delivery networks rely extensively on
caching binaries on servers; this optimization is no longer possible with unique binaries.
In the context of privacy-preserving software such as TB, compile-time randomization
raises additional challenges. Randomized builds would complicate the deterministic
build process7, which is important to increase trust in the distributed binary. Moreover,
compile-time randomization would (a) increase the feasibility of a de-anonymization
attack due to individual, observable characteristics of a particular build, and (b) allow
an attacker to build knowledge of the memory layout across application restarts, since
the layout would be fixed.
For these reasons, we decided to develop a framework which makes the program
binary randomize itself at load time. We chose function permutation [113] as the
randomization granularity, since it dramatically increases the entropy of the code layout
while imposing the same low overheads as ASLR [218]. Since discovering function
boundaries at load-time by analyzing the program binary is unreliable and does not
scale to large programs, we pre-compute these boundaries statically and store the
necessary information in each binary. We call this Translation and Protection (TRaP)
information.
Rather than modifying the compiler or linker, we developed a small tool which wraps
the system linker, extracts all function boundaries from the object files used to build
the binary, then appends the necessary TRaP information to the binary itself. Our linker
wrapper works with the standard compiler toolchains on Linux and Windows and only
requires a few changes to the build scripts to use with the TB.
Figure 39 illustrates the overall design and workflow of selfrando. First, the
unmodified source code is compiled into object files 1 . Object files are comprised
7 A randomized build can be implemented in a deterministic environment by passing a random seed as
an input to the deterministic process. The builds would then be distributed along with their seed. A user
could then check the integrity of her build by running the deterministic process again with the same seed.
However, that check would not prove the integrity of builds with other seeds.
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of the compiled binary code of the respective source file, as well as, metadata, like
function boundaries and references, which are required by the linker to combine object
files into the one executable file. In a normal compilation process these metadata are
not included by the linker in the final binary. However, our linker wrapper extracts
all metadata, which are required to re-randomize the binary during load time 2 . The
extracted information of each object file are bundled into the TRaP information, and
embedded together with a load-time randomization library, RandoLib, into the binary
file 3 .
Pre-compiled language runtime object files are another obstacle. One example is
crtbegin.o for GCC which contains functions to initialize the runtime environment
for applications that were programmed in C. In our current implementation, we treat
such object files as one single block because they contain only a few functions. This has
a negligible impact on the overall randomization entropy.
When the loader loads the application, it will invoke RandoLib instead of the entry
point of the application. RandoLib performs function permutation using the embedded
TRaP info, and consists of two parts: a small helper stub and the main randomization
module. The purpose of the helper stub (RL Starter is to make all selfrando data
inaccessible after RandoLib finishes. The operating system loader 4 calls this stub,
invoking RandoLib as the first step of program execution. The function permutation
algorithm proceeds in several steps. First, RandoLib generates a random order for
the functions using the Fisher-Yates shuffling algorithm. Second, RandoLib uses the
embedded metadata to fix all references that became invalid during the randomization.
Finally, after RandoLib returns, the helper stub makes selfrando’s data inaccessible 5 ,
and jumps to the original entry point of the binary.
4.3.2 Evaluation
We thoroughly evaluated selfrando from a security, and load- and run-time performance
standpoint.
Security
For any randomization scheme the amount of entropy provided is critical, because a
low randomization entropy enables an attacker to guess the randomization secret with
high probability [193]. We compare selfrando to Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR)—the standard code randomization technique that is available on all modern
systems.
We determined the real-world entropy of ASLR by running a simple,
position-independent program multiple times and analyzing the addresses, on a
Debian 8.4 machine using GCC 6.1.0 and Clang 3.5.0. ASLR provides up to 9-Bits of
entropy on 32-bit systems and up to 29-Bits of entropy on 64-bit systems. While the ASLR
offset on 32-bit systems is guessable in a reasonable amount of time, such attacks become
infeasible on 64-bit systems because the address space is that much larger. However, an
attacker can bypass ASLR by leaking the offset that the code is loaded at in memory
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through a pointer into application memory. Once this offset is known the attacker can
infer any address within the application, because it is used to shift the address of the
whole application.
selfrando, on the other hand, applies more fine-grained function permutation. This
means the randomization entropy does not depend on the size of the address space, as
it is the case for ASLR, but on the number of functions in the randomized binary.
We applied selfrando to Tor Browser, and analyzed the entropy for different library.
The smallest library (libplds4.so) has 44 functions in 10 KB of code, while the biggest
(libxul.so) has 242 873 functions in 92 MB. The median is 494 functions in 163 KB,
while the average is 16 814 functions in 6.5 MB. With the assumption that the attacker
needs the address of at least three functions, selfrando is significantly more effective
than ASLR. For the smallest library, the attacker needs to guess at least 39-Bits, while
for the biggest, the attacker needs at least 78-Bits.
To protect selfrando against sophisticated memory-disclosure attacks it must be
combined with some form memory-disclosure mitigation, like Readactor (Section 4.1)
and LR2 (Section 4.2).
Run-time Performance
We performed multiple tests to measure selfrando’s run-time overhead. Since selfrando
works at load-time, we also measured the additional startup time. All tests were
performed on a system with an Intel Core i7-2600 CPU clocked at 3.40 GHz, with 12 GB
of RAM and a 7200 RPM hard disk. We used version 5.0.3 of the Tor Browser on Ubuntu
14.04.3.
We executed all the C and C++ benchmarks in SPEC CPU2006 with the two standard
Linux compilers (GCC and Clang) with selfrando enabled. Moreover, we ran the
benchmarks with a version of selfrando that always chooses the original order for the
randomization (identity transformation). This version runs all the load-time code but it
does not actually modify the code segment. It allows us to distinguish between load-time
overhead and run-time overhead.
The geometric mean of the positive overheads is 0.71% for GCC and 0.37% for
Clang. We found one of the benchmarks programs, xalancbmk, to be an outlier, with
an overhead of about 14%.
We investigated this issue using the Linux performance analysis tool, perf, comparing
the full selfrando and the identity transformation runs. We discovered a 69% increase
in L1 instruction cache misses and a 521% increase in instruction TLB (Translation
Lookaside Buffer) misses. We believe that the xalancbmk benchmark is sensitive to
the function layout and that some frequently executed functions must be co-located
to ensure optimal performance. A possible extension to selfrando to cope with
location-sensitive programs is to automatically use performance profiling to identify
groups of functions that should be moved as a single bundle similar to the work of
Homescu et al. [95].
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Load-time Performance
Finally, we evaluated the load-time overhead using the standard tool time. As a baseline,
we used the source code of Tor Browser 5.0.3, unmodified except for the main function.
For both versions, the reported time is the average of 10 runs. We cleaned the disk cache
before each run, so the binary was loaded from the disk every time.
The average load time for the normal version was 2.046 s, while the selfrando version
took 2.400 s on average. The average overhead is 354 ms. We believe this is an acceptable
overhead.
4.3.3 Conclusion
We have introduced selfrando, a fast and practical load-time randomization tool. It has
negligible run-time overhead, a perfectly acceptable load-time overhead, and it requires
no changes to the source code.
We successfully tested selfrando with a variety of different software. Further, in a
collaboration with the Tor Project we integrated selfrando into Tor Browser which is
currently distributed in the beta version for Linux users.
Moreover, selfrando can be combined with integrity techniques such as execute-only
memory to further secure the Tor Browser and virtually any other C/C++ application.
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4.4 pt-rand : mitigating attacks against page tables
Operating system kernels are essential components in modern computing platforms
since they provide the interface between user applications and hardware. They also
feature many important services such as memory and disk management. Typically,
the kernel is separated from user applications by means of memory protection, i.e.,
less-privileged user applications can only access the higher-privileged kernel through
well-defined interfaces, such as system calls. Attacks against kernels are gaining more
and more prominence for two reasons: first, the kernel executes with high privileges,
often allowing the attacker to compromise the entire system based on a single kernel
exploit. Second, the kernel implements a major part of the security subsystem. Hence,
to escalate execution privileges to root or escape from application sandboxes in browsers,
it is often inevitable to compromise the kernel. Kernel exploits are leveraged in (i) all
of the latest iOS jailbreaks, (ii) browser sandbox exploits against Chrome [146], and
(iii) large-scale attacks by nation-state adversaries to obtain full control of the targeted
system, as in the infamous case of Stuxnet [175].
Typical means for program code exploitation are memory corruption vulnerabilities.
They allow attackers to alter control and data structures in memory to execute
(injected) malicious code, or to launch code-reuse attacks using techniques such as
return-oriented programming [100, 192]. One of the main reasons for the prevalence
of memory corruption vulnerabilities is that a vast amount of software is programmed
in unsafe languages such as C and C++. In particular, kernel code is typically completely
written in these languages for better performance, legacy reasons, and hardware-close
programming. The monolithic design of the commodity kernels and numerous device
drivers increase the attack surface compared to user-mode applications. For instance,
over the last 17 years 1526 vulnerabilities have been documented in the Linux kernel [54].
Various solutions have been proposed or deployed in practice to protect software
systems against code-injection or code-reuse exploits: modern kernel hardening
solutions like Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP) and Supervisor Mode Access
Protection (SMAP) [106] prevent access to user-mode memory while the CPU executes
code in kernel mode [12, 106]. This prevents the attacker from executing code with
kernel privileges in user mode. The deployment of W⊕X (Writable ⊕ Executable)
prevents the attacker from executing code in the data memory. Indeed, W⊕X has
dramatically reduced the threat of code-injection attacks. However, attackers have
already eluded to more sophisticated exploitation techniques such as code reuse to
bypass these measures and to hijack the control flow of the targeted code. Mitigating
control-flow hijacking attacks is currently a hot topic of research [205]. The most promising
and effective defenses at the time of writing are control-flow integrity (CFI) [6],
fine-grained code randomization [119], and code-pointer integrity (CPI) [118]. However,
all defenses against control-flow hijacking are based on the following assumptions:
firstly, they assume that code pages cannot be manipulated. Otherwise, the attacker can
replace existing code with malicious code or overwrite CFI/CPI checks. Secondly, they
assume that critical data structures containing code pointers (e.g., the shadow stack for
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CFI, the safe region for CPI) are isolated. Otherwise, the attacker can manipulate them
by overwriting code pointers.
However, as observed by Ge et al. [78], defenses against control-flow hijacking in
the kernel additionally require the protection of page tables against data-only attacks.
Otherwise the assumptions mentioned above will not hold and these defenses can
simply be bypassed by manipulating the page tables.
Data-only attacks do not change the control flow of the program. Instead they
direct the control flow to certain nodes within the control-flow graph (CFG) of the
underlying program by altering the input data. Hence, the executed path in the CFG is
indistinguishable from any other benign execution. Page tables are data structures that
map virtual addresses to physical addresses. They define read-write-execute permissions
for code and data memory pages, where a page is simply a contiguous 4KB memory
area. Hence, attackers can launch data-only attacks (based on memory corruption
vulnerabilities in the kernel) to alter page tables, and consequently disable memory
protection, manipulate code pages, and inject malicious code [147]. Recently industry
researchers have presented several page-table based attacks [65] stressing that these
attacks are possible because the attacker can easily determine the location of the page
tables.
To tackle data-only attacks on page tables, previous work suggested kernel
instrumentation to mediate any access to memory-management structures according to
a security policy [14, 15, 53, 77, 176, 200]. However, all these solutions suffer from at least
one of the following shortcomings: high performance overhead, require additional and
higher privileged execution modes (e.g., hypervisors), or depend on architecture-specific
hardware features. Recently, Microsoft released a patch for Windows 10 [108] that
randomizes the base address used to calculate the virtual address of page table entries.
However, this patch does not protect against crucial information disclosure attacks
that have been frequently shown to circumvent any (even fine-grained) randomization
scheme [61, 196].
Goal and Contributions. In this chapter, we present the design and implementation
of a novel memory protection scheme, PT-Rand, that prevents the attacker from
manipulating page tables. We highlight the importance of page table protection by
implementing a real-world exploit, based on a vulnerable kernel driver (CVE-2013-2595),
to directly manipulate the code of a kernel function. Using this attack, we circumvent a
recently released CFI kernel hardening scheme, Linux RAP [166], and execute arbitrary
code with kernel privileges. In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• Page Table Protection. We present a practical and effective protection of
page tables against data-only attacks without requiring additional hardware or
a hypervisor. Rather than applying expensive policy enforcement checks, we
randomize page tables when they are allocated and ensure that no information
related to the location of page tables is leaked. To achieve this, we need to tackle
several challenges. (1) There are many data pointers that the attacker can exploit
to locate page tables. (2) The physical memory (including page tables) is usually
mapped 1:1 into the virtual address space. Hence, the attacker can easily locate and
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access this section. (3) The kernel still needs to efficiently access page tables, and
distinguish between randomized and regular memory pages. As we will show in
Section 4.4.5.1, PT-Rand tackles all these challenges, while remaining compatible
to existing software, like kernel drivers.
• Prototype Implementation. We provide a fully working prototype implementation
for a recent Linux kernel (v4.6). We also combine Linux kernel CFI protection
(RAP) with PT-Rand to protect RAP against data-only attacks on page tables.
• Performance Evaluation. We provide an extensive security and performance
evaluation. In particular, we show that the attacker cannot bypass the
randomization by means of guessing attacks. Our performance measurements
for popular benchmarking suites SPEC CPU2006, LMBench, Phoronix, and
Chromium browser benchmarks show that PT-Rand incurs almost no measurable
overhead (0.22% on average for SPEC), successfully applies to many complex,
modern system configurations, and is highly practical as it supports a variety of
applications and kernel code.
PT-Rand effectively enables memory protection and paves the way for secure
deployment of defenses to thwart code-reuse attacks on the kernel.
4.4.1 Background on Memory Protection and Paging
In this section, we recall the basic principles of memory protection and paging that are
needed for the understanding of the following sections.
Memory protection ensures that (i) privileged kernel code is isolated from
less-privileged user code, (ii) one process cannot access the memory space of another
process, and (iii) read-only data memory cannot be tampered with by unauthorized
write operations. To enforce memory protection, modern operating systems leverage a
widely-deployed CPU feature called paging. Although the implementation details vary
among different architectures, the basic principles are the same. Hence, without loss of
generality, we focus our discussion on paging for the contemporary x86_64 architecture.
Paging creates an indirection layer to access physical memory. Once enabled, the CPU
will only operate on virtual memory (VM), i.e., it can no longer access physical memory.
The advantage of paging is that processes start working with large contiguous memory
areas. However, physically, the memory areas are scattered throughout the RAM, or
swapped out on hard disk. As a consequence, each access to a virtual memory address
needs to be translated to a physical address. This is achieved by a dedicated hardware
engine called Memory Management Unit (MMU). The translation is performed by
means of page tables that operate at the granularity of pages, where a typical page size
is 4KB. Specifically, the operating system stores mapping information from virtual to
physical addresses into these page tables thereby enabling efficient translation. To isolate
processes from each other, the kernel assigns each process to its own set of page tables.
In addition, page tables maintain read-write-execute permissions for each memory page.
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Figure 40: Paging - translation of virtual addresses to physical addresses.
These permissions are enforced at the time of translation, e.g., allowing the operating
system to prevent write operations to code pages or executing data pages.
Figure 40 provides high-level insights into the translation process. First, the memory
subsystem of the CPU receives the access mode and a virtual memory address from the
execution unit as input 1 . To access the page tables, the MMU reads out the pointer
to the page table root which is always stored in the third control register (CR3) on
x86_64 2 . This pointer is already a physical memory address pointing to the root of the
page table hierarchy 3 . That said, page tables are organized in a tree-like hierarchy for
space optimization reasons. The MMU traverses the page table hierarchy until it reaches
the page table entry (PTE) which contains the physical address for the given virtual
memory address 4 . In addition, the PTE holds the access permissions and ownership
(user or kernel) of the associated memory page. The memory subsystem leverages this
information to validate whether the target operation (read, write, or execute) adheres to
the permission set and ownership of the page. If validation is successful, the translation
information is used to fetch the data from the physical memory slot and stored into
the cache 5 . Note that the cache internally consists of a data and an instruction cache.
For read and write operations the fetched data is stored into the data cache. In contrast,
execute requests lead to a write of the fetched data to the instruction cache. Finally, the
fetched data is forwarded to the execution unit of the CPU 6 . If the MMU either does
not find a valid mapping in the page table hierarchy or observes an unauthorized access
in 4 , the memory subsystem generates an exception 6 .
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It is important to note that the page tables only contain physical addresses. This
becomes a performance bottleneck when the kernel aims at changing the page
permissions. As the kernel operates on virtual addresses, all the physical addresses
belonging to a page would need to be mapped to virtual addresses dynamically before
the permission update can be performed. To tackle this bottleneck, the kernel maintains
a so-called 1:1 mapping which permanently maps the whole physical memory to a fixed
address into the virtual memory. To quickly translate a physical to a virtual address, the
kernel adds the physical address to the start address of the 1:1 mapping, and can then
use the resulting virtual address to access the memory.
4.4.2 On the Necessity of Page Tables Protection
In the adversary setting of kernel exploits the attacker has full control of the user mode,
and hence, can execute arbitrary code with user-mode privileges, and interact with
the kernel through system calls and driver APIs. The attacker’s goal is to gain higher
privilege level to be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel-mode privileges. To do so,
the attacker needs to hijack a control-flow path of kernel code by overwriting a kernel
code pointer, e.g., a return address or function pointer, using a memory-corruption
vulnerability that is exposed either through the kernel itself or one of the loaded drivers.
In the following, we briefly provide an overview of the main kernel-related
exploitation techniques as well as the defenses that are deployed or proposed against
these attacks. To mitigate kernel code-injection and kernel code-reuse attacks, the kernel
must be hardened with a variety of protection measures such as W⊕X and Control-Flow
Integrity (CFI), fine-grained randomization or Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI). However, as
we elaborate in the following the security of all these defenses relies on the integrity of
page tables that can be attacked by means of data-only attacks – We show this using a
real-world exploit that manipulates page tables against a kernel CFI protection.
4.4.2.1 Traditional Kernel Attacks
To escalate the attacker’s privileges to kernel privileges, a common exploitation
technique is as follows: first, the attacker allocates a new buffer in memory, writes
malicious code into this buffer, and sets the memory page on which the buffer is located
to executable. The latter can be achieved by common user space library functions such
as mprotect() on Linux and VirtualProtect() on Windows. Recall that these actions are
possible because the attacker has already gained control of the user space. Second, the
attacker overwrites a kernel code pointer with the start address of the malicious code
based on a memory corruption vulnerability inside the kernel. These vulnerabilities are
typically triggered by abusing the kernel’s interfaces such as system calls and driver
APIs. Third, the attacker triggers the execution of a function that executes a branch on
the corrupted kernel code pointer. As a result, the kernel’s internal control flow will
be dispatched to the previously injected, malicious code. Although this code resides in
user space, it will be executed with kernel privileges because the control-flow hijacking
occurred in the kernel mode. In a similar vein, the attacker can launch code-reuse attacks
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using the return-oriented programming (ROP) [192] technique. These attacks combine
and chain short instruction sequences (called gadgets) that end in an indirect branch
instruction. They are typically leveraged if the attacker cannot allocate new malicious
code on an executable page. Thus, the user-mode buffer will hold a ROP payload
consisting of code pointers to gadgets. Upon corruption of the kernel pointer, the ROP
gadget chain will be executed under kernel privileges [67].
4.4.2.2 Code-injection and Code-reuse Attacks
Modern CPUs feature hardware extensions Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP)
and Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP) that prevent access to user-mode memory
while the CPU executes code in the kernel mode [12, 106]. Alternatively, if these
extensions are not present, the kernel can simply unmap the entire user space memory
when kernel code is executed [130]. Such protections force the attacker to directly
inject malicious code or the ROP payload into the kernel’s memory space which is a
challenging task since the attacker cannot directly write into kernel memory. However,
several kernel functions accept and process user-mode buffers. A prominent example is
the msgsnd() system call which allows exchange of messages. The attacker can exploit
this function to cause the kernel to copy the user-mode exploit buffer (the message) into
kernel memory. By leveraging a memory disclosure attack inside the kernel, the attacker
can determine the address where the buffer is located in kernel memory and launch
the exploit thereafter [169]. Several techniques are deployed or proposed to harden the
kernel against these attacks: W⊕X (Writable⊕ Executable) is leveraged by many modern
operating systems to prevent code to be executed from data memory. Fine-grained code
randomization diversifies the code address layout to complicate code-reuse attacks [119].
Many modern operating systems apply Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization
(KASLR) [66, 130]. Control-flow integrity (CFI) mitigates control-flow hijacking attacks
by validating that the application’s control flow remains within a statically computed
control-flow graph [6]. CFI has been also adapted to kernel code [53, 78]. Recently
a CFI-based protection for Linux kernel (RAP [166]) has been released. Code pointer
integrity (CPI) [118] prevents control-flow hijacking by ensuring the integrity of code
pointers, and pointers to code pointers.
Principally all these defenses significantly raise the bar. However, as observed
in [53, 78] these defenses heavily rely on the assumption that the instrumented code
cannot be manipulated, i.e., the attacker cannot compromise integrity checks or exploit
information leakage against randomization schemes, and replace existing code with
malicious code. On the other hand, this assumption is easily undermined by data-only
attacks that tamper with the page tables as we describe next.
4.4.2.3 Data-only Attacks against Page Tables
In contrast to control-flow hijacking attacks, data-only attacks abstain from
compromising code pointers. For example, the attacker can overwrite the is_admin
variable of an application at run-time [38]. Although no code pointer has been
compromised, the attacker can now execute benign functionality with higher privileges.
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In the context of the kernel, data-only attacks allow code injection attacks by modifying
page table entries (PTEs) which we explained in Section 4.4.1. To initiate data-only
attacks, the attacker first exploits a memory-corruption vulnerability in the kernel or
a device driver to gain read and write access to kernel memory. Since kernel memory
contains references to page tables, the attacker can carefully read those references and
locate them [147]. In particular, the attacker can disclose the virtual address of a PTE
corresponding to a page that encapsulates a kernel function which can be triggered
from the user space. Next, the attacker modifies the page permissions to writable and
executable. For instance, the entire code of the kernel function could be replaced with
malicious code. Finally, the attacker triggers the kernel function from user space to
execute the injected code with kernel privileges.
4.4.2.4 Generic bypass of Kernel CFI
To demonstrate the potential of data-only attacks against page tables, we first
hardened the current Linux kernel with the open source version of RAP [166]. RAP
is a state-of-the-art CFI implementation that instruments the Linux kernel during
compile-time to enforce fine-grained CFI at run-time. In particular, RAP ensures that
the attacker cannot overwrite code pointers (used for indirect branches) with arbitrary
values. This is achieved by emitting CFI checks before all indirect branches that validate
whether the program flow targets a valid destination. However, as mentioned before, a
fundamental assumption of RAP is the integrity of the kernel code. If code integrity is
not ensured, the attacker can simply overwrite the CFI checks with NOP instructions or
directly overwrite existing kernel code with malicious code.
We undermine this assumption by using a data-only attack to first modify the page
tables and change the memory permission of the kernel code to writable. Next, we
overwrite an existing system call with our attack payload which elevates the privileges
of the current process to root. After successfully overwriting the kernel code, we invoke
the modified system call from user mode to eventually obtain root access. The details
of this exploit are described in Section 4.4.5.2. While the impact of the attack itself
is not surprising (CFI does not aim to prevent code-injection attacks), it highlights
the importance of having an effective protection against data-only attacks that target
page tables. We note that this attack is not limited to RAP but can also be applied to
randomization or isolation-based defenses (CPI) against code-reuse attacks.
4.4.2.5 Summary
All known exploit mitigation schemes strongly depend on memory protection to prevent
the attacker from injecting code or corrupting existing code. Even with these schemes
in place, page tables managing memory permissions can be compromised through
data-only attacks. Hence, designing a defense against data-only attacks is vital and
complements the existing mitigation technologies allowing their secure deployment for
kernel code.
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4.4.3 Threat Model
The adversary setting for our protection scheme PT-Rand against page tables corruption
is based on the following assumptions (which are along the lines of the assumptions of
related literature):
Defense Capabilities
User Space Access. User-mode pages are not accessible when the CPU is in the
kernel mode. This is enforced by modern CPU features such as SMAP/SMEP [12,
106] or by simply unmapping the user space during kernel code execution [130].
Writable⊕Executable. Kernel code pages are not per-se writable. This is enforced
by W⊕X protection inside the kernel. As a consequence, the attacker needs to
resort to a data-only attack to manipulate code page permissions, and inject code
thereafter.
Code-reuse Defense. A defense mechanism against kernel-related code-reuse
attacks is enforced, such as control-flow integrity (CFI) [6, 78], fine-grained
code randomization [51, 119], or code-pointer integrity (CPI) [118]. Specifically,
our prototype implementation of PT-Rand incorporates RAP [166], a public
state-of-the-art CFI implementation for the Linux kernel. As mentioned before,
existing defenses against code-reuse attacks cannot prevent data-only attacks
against the page tables. (Our solution serves as a building block to prevent these
protection frameworks from being undermined by data-only attacks against page
tables.)
DMA Protection. Direct Memory Access (DMA) [181, 231] cannot be exploited
to bypass virtual memory permissions because an IOMMU [106] is configured to
prevent DMA to security-critical memory.
Safe Initialization. The attacker cannot attack the kernel prior the initialization
of PT-Rand. This is not a limitation because PT-Rand is initialized at the early boot
phase during which the attacker cannot interact with the kernel.
Source of randomness. A secure (hardware) random number generator is
available [12, 106, 217].
Side-channels. Timing and cache side channel attacks as well as hardware attacks,
like rowhammer [114], are orthogonal problems, and hence, beyond the scope of
this chapter. Nevertheless, we discuss in Section 4.4.5.2 how we can adopt known
techniques from Apple’s iOS to prevent practical side-channel attacks.
Adversary Capabilities
Memory Corruption. There exists a memory corruption vulnerability in either
the kernel or a driver. The attacker can exploit this vulnerability to read and write
arbitrary memory (e.g., [147]).
Controlling User Space. The attacker has full control of the user space, and
consequently can execute arbitrary code in user space and call kernel API functions.
4.4 pt-rand : mitigating attacks against page tables 127
4.4.4 Overview of PT-Rand
Our goal is to mitigate data-only attacks against the kernel page tables in the threat
model explained in section 4.4.3. To do so, we introduce the design and implementation
of a novel kernel extension called PT-Rand. The main idea of PT-Rand is to (i) randomize
the location of page tables securely, i.e., prevent the leakage of the randomization secret,
and (ii) substitute pointers that reference page tables with physical addresses to obfuscate
these references and prevent their leakage.
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Figure 41: Overview of the different components of PT-Rand.
Figure 41 depicts the overall architecture and workflow of PT-Rand. During the early
boot phase, the kernel operates only on physical memory. To guarantee a successful
switch to virtual memory, contemporary kernels allocate an initial set of page tables at
a constant and fixed address. These page tables manage the kernel’s core functions as
well as data areas, and remain valid for the rest of the kernel’s life-time. To prevent the
attacker from tampering with page tables, PT-Rand generates a randomization secret 1 ,
and randomizes the location of the initial page tables 2 . The randomization secret is
stored in a privileged CPU register which is neither used during normal operation of
the kernel nor accessible from user mode. Recall from Section 4.4.3 that the attacker can
only access the kernel memory, but not the kernel’s registers. The latter would require
the attacker to either launch a code-injection attack (prevented by W⊕X) or a code-reuse
attack (mitigated by CFI [6], code randomization [119] or CPI [118]). After relocating
the initial page tables to a random address, the kernel can no longer access these page
tables through the 1:1 mapping. In particular, PT-Rand relocates the initial page tables
in an unused memory region. As we will evaluate in detail in Section 4.4.5.2, the entropy
for this memory region is reasonably high for contemporary 64-bit systems rendering
brute-force attacks infeasible A .
Note that the kernel features dedicated allocator functions for page table memory.
For PT-Rand, we instrument these functions to (i) move the initial page tables to a
random address, and (ii) always return physical addresses for any page table related
memory allocation. In contrast, the default allocators always return a virtual address as
a reference to newly allocated page table memory. This small adjustment allows us to
obfuscate the location of page tables from user-level attackers, because the kernel code
operates on virtual addresses when accessing page tables. Hence, at this stage, neither
the attacker nor the kernel itself can access the page tables. In order to allow benign
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kernel code to still access the page tables, we modify all kernel functions that access
page table memory: for each of these functions we convert the physical address to a
virtual address based on the randomization secret generated in 1 .
However, during the early boot phase, the kernel has already saved references to the
initial page tables in various data structures. Since the initial tables were not allocated
with our modified allocator, the references contain obsolete virtual addresses. To avoid
a kernel crash, PT-Rand updates all these references (virtual addresses) with the new
physical address 3 . To this end, every reference to page tables now contains a physical
address rather than a virtual address. Thus, the attacker aiming to locate page tables
by reading the designated places of page table pointers [147] only retrieves physical
addresses. Since there is no direct correlation between physical and virtual addresses,
the attacker cannot use any leaked references to infer the corresponding virtual
address B . We also implemented PT-Rand such that no intermediate computation
result that includes the randomization secret is ever written into memory. Specifically,
we instruct the compiler to keep intermediate and the end result that include the
randomization secret in registers, and prevent them from getting spilled.
Our modified page table memory allocator also randomizes any future page table
allocations into the PT-Rand memory region 4 . Further, we ensure that every physical
memory page that contains page table entries is unmapped from the 1:1 mapping.
Hence, if the attacker discloses a physical address of a page table pointer, she cannot
exploit the 1:1 mapping to read out page tables C . Finally, PT-Rand provides an
interface for the kernel to access and manage page tables 5 . In particular, PT-Rand
translates the physical addresses of page table pointers to virtual addresses based on
the randomization offset.
4.4.5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we present the implementation and evaluation results for PT-Rand. For
our evaluation, we first analyze security aspects such as randomization entropy and
leakage resilience. Thereafter, we present a thorough investigation of the performance
overhead incurred by PT-Rand. For this, we conducted micro-benchmarks on hot code
paths, measure performance overhead based on SPEC CPU industry benchmarks, and
quantify the impact on complex applications such as browsers.
4.4.5.1 Implementation
We implement PT-Rand for the Linux kernel version 4.6. However, the concepts of
PT-Rand can be applied to other kernels as well. Our modifications mainly target
the memory allocator for page tables, and the part of the page fault handler that is
responsible for traversing the page tables. Further, we extend the initialization code of
the kernel to relocate page tables, which were required during the boot time.
To provide sufficient entropy, PT-Rand requires a large memory area to store the
page tables. Therefore, we first analyzed the usage of the 64-bit address space of the
Linux kernel which is shown in Figure 42. We identified two unused regions of 40 bit
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0x00000000000 47 Bits
Address Size
User Space
Purpose
hole caused by [48:63] sign extension
0xffff8000000 43 Bits Hypervisor
0xffffc800000 40 Bits PT-Rand (Hole)
0xffffc900000 45 Bits vmalloc/ioremap
0xffffe900000 40 Bits Hole
0xffffea00000 40 Bits Memory Map
unused hole
0xffffec00000 44 Bits Kasan
unused hole
0xffffff00000 39 Bits Fixup Stacks
unused hole
0xffffffff800 512M Kernel Text
0xffffffffa00 1525M Modules
0xffffffffff6 8M vsyscalls
0xffffffffffe 2M Hole
0xffff8800000 43 Bits 1:1 Mapping
Figure 42: The x86_64 virtual memory map for Linux with four level page tables.
which each translates to one TB of memory, and we utilize one of them to store the
page tables at a random address. To randomize the location of the page tables, we first
generate a random address within this region using the available kernel Application
Programming Interface (API), which uses a hardware random number generator if
available. PT-Rand stores this randomization secret in the DR3 register, which is normally
used for debugging purposes. We modify the page fault handler to use this secret to
traverse the page tables, as well as the memory allocator for page tables to use the
register to obfuscate the page table addresses. In particular, we modify the allocator such
that all pointers to the page table are physical addresses, and can only be converted into
virtual addresses with the randomization secret that is stored in the DR3 register. Next,
we relocate the page tables that were used during boot time to set up the initial virtual
address space. This is necessary because these page tables are statically included in the
binary. Finally, PT-Rand ensures that the memory, in which the page tables are stored,
is not accessible through the 1:1 mapping which maps the entire physical memory.
4.4.5.2 Security Considerations
Our main goal is to prevent data-only attacks against the kernel page tables at run
time. For this, we randomize the location of page tables per boot. In general, any
randomization-based scheme must resist the following attack vectors: (i) guessing
attacks, (ii) memory disclosure through code and data pointers, and (iii) memory
disclosure through spilled registers. In the following, we discuss each attack vector
to demonstrate the effectiveness of PT-Rand. We also include an exploit in our study
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to demonstrate that exploit hardening mechanisms at the kernel-level can be bypassed
when PT-Rand is not applied.
Guessing Attacks
Low randomization entropy allows the attacker to guess the randomization secret with
high probability [193]. The randomization entropy of PT-Rand depends on: (1) the
number of guesses, (2) the size of the region where the page tables are allocated, and
(3) the overall size of memory that is required to store all page tables.
We limit the number of attacker’s guesses by configuring the kernel to initiate a
shutdown in case of an invalid memory access in kernel memory. Note that this has
no impact on the kernel’s execution. In fact, this was the default behavior of previous
versions of the Linux kernel. As described in Section 4.4.5.1, we utilize an unused
memory region of 1TB (40 Bit) to randomize the memory allocations for the page tables.
However, the smallest memory unit in paging is a 4KB (12 Bit) page. This means when
one page table entry is placed randomly into the PT-Rand region, 4KB of memory
become readable. Hence, the attacker does not have to guess the correct address of
a particular page table entry but only the start address of the page which contains the
entry. As a consequence, the total randomization entropy available for PT-Rand is 28 Bit.
For a deterministic attack, the attacker has to manipulate a specific page table entry
S that protects a specific function of the kernel. Alternatively, it might be sufficient
for the attacker to corrupt an arbitrary valid entry A of the page table. However, it is not
guaranteed that this modification will allow the attacker to compromise the kernel, thus,
the attack success is probabilistic. Hence, we calculate the success probability that the
attacker can correctly guess the address of the page which contains S. We denote this
probability with p(x) which depends on the number of pages, denoted by x that contain
page table entries.
We can reduce the problem of calculating the success probability sp(x) to a classical
urn experiment without replacement and with three different colored balls: black,
red, and green. The black balls represent the unmapped pages. The attacker loses the
experiment by drawing a black ball (because accessing an unmapped page crashes the
operating system). The red balls represent the valid pages, however, they do not contain
the attacker’s target page table entry S. The attacker is allowed to continue and draw
another ball, as long as the attacker draws a red ball (access to a valid page). A green ball
represents the page containing the page table entry S that the attacker aims to modify.
With SG we denote the event that the attacker draws the green ball eventually without
drawing a black ball (guessing the correct address of S without accessing an unmapped
page). Hence, the probability of SG is the sum of the probabilities that the attacker draws
the green ball in the first try plus the probability that the attacker draws the green ball
after drawing the i-th red ball where i > 1. The resulting probability of SG is computed
as follows:
Pr[SG] = p(x) =
1
228
+
x∑
i=1
(
x
i
)(
228
i
) ∗ 1
228 − i
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Figure 43: Probability for guessing attacks based on the number of mapped pages in the PT-Rand
region.
Figure 43 plots the probability that the attacker can succeed in guessing a specific page
table entry if up to 216 memory pages for page tables are allocated. The graph shows that
even if a high number of page table entries (PTEs) are allocated, the attacker’s success
probability is still very low ranging from 3.725 ∗ 10−9 to 3.726 ∗ 10−9. We measured the
number of page tables for a variety of different systems and configurations. For a normal
desktop system, we observed that between 2,000 and 4,000 PTE pages were allocated. If
we start a virtual machine up to 16,000 pages for PTEs are allocated. Lastly, our server
(24 cores and 64GB RAM) running 9 virtual machines in parallel allocates up to 33,000
pages for PTEs. As shown in Figure 43, the probability grows linearly. Therefore, even if
the attacker attempts to decrease the entropy by forcing the operating system to allocate
more pages that contain page table entries8 the attacker’s success probability is very
low. Further, PT-Rand can prevent attacks on the entropy by limiting the amount of
page tables to a number that will guarantee a user configurable amount of entropy.
For this reason, even if the attacker tries to decrease the randomization entropy by
forcing PT-Rand to allocate a large amount of memory within the PT-Rand region, e.g.,
by spawning new processes, the success probability will not increase significantly before
such an attack can be detected, e.g., by only allowing a fixed number of allocated pages.
Memory References
Memory disclosure is another severe threat to any kind of randomization scheme. For
PT-Rand, we assume that the attacker can disclose any kernel data structure, and
therefore, possible references to page tables. Hence, we obfuscate the references to
page tables in all kernel data structures by substituting the virtual addresses with
8 the attacker can force the operating system to create new page table entries by starting new processes.
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physical addresses. Note, there is no correlation between virtual and physical addresses.
Therefore, the attacker does not gain any information about the real location of the
page tables by disclosing obfuscated addresses. Since our modified memory allocator
for page-table memory only returns obfuscated references, the attacker cannot access
page tables by reading those pointers. The remaining potential source of leakage are
functions that did not use our modified allocator. Recall, all functions that access the
page tables now expect a physical address. Hence, if these functions receive a virtual
memory address of a page table entry, they will automatically try to translate them
using the randomization secret. The result is very likely an invalid address which will
lead to a kernel crash.
Spilled Registers
As recently demonstrated in [45], even temporarily spilled registers which contain a
security-critical value can compromise PT-Rand. To prevent any access to the debug
register (DR3) that contains the randomization secret, we patched the Linux kernel code
to never access DR3, i.e., DR3 cannot be accessed through any kernel API. Note that
the CPU does not spill debug registers during interrupts [106]. Further, we prevent
the compiler from writing the randomization secret to the stack by performing all
computations in registers and never save or spill the result to memory. However, there
might be cases, where a register that contains an intermediate value is spilled on
the stack due to a hardware interrupt. In contrast to software interrupts, which we
disable during page walks, hardware interrupts cannot be disabled. This opens a very
small time window that may enable the attacker to use a concurrent thread to disclose
register values, and potentially recover parts of the randomization secret. We performed
preliminary experiments with a setting that favors the attacker to implement this attack,
and did not succeed. Nevertheless, we are currently exploring two different strategies
to mitigate such attacks. The first strategy is to further decrease the already small time
window where register values could potentially be leaked. In particular, we envision to
instrument the page table reads, by rewriting them with inline assembly, such that the
de-obfuscated address is only present in the register for a couple of instructions. After
accessing the page-table memory all registers that contain (intermediate values of) the
randomization secret is set to zero. Alternatively, the second strategy ensures that the
attacker cannot use a concurrent thread to access the stack of a victim thread that got
interrupted and whose registers got temporarily spilled to memory. This can be achieved
by using different page tables per kernel thread. Specifically, this allows us to assign
stack memory per kernel thread which cannot be accessed by other (concurrent) threads.
Therefore, even if intermediate values are spilled to memory, the attacker cannot leak
them using concurrent threads. A simpler version of this technique, where the kernel
uses a different page table per CPU, is already deployed in the grsecurity patch [202].
Real-world Exploit
We evaluated the effectiveness of PT-Rand against a set of real-world vulnerabilities.
In particular, we use an information disclosure vulnerability in the Linux kernel to
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bypass KASLR9, and a vulnerable driver which does not sanitize pointers provided by
a user-mode application (CVE-2013-2595) to read and write arbitrary kernel memory.
Based on these attack primitives, we develop an attack which allows us to execute
arbitrary code in the kernel, despite having the kernel protected with state-of-the-art
CFI for the kernel. The goal of our attack is to (i) change the memory permissions of a
page that contains the code of a pre-defined kernel function to writable, (ii) overwrite
the function with our shellcode, and (iii) finally trigger the execution of this function to
instruct the kernel to execute our shellcode with kernel privileges.
To retrieve the KASLR offset, we use the aforementioned information disclosure
vulnerability. The vulnerability allows the attacker to disclose the absolute address of a
kernel function. Since we can determine the relative offset of this function to the start
address of the kernel code section, we can compute the absolute address of the kernel
after KASLR. Based on this address, we can compute the address of every function or
global variable of the kernel since KASLR only shifts the whole kernel by a randomized
offset during boot. In an offline analysis of the kernel image, we discovered a global
variable that holds a reference to the task_struct of the initial process. The task_struct
is a kernel data structure in which the kernel maintains information about each process,
like id, name and assigned virtual memory. Specifically, it contains a pointer to the
mm_struct which maintains information about the memory that is assigned to the
process. Within this structure, we discovered a virtual memory pointer to the root of
the page table of the corresponding process.
Using the arbitrary read capability and the 1:1 mapping, we traverse the page table
to the entry that maintains the permissions for the system call sys_setns. Next, we
set this page to writable and overwrite the beginning of sys_setns with our shellcode.
In our proof-of-concept exploit, we re-write the function to elevate the current process’
privileges to root. Naturally, other payloads are possible as well, like installing a kernel
rootkit. After we modified the system call function, we set the corresponding page table
entry again back to readable and executable, and invoke the system call to trigger the
execution of our shellcode.
As explained in detail, this attack does not involve changing any code pointer. Hence,
it resembles a data-only attack that cannot be mitigated by defenses against control-flow
hijacking. However, after hardening the kernel with PT-Rand, this attack fails since we
cannot reliably locate the correct page table entry for system call task_struct.
Side-channel Attacks
As stated in Section 4.4.3, preventing side-channel attacks is beyond the scope of
this chapter. However, since side-channel attacks have the potential to undermine the
security guarantees of PT-Rand, we will shortly discuss how these attacks work and
how the kernel could be extended to prevent them.
Through side channels the attacker can disclose information about the kernel memory
layout. In particular, the attacker discloses whether a kernel memory page is mapped.
9 . This vulnerability was silently fixed by the Linux kernel maintainers which is why there was no official
CVE number assigned: https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/
?id=b2f739
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Hence, the attacker, in user mode, will attempt to read or write to a kernel memory
page. Since kernel memory cannot be accessed by the user-mode programs such an
attempt will result in an access violation. However, the time elapsing between the
attempted access and the access violation depends on whether the page is mapped.
Hund et al. [101] first demonstrated the feasibility of this attack by measuring the
different timings the page fault handler needs to deliver an exception to the user mode to
bypass kernel ASLR. Wojtczuk [232] improved this attack by using Intel’s Transactional
Synchronization Extensions (TSX) which provides new instructions for hardware-aided
transactional memory. The advantage of using TSX instructions to access kernel memory
is that the faulting access does not invoke the page fault handler, and hence, allows to
execute the previous attack of Hund et al. faster and with higher precision.
These timing-side channels exist because the user and kernel mode share the same
address space, i.e., they use the same page tables. Hence, we can prevent such attacks
by ensuring that the user and kernel mode use different page tables similar to Apple’s
iOS [130].
Code-reuse attacks
PT-Rand is complementary to defenses against code-reuse attacks, like CFI [6, 78],
CPI [118], or fine-grained randomization [51, 119]. We applied the open-source version
of the CFI kernel protection for Linux RAP [166] to prevent the attacker from hijacking
the control flow. Hence, the attacker cannot use code-reuse attacks like ROP to leak the
randomization secret.
4.4.5.3 Performance
We rigorously evaluated the performance impact of PT-Rand using a variety of
benchmarking suits on an Intel Core i7-4790 (3.6GHz) with 8GB RAM. In particular, we
measure the impact on (1) CPU intensive applications using SPEC CPU, (2) start up time
using LMBench, (3) on real-world applications using Phoronix, (4) and on JavaScript
using JetStream, Octane, and Kraken.
On average, we observe an average run-time overhead of 0.22% for (1), 0.08% for (3),
-0.294% for (4) and, 0.1ms increase in the start-up for (2). These results confirm that
PT-Rand has no noticeable impact on the performance of the system, and hence, make
PT-Rand a viable defense against page table attacks.
4.4.5.4 Robustness
To evaluate the robustness of PT-Rand we executed a large number of popular
user-mode applications, and the three aforementioned benchmarking suites. We did
not encounter any crashes during these tests, and all applications behaved as expected.
To further stress test our implementation we executed the Linux Test Project (LTP) [123].
The LTP is comprised of different stress tests that can be used to evaluate the robustness
and stability of the Linux kernel. We executed the most important tests under PT-Rand,
and did not encounter any deviation in the behavior compared to the vanilla kernel.
4.4 pt-rand : mitigating attacks against page tables 135
Finally, we did not encounter any compatibility issues or crashes when combining
PT-Rand with RAP [166].
4.4.6 Discussion
4.4.6.1 Choice of 64-bit.
The choice of 64-bit architectures is not a conceptual limitation. PT-Rand can be
ported to 32-bit architectures. However, similar to ASLR, PT-Rand relies on the
available randomization entropy which is known to be low for 32-bit systems [193].
Hence, we focused our efforts on hardening 64-bit-based architectures because nearly
all commodity desktops and servers feature 64-bit CPUs. Even mobile devices are
increasingly deploying 64-bit CPUs. As of 2013, Apple’s iPhone embeds a 64-bit
processor and iOS 9 runs exclusively on 64-bit processors. In a similar vein, Google
runs 64-bit processors for their latest Nexus smartphone.
4.4.6.2 Malicious Drivers.
Our threat model does not consider injection of malicious drivers. These would allow
the attacker to execute arbitrary code in kernel mode without requiring exploitation of
a memory corruption vulnerability. As such, malicious drivers could access and leak
the randomization secret. However, note that all modern operating systems support
driver signing to prevent the loading of such malicious drivers thereby ensuring that
the randomization secret is not leaked to the attacker.
4.4.6.3 Physical Attacks.
Similar to previous work [53], the main focus of this work is to prevent remote attacks
against the kernel. As a result, attacks that rely on physical access to the victim system
are beyond the scope of this work. For instance, several attacks in the past utilized special
hardware (e.g., FireWire [181]) to create a snapshot of the physical memory [90]. Such
snapshots can be analyzed by means of forensic tools to identify critical data structures
such as the page tables in the case of PT-Rand. However, they require physical access to
the RAM. Creating a memory snapshot remotely to detect the location of page tables is
not feasible because the remote attacker has only access to virtual memory, i.e., linearly
scanning virtual memory will eventually lead to a system crash since we move the page
tables to a memory region where the majority of surrounding pages are not mapped.
Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention that PT-Rand does not depend on any specific
operating system features and can be ported to other operating systems.
4.4.7 Conclusion
Exploitation of software is a pre-dominant attack vector against modern computing
platforms. In particular, exploits against the kernel are highly dangerous as they
allow the attacker to execute malicious code with operating system privileges. The
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research community has introduced several classes of exploit mitigation techniques
that significantly raise the bar of such attacks. However, these defenses build on
the assumption that the attacker cannot alter the kernel’s page tables which is the
main place to manage access permissions of code and data memory. For the first
time, we introduce a highly-efficient randomization technique that enables effective
protection against page table corruption attacks for a contemporary Linux-based system.
Our open-source solution, called PT-Rand, randomizes the location of all page tables,
and obfuscates all references to the page tables without requiring extra hardware,
costly hypervisors, or inefficient integrity checks. PT-Rand is a practical and necessary
extension to complement existing mitigation technologies such as control-flow integrity,
code randomization, and code pointer integrity.
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4.5 related work
In this section, we discuss related defensive research. We note that the recent effort in
mitigating code-reuse attacks resulted in a large body of research, which goes beyond
the scope of this dissertation. For example, automatic discovery of memory-corruption
vulnerabilities by means of static and dynamic analysis [194, 235], or the development
of new languages [110] are additional possible approaches to mitigate the risk of
code-reuse attacks. Hence, we limit our discussion to research that is directly related
to the defensive work of this chapter. In particular, we offer a detailed discussion
of leakage-resilient software diversity and integrity-based defenses as an alternative
defense against code-reuse attacks. We then briefly summarize existing general
mitigations against data-only attacks, and end this section with an overview of kernel
and page table mitigations.
4.5.1 Leakage-Resilient Diversity
Various research papers have been published on software diversity over the last two
decades. We refer to Larsen et al. [119] for an overview.
Backes and Nürnberger [16] are the first to try to mitigate Just-in-Time
Return-oriented Programming (JIT-ROP) attacks. Their Oxymoron approach uses the
vestiges of x86 segmentation features to hide code references between code pages, which
in turn prevents the recursive disassembly step in the original JIT-ROP attacks. However,
as we demonstrate in Section 3.1.3 Oxymoron is vulnerable to indirect disclosure attacks.
The eXecute-no-Read (XnR) approach by Backes et al. [17] provides increased
resilience against memory disclosure vulnerabilities by emulating eXecute-only Memory
(XoM) on x86 processors. While the concept of XoM goes back to MULTICS [47], it is
hard to support on x86 and other platforms that implicitly assign read permissions
to executable pages. The XnR approach is to mark code pages not present so that any
access invokes a page-fault handler in the operating system. If an access originates from
the instruction fetcher, the page is temporarily marked present (and thus executable
and readable), otherwise execution terminates. This prevents all read accesses outside a
sliding window of recently executed pages.
Gionta et al. [80] demonstrate that XoM can also be implemented using a technique
known as TLB Desynchronization on certain x86 processors. Whereas virtual addresses
usually translate to the same physical address regardless of the type of access, the
HideM approach translates reads and instruction fetches to distinct physical pages. This
means that HideM, in contrast to XnR, can support code that embeds data in arbitrary
locations. However, both mitigations can be bypassed using techniques we discussed in
Section 3.2.3.1.
Gionta et al. [81] and Pomonis et al. [172] implement XoM for the kernel leveraging
techniques we discussed in Section 4.2 and Section 4.1, respectively. Both schemes,
however, do not implement comprehensive code-pointer protections, and hence, remain
vulnerable to indirect disclosure attacks (cf. Section 3.1.3).
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Lu et al. [124] present ASLRGuard, which aims to prevent the attacker from disclosing
the code layout. Therefore, it uses a secure memory region, similar to a SafeStack [118],
to store return addresses, and encryption for all other pointers, which are stored outside
of the secure memory region. ASLRGuard relies on information hiding to protect the
secure memory region, and to store the decryption key for pointers. However, encrypted
code pointers can be reused for Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming (COOP)-like
attacks (cf. Section 3.3).
Tang et al. [206] and Werner et al. [229] propose to prevent direct
information-disclosure attacks through destructive code reads (DCR). DCR is based on
the assumption that benign code will never read from the code section. Therefore, DCR
intercepts memory-read operations to the code section, and overwrites the read bytes
with random values before returning the original content. As a result, the attacker can
learn the applied code randomization but she cannot leverage this information for a
code-reuse attack because the code was replaced during the disclosure attack. However,
as it turns out, these approaches are vulnerable to code-reload and code-inference
attacks [197].
Pewny et al. [171] improve the original idea of destructive code reads. Contrary to
previous work, the authors leverage static analysis to identify code and data within the
code section. They utilize this information to enforce execute-only access for memory
that was identified to contain code and read-only access for memory that contains
data. Destructive code reads are only enforced for memory that could not be reliably
identified as either code or data. Their technique drastically minimizes the attack surface,
and prevents attackers from using known attack techniques to bypass destructive code
reads.
Mohan et al. [143] present Opaque CFI (O-CFI), which is designed to tolerate certain
kinds of memory disclosure by combining code randomization and integrity checks.
Specifically, it tolerates code layout disclosure by bounding the target of each indirect
control-flow transfer. Since the code layout is randomized at load time, the bounds for
each indirect jump are randomized too. The bounds are stored in a small table, which
is protected from disclosure using x86 segmentation. O-CFI uses binary rewriting and
stores two copies of the program code in memory to detect disassembly errors, hence,
it comes with a high memory overhead. Apart from the fact that O-CFI requires precise
binary static analysis as its purpose is to statically resolve return addresses, indirect
jumps, and calls, the attacker may be able to disassemble the code, and reconstruct (parts
of) the control-flow graph at runtime. Hence, the attacker could dynamically disclose
how the control-flow is bounded.
Another way to defend against information disclosure is live re-randomization, where
the program is periodically re-randomized to invalidate any current code pointers,
thereby preventing the attacker from exploiting any knowledge they gain of the program.
Giuffrida et al. [82] describe the first implementation of this idea. However, even with
very short randomization periods, the attacker may still have enough time for an
attack [17, 61].
Bigelow et al. [21] propose an improved approach, TASR, which only re-randomize
programs when they perform input or output operations that the attacker could
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potentially exploit to disclose memory values. This approach requires that all code
pointers are updated post-randomization, and rely on a modified C compiler to provide
their locations. However, finding all code pointers in a C program is not always possible
in the general case. The authors describe a set of heuristics and assumptions they depend
upon to find the pointers, but real-world C code does not strictly comply with C’s
standard rules and often violates common sense assumptions about pointer use and
safety [44].
Lu et al. [125] implement RuntimeAddress Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)
which leverages a Pintool [126] to re-randomize the ASLR offsets after a process forks
or clones itself. The fork() and clone() system call creates a new child process with an
exact copy of the parent’s address space, and is commonly used by server applications
to handle client connections. The attacker can exploit this to brute force ASLR offsets
by creating multiple requests and observe whether the child process crashes, which
indicates wrong guess, or continues running [22]. Contrary to previous work, the
authors use taint tracking to identify pointers.
Chen et al. [42] implement re-randomization for binaries. To track pointers, their
approach relies upon indirection. Further, the authors deploy honey-gadgets [50] to
counter guessing attacks.
Isomeron by Davi et al. [61] clones the code and switches between clones at each call
site by randomly flipping a coin. If the coin comes up heads, an offset is added to the
return address before it is used. Because the result of the coin-flip is stored in a hidden
memory area, adversaries cannot predict how the return addresses in a return-oriented
programming (ROP) payload will be modified by Isomeron.
4.5.2 Integrity-based defenses
The main focus of the defense part of this dissertation is on increasing the resilience
of code randomization against memory-disclosure attacks to effectively mitigate
code-reuse attacks. However, integrity-based defenses present a viable alternative.
Therefore, we provide a brief overview about this direction of research to mitigate
code-reuse attacks.
4.5.2.1 Control-flow Integrity
After Data Execution Prevention (DEP), Control-flow Integrity (CFI) [5, 6] is the most
prominent type of integrity-based defense. Burow et al. [29] provide an excellent
comparison of different implementations of CFI.
CFI constrains indirect branches in a binary such that they can only reach a statically
identified set of targets. Since CFI does not rely on randomization, it cannot be bypassed
using memory-disclosure attacks.
However, it turns out that the precise enforcement of control-flow properties
invariably comes at the price of high performance overheads on commodity hardware.
In addition, it is challenging (if not impossible) to resolve all valid branch addresses for
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indirect jumps and calls. As a result, researchers have sacrificed security for performance
by relaxing the precision of the integrity checks.
Coarse-grained CFI
Zhang et al. [237] present CCFIR, a coarse-grained CFI approach based on static binary
rewriting that combines randomization with control-flow integrity. CCFIR collects
all indirect branch targets into a springboard section and ensures that all indirect
branches target a springboard entry. Unfortunately, the springboard is vulnerable to
direct-disclosure attack (cf. Section 3.1.2), and hence, allows for a complete bypass.
Zhang and Sekar [239] present another coarse-grained CFI approach which relies on
static binary rewriting to identify all potential targets for indirect branches (including
returns) and instruments all branches to go through a validation routine. However,
this mitigation merely ensures that branch targets are either call-preceded or target
an address-taken basic block. Similar policies are enforced by Microsoft’s security
tool called EMET [138], which builds upon ROPGuard [73]. Microsoft’s Windows
10 is the first operating system to deploy coarse-grained CFI [137]. A number of
approaches have near-zero overheads because they use existing hardware features to
constrain the control-flow before potentially dangerous system calls. In particular, x86
processors contain a last branch record (LBR) register which Pappas et al. [163], and
Cheng et al. [43] use to inspect a small window of recently executed indirect branches.
However, all these coarse-grained CFI policies give the attacker enough leeway to launch
Turing-complete code-reuse attacks [31, 60, 83, 84, 185].
Davi et al. [58] and Pewny and Holz [170] implement mobile-oriented CFI
solutions based on binary rewriting and compilation of iOS apps respectively. Both
implementations use static analysis augmented by either heuristics [58] or programmer
intervention [170] to generate a control-flow graph (CFG) to restrict the program’s
control flow. This adds a high degree of uncertainty to the CFG’s accuracy. A CFG
that is too coarse-grained, i.e., places too few restrictions on the control flow, is easily
exploitable by attackers, so the security of these defenses depends on the quality
(granularity) of the generated CFGs.
Overwriting virtual tables (vtables) pointers (cf. Section 3.2.3.1) is a common attack
technique to hijack the control flow of C++ applications. Hence, a number of recent
CFI approaches focus on analyzing and protecting vtables in binaries created from
C++ code [75, 173, 183, 221, 238]. While these approaches come with the advantage
of being compatible with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries, the CFI policy is
not as fine-grained as its compiler-based counterparts. Recently, Pawlowski et al. [164]
introduced new techniques to recover C++ class hierarchies from stripped binaries, which
can help to increase the precision of solutions that hard COTS binaries with CFI against
code-reuse attacks.
As coarse-grained CFI fails to provide sufficient protection against code-reuse attacks,
we now turn our attention to fine-grained CFI solutions.
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Fine-grained CFI
Niu and Tan [153] demonstrate fine-grained compiler-based CFI implementation that
is applied to individual modules, hence, supports dynamically linking shared libraries.
Therefore, the authors extend the compiler to store control-flow information in each
resulting binary, which is then used during run-time to extend the control-flow
graph (CFG). Niu and Tan [154] extend their previous work to support Just-in-Time
(JIT)-compiled code and C++, where they leverage a sandbox and double-mapping of
the JIT-code memory to ensure that the attacker cannot modify the JIT-code during run
time. Payer et al. [167] also utilize a sandbox for their fine-grained CFI implementation to
protect return addresses. Finally, Niu and Tan [155] aim to increase the precision of their
previous CFI implementations by leveraging points-to information which they collect
during run time. Concurrently, van der Veen et al. [220] present a similar approach,
albeit their precision is limited by the size of the Last Branch Record (LBR).
Mashtizadeh et al. [131] demonstrate fine-grained CFI using modern cryptography.
Specifically, their CFI implementation relies on the AES instructions of recent x86
processors to protect pointers and uses the storage location as a nonce during encryption
to reduce the ability of the attacker to reuse encrypted pointers in replay attacks.
PaX Team [166] implements fine-grained CFI for the Linux kernel. The author extends
the GCC compiler to compute hashes from function signatures. The hashes are then used
to ensure indirect function call only target functions with a matching function signature.
The return addresses are protected through xor-based encryption scheme.
Another recent example of full-system CFI enforcement for an operating system
kernel is KCoFI [53]. It securely stores the policies for safeguarding its virtualized
guests inside a memory region that is only accessible through the hypervisor. However,
this solution also comes with significant overhead of up to 200%, and requires a
hardware-support for virtualization and deployment of a hypervisor.
A number of compiler-based CFI schemes focus on enforcing CFI for virtual function
calls [26, 92, 111], and Tice et al. [215] generalize this idea to protect all indirect calls. The
main idea is to extend the compiler to perform static analysis of the class hierarchy, and
then instrument all virtual function calls to ensure that they can only target intended
virtual functions.
Although these techniques have the advantage of adding only minimal performance
overhead, they do not protect against attacks that use ret-terminated gadgets. Therefore,
these defenses have to be combined with a shadow stack.
Dang et al. [56] provide an overview of different shadow stack implementations.
Their results show that implementations with good performance are susceptible to
memory-corruption attacks, and secure shadow stacks implementations cause a high
performance overhead of up to 10% for common benchmarks.
Hardware-accelerated CFI
To overcome the performance challenges, researchers explore the possibility of
extending the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) to enforce CFI in hardware, or to
leverage new hardware features to accelerate software-based CFI.
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Arias et al. [11] and Sullivan et al. [204] implement CFI for the SPARC LEON3
processor, and report good performance results of below 2% avg. run-time overhead.
Recently, Intel [107] announced that future Central Processing Units (CPUs) will provide
native support for shadow stacks and coarse-grained CFI for call and jump instructions.
Nyman et al. [156] introduce CFI for microcontrollers that are typically used in an
Internet of Things (IoT) environment. Contrary to related work, their design takes
interrupts into account which is important because microcontrollers commonly run
bare-metal code.
Gu et al. [91], Ge et al. [79], and Liu et al. [122] leverage Intel’s processor trace feature,
which was originally intended for application profiling and debugging purposes, but
also allows one to track the control flow, which in turn allows the enforcement of CFI.
4.5.2.2 Software-Fault Isolation
SFI isolates untrusted code so it cannot access memory outside the sandbox or
escape confinement. SFI policies are typically enforced by inserting inline reference
monitors [132, 184, 225].
Since reads are far more frequent than writes, some SFI implementations only sandbox
writes and indirect branches. Google’s NaCl implementation for ARM [187] eschewed
load-isolation initially but support was later added [2] to prevent untrusted plug-ins
from stealing sensitive information such as credit card and bank account numbers.
NaCl for ARM uses a customized compiler and masks the high bits of addresses, and
constrains writes and indirect branches. ARMor [28] is another SFI approach for ARM.
It uses link-time binary rewriting to instrument untrusted code. This makes ARMor
less efficient than compile-time solutions and the authors report overheads ranges from
5-240%.
Several hardware-based fault isolation approaches appeared recently. Zhou et al. [240]
present ARMlock, which uses the memory domain support in ARM processors to
create sandboxes that constrain the reads and writes, and branches of code running
inside them with no loss of efficiency. While ARMlock prevents code from reading the
contents of other sandboxes, it cannot support our use-case of preventing read accesses
to code inside the sandbox. Santos et al. [182] use the ARM TrustZone feature to build
a trusted language runtime (TLR); while this greatly reduces the TCB of open source
.NET implementations, the performance cost is high.
4.5.2.3 Memory Safety
Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) by Kuznetsov et al. [118], Szekeres et al. [205] aims to
prevent pointer hijacking by storing code pointers, pointers to code pointers etc. in
a safe region; all accesses to the safe region are instrumented to ensure the integrity
of the pointers. Performance overhead is relatively small because CPI only needs to
instrument a subset of memory operations. The critical issue is the protection of the safe
region; on 64-bit Intel processors, segmentation is not available, thus CPI is forced to use
information hiding. Unfortunately, the most efficient implementations of this defense
can also be bypassed [68].
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Nagarakatte et al. [148] extend the compiler to enforce spatial safety for C and
C++. In a follow-up work, Nagarakatte et al. [149] added temporal safety as well.
If combined, both defenses guarantee memory safety, however, they introduce a
performance overhead of over 100% which is impractical for most use cases.
4.5.3 Data-only Defenses
To mitigate data-only attacks a number of data-randomization approaches have been
proposed. Cadar et al. [30] and Bhatkar and Sekar [19] apply static analysis to divide
data accesses into equivalence classes. Next, they instrument all data accesses to use
an xor key per equivalence-class for reading and writing data from and to memory.
This prevents the attacker from exploiting a memory-corruption vulnerability to access
arbitrary data. However, the instrumentation of data accesses is expensive with up to
30% run-time overhead.
Castro et al. [33] aim to mitigate data-only attacks by enforcing Data-flow Integrity
(DFI). The high-level idea is the same as in Control-flow Integrity. DFI relies on
static analysis to infer a data-flow graph (DFG), and instrumentation of all read and
write instructions to ensure that all data flows during run time are within the DFG.
In a follow-up work, coined Write Integrity Test (WIT), Akritidis et al. [7] tackle
the performance issues of DFI by reducing the precision of the DFG. Similar, to
coarse-grained CFI, coarse-grained DFI would give the attacker enough leeway to
perform attacks. Therefore, the authors additionally add CFI for forward edges to WIT.
4.5.4 Kernel and Page-Table Attack Mitigations
Several kernel defenses have been proposed that also protect the page table against
malicious manipulations [14, 53, 77, 191, 226]. In general, existing approaches are based
on a dedicated kernel monitor that enforces a set of pre-defined policies at run time,
including integrity policies for page tables. To the best of our knowledge, PT-Rand is
the first to use a randomization-based approach to defend against data-only attacks on
page tables.
SecVisor [191] and HyperSafe [226] follow a hypervisor-based approach. SecVisor
enforces W⊕X for the kernel space to ensure the integrity of the kernel code. This
is done by using memory virtualization to allow only certain physical pages to be
executable. SecVisor provides an interface to the kernel to allow new physical pages
to be marked as executable. These requests are checked against a user-provided policy
which is not further specified. HyperSafe protects its page tables by marking them
read-only, and checks before updating the page tables if the update conforms to an
immutable set of policies that should prevent malicious changes of page tables. Since the
hypervisor maintains its own memory domain, virtualized guests cannot compromise
its integrity by means of data-only attacks. However, the page tables maintained in the
hypervisor itself can be compromised by the attacker. For instance, evasion attacks can
be deployed to attack the hypervisor from a virtualized guest system [231]. Another
practical shortcoming of hypervisor-based approaches is the incurred performance
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overhead. SecVisor reports 14.58% average overhead (SPECInt) and HyperSafe 5%
overhead (custom benchmarks). In contrast, PT-Rand only incurs 0.22% for SPEC CPU
benchmarks. Some of the extra overhead of SecVisor and HyperSafe can be attributed
to additional checks that go beyond table protection. However, the hypervisor itself will
always add some extra execution overhead. In addition, these approaches rely on extra
hardware features such as virtualization extensions.
SPROBES and TZ-RKP both leverage hardware trust anchors [15, 77]. In particular,
both issue run-time checks for the kernel’s memory management functions. These
checks are executed inside the hardware-enabled secure environment ARM TrustZone.
This secure environment cannot be tampered with by any other software. The overhead
of TZ-RKP is up to 7.56%. In addition to the higher overhead, SPROBES and TZ-RKP
rely on dedicated hardware trust anchors to protect page tables. SKEE implements
similar run-time checks to SPROBES and TZ-RKP [14]. It utilizes the fact that ARM
provides two registers for paging. This enables SKEE to isolate the run-time checks
from the kernel. The overhead for protecting memory management varies between 3%
and 15%. Policy-based approaches like HyperSafe [226] and SPROBES/TZ-RKP [15, 77]
mark pages that contain the page table structures as read-only to prevent malicious
modifications. However, when the operating system needs to update the page tables
these defenses mark the corresponding pages temporarily writable which opens a time
window in which the attacker can concurrently modify page-table entries on the same
page. PaX/Grsecurity [202] provide a patch with various techniques to further harden
the Linux kernel. Amongst others the patch aims to prevent information leaks, and
randomizes important data structures at compile time. However, it does not deploy any
techniques to explicitly prevent data-only attacks against the page table.
Windows 10 [108] recently released an update to randomize the base address, which
is used to compute the address of page table entries. However, the randomized base
address is not protected against information-disclosure attacks, which is why the attack
we implemented in Section 4.4.5.2 will also work against Windows 10. In contrast,
PT-Rand mitigates information-disclosure attacks by keeping the randomization secret
in a register, which cannot be accessed by the attacker, and by obfuscating all pointers
to the page tables.
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In this chapter, we discussed how randomization-based defenses can be leveraged
to efficiently mitigate code-reuse attacks. With Readactor we tackle the previously
identified challenge of memory-disclosure attacks against randomization-based
defenses. In particular, we leverage a very small hypervisor to enable memory
virtualization, which allows us to enforce execute-only access for memory on desktop
computers. We further modify the compiler to separate code and data, and to apply
code randomization. This allows us to map the code section as execute-only, and
hence, prevents direct disclosure attacks. To mitigate indirect disclosure attacks we
introduce code-pointer hiding, which builds a layer of indirection and prevents the
attacker from learning valid code addresses. Next, we presented techniques that allow
one to implement execute-only memory for embedded devices that often do not feature
hardware virtualization. Specifically, we split the address space into a code and data
region, and instrument all read instructions of the binary to ensure that the address
points to the data region. Finally, we presented the design of a linker wrapper that
embeds compile-time information about the functions, as well as randomization code, to
create self-randomizing binaries. Contrary to previous solutions, ours is highly practical,
and is deployed in Tor Browser.
We then turned our attention to leveraging randomization to mitigate data-only
attacks against the page table. Since the page tables are used to configure memory-access
permissions, the attacker can easily compromise the system and bypass any other
mitigations if she can tamper with the page tables. Previous work protects the page
tables using an integrity-based approach. However, this is often comes with hardware
dependencies, or has a negative impact on the overall performance of the system.
Our randomization-based approach relocates the page tables into a large and unused
memory region that provides enough entropy to prevent guessing attacks. Further, we
protect all pointers to the page tables to ensure that the attacker cannot leverage an
information-disclosure vulnerability to recover the randomization secret.
To conclude, randomization-based defenses can offer efficient and effective protection
from memory-corruption-based attacks if combined with some form of leakage
resilience.

5
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
Memory-corruption vulnerabilities pose a serious threat to modern computer security
because they allow the attacker to undermine other security primitives like access
control, integrity checks, or secrecy. For example, the Heartbleed bug [133] is a simple
memory-disclosure vulnerability, yet, it enabled attackers to leak the private SSL key
of servers, or data of other users. Note that this bug only allowed to disclose memory.
In other cases, memory-corruption vulnerabilities enable the attacker to corrupt data,
which often leads to a complete take-over of the vulnerable system.
The main goal of this dissertation is to explore the limitations of state-of-the-art
defenses against code-reuse attacks. Next, we leverage our new insights to design new
defenses. We summarize the results of this dissertation in Section 5.1 and elaborate on
future research directions in Section 5.2.
5.1 dissertation summary
In Chapter 3, we presented memory-corruption attacks against code-randomization and
Control-flow Integrity (CFI). Our attacks against randomization-based defenses show
that the attacker can bypass any randomization scheme if she can repeatedly exercise
a direct memory-disclosure vulnerability to read the content of the code section [196].
In addition, we show that preventing the attacker from reading the code section is not
sufficient to harden code-randomization against disclosure attacks. By combining offline
knowledge about the applied code randomization with run-time knowledge in form of
leaked code pointers, the attacker can bypass code randomization [61]. While CFI is
immune against disclosure attacks, it comes with its own weaknesses. Specifically, we
show that the enforced policy of coarse-grained CFI gives the attacker enough freedom
to conduct Turing-complete code-reuse attacks by leveraging virtual-function calls [186].
Furthermore, we find that the compiler can introduce security vulnerabilities in an effort
to optimize the code for fine-grained CFI checks [45], which enables the attacker to
bypass it as well. Finally, we demonstrate how the attacker can leverage data-only attacks
to bypass code randomization and CFI by corrupting the intermediate representation of
just-in-time compilers [72].
In Chapter 4 we turn our attention to mitigating code-reuse attacks. Therefore,
we first evaluate eXecute-only Memory (XoM) as a potential primitive to mitigate
information-disclosure attacks [51]. Our results show that XoM is suitable for the
prevention of direct-disclosure attacks by setting the access permissions for the code
section to execute only. Then, we leverage XoM to implement code-pointer hiding, which
is an indirection for code pointers that effectively prevents indirect memory-disclosure
attacks. Our approach leverages a small hypervisor to enable XoM because the
regular memory permissions model does not distinguish between the read and execute
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permission. Nowadays, x86-based Central Processing Units (CPUs) commonly support
hardware virtualization, however, most embedded systems do not. Thus, we present
a compiler-based approach that is tailored towards Reduced Instruction Set Computer
(RISC)-based CPUs to implement XoM in software [27]. We also introduce the design of a
fine-grained load-time randomization scheme that is reliable and adopted by real-world
software [46]. We conclude our defense chapter with a novel defense against data-only
attacks that target the page tables [62].
5.2 future research directions
The problem of memory-corruption attacks has been known for over three decades,
and is unlikely to be solved in the near future. The primary cause is that C and C++ are
versatile languages, a large part of legacy software is based upon them, and it takes time
to train programmers in alternative languages. Based on this assumption we believe that
future research will focus on tolerating memory-corruption attacks.
Attack Surface Reduction.
The success of modern memory-corruption attacks often depends on degree the attacker
can interact with the vulnerable application. For example, to perform the initial memory
corruption the attacker often needs to bring the memory allocator into a certain state,
e.g., by means of the heap feng shui technique [201]. Other times, the attacker needs
to perform analysis during run time to adjust the payload [22, 61, 196], or exploit race
conditions by spawning multiple threads [45]. Or, the attacker relies on a large code
base to bypass control-flow integrity without violating the enforced policy [69, 186].
To summarize, many attacks rely on reusing the rich functionality of the vulnerable
application. However, by isolating individual components, applications can reduce the
functionality that is exposed to the attacker.
Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [2, 132, 187] provides isolation to execute untrusted
code. Browsers, like Chrome and Edge, utilize a two-process approach. The first
process runs with low privileges and executes the code base which is responsible for
parsing webpages, executing JavaScript, and is likely to contain vulnerabilities. The
second process runs with normal privileges and provides an interface for the first
process to perform operations which require higher privileges, like reading files. As
a consequence, the attacker, who is likely to compromise the first process, has to find
another vulnerability in the second process, which has a much smaller attack surface.
However, both approaches are very coarse-grained.
PartitionAlloc [209] (heap) and SafeStack [118] (stack) implement a more fine-grained
approach by providing separated memory regions for allocating buffer objects
and other objects because code that accesses the buffer is more likely to contain
memory-corruption vulnerabilities. Hence, a buffer overflow cannot be exploited to
overwrite pointers, which are present in other objects. Recently, Edge outsourced the
native code generation for JavaScript to another process [141], thereby isolating the
just-in-time compiler, which is likely to contain vulnerabilities due to its large code
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base, from the part of the browser which is exposed to the attacker. Further, it enables
Edge to enforce real Writable⊕Executable memory. Note that other browsers do not fully
utilize Writable⊕Executable memory but either keep the just-in-time code memory as
read-write-executable or re-map this memory from executable to writable and the other
way around.
Isolating individual components greatly reduces the attack surface of an application.
However, generic approaches are too coarse-grained to prevent the attacker from fully
compromising the isolated component, and fine-grained approaches often require a
manual redesign of the application. Therefore, we believe that designing primitives
that enable fine-grained in-process isolation and (semi-) automatic approaches to isolate
components of an application are important future research directions.
Formalization of Memory-corruption Attacks.
One limitation of current security research is the absence of a complete formal model for
modern systems, which would allow one to verify the security properties of proposed
mitigations. As a result, current code-reuse attack mitigations only defeat existing
attacks but are commonly broken by previously unknown attacks. For example, Abadi
et al. [6] provide a formal proof of the security properties of control-flow integrity.
However, as we described in Section 3.2.3.2, the attacker can overwrite a return address,
which is stored in user-mode memory, but used by the kernel to return from a system
call. Similarly, Kuznetsov et al. [118] proof their security properties, however, the
model used does not accurately represent the real system, and hence, one of their
implementations was bypassed [68].
Building a complete formal model for modern systems is very challenging due to
their high complexity. Nevertheless, we believe that the insights gained from the existing
body of research will greatly support the creation of a formal model for systems that
will allow a formal proof the security properties of code-reuse attack mitigations. As
stated above, reducing the attack surface of application can be utilized to simplify such
a formal model, and allow for further research.
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